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The World Economic Forum is pleased to issue this
report, which seeks to explore how “Blended Value
Investing” (BVI), as distinct from either market-rate
investing or philanthropy, can leverage economic
performance while also creating social and/or
environmental value within a single, unified
approach to investing and capital finance. 
BVI is, by definition, a market-based approach to
addressing many of the challenges facing the
global community. BVI seeks to engage capital in
creating sustainable, long-term solutions to those
same challenges. Such strategies are defined as
“blended value” and not “double bottom line” or
philanthropy since they view the value being
created as neither solely economic nor solely
social, but a blend of both. This approach
recognizes that economic value can create various
forms of social and environmental impact and
cannot be viewed as a separate component of the
value proposition found within any given
investment. Therefore, BVI seeks not a double
bottom line, but rather a single bottom line with
multiple value components.
In September 2004, the World Economic Forum’s
Global Foundation Leaders Advisory Group hosted
an international meeting of investors, foundation
executives and representatives from non-
governmental organizations to discuss the state of
blended value investing and explore what barriers
exist to expanding the use of private capital for
social gain. Private Investment for Social Goals:
Building the Blended Value Capital Market was
published by the Forum in 2005 and presents the
key discussion points and findings from that
session.
At the conclusion of the 2004 meeting and follow-
up discussions during the World Economic forum's
Annual Meeting in Davos in 2005, session
participants requested that a research project be
undertaken during 2005 that could explore in
greater detail how a variety of capital finance
strategies are being applied to the area of blended
value investing. Furthermore, since the arena of
microfinance is viewed by many as an excellent
example of how economic and social value may be
leveraged through investment innovations, participants
asked that this research also summarize current
practices in microfinance that might inform investing
activities in other related areas. 
In fact, many of the examples presented in this
document are taken from the field of microfinance and
could be applied more broadly to other areas of
interest, whether housing, local building projects,
small/medium enterprise development, healthcare,
education or beyond.
We wish to thank Cisco Systems Foundation for
making this project possible, Jed Emerson of the
Generation Foundation and Joshua Spitzer for drafting
and researching the report, and the members of the
Forum’s Global Foundation Leaders Advisory Group for
providing comments and overall guidance. We also
wish to thank Adele Simmons, Senior Adviser to the
Forum, and Sam Mbugua, Global Leadership Fellow,
for their support of the project.
The World Economic Forum’s efforts at catalyzing and
sustaining the important debate around Blended Value
Investing have received support from many quarters. In
gratefully acknowledging these contributions, both
financial and intellectual, we also look forward to the
positive evolution of this discussion and to the
expanded application of creative investment
approaches that can accelerate progress on pressing
social and environmental problems.
Richard Samans
Managing Director
March 2006
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Organization and Conclusions
This paper is organized into three inter-related
sections, each with case studies presenting details
on the process of innovation within the blended
value investing arena.
The first section explores innovation in debt
finance. It has two subsections. The first
subsection presents the process by which loans to
microfinance institutions are “packaged” as financial
securities that offer the opportunity to expand the
capital available to such funds. These
developments serve as examples of what could
take place in other emerging areas of investing. The
second subsection explores another novel
application of debt finance applied in the realm of
community investing, which further investigates
how blended value investing strategies can be
made accessible to individual investors. 
The second section presents cases in which credit
guarantees and enhancements have been used
to manage the risk (perceived and real) associated
with various blended value investment
opportunities. In several cases, such
enhancements helped other investors price risk
more accurately so that ultimately capital could flow
more freely to those investments. 
The third section presents private equity
investing innovations, which provide risk capital
to new funds and enterprises that generate both
social/environmental impacts as well as economic
value and returns.
Those attending the discussions at the Forum in
Geneva asked that several of the anecdotal stories
of participants around the table be brought
together and formally presented to others
interested in understanding more about:
• How these deals evolved;
• The challenges of structuring them;
• The possible prospects such investing practices
hold for broader application by others interested
in creating innovations in capital finance.
This paper is offered not as a fully comprehensive
survey of the emerging area of blended value
investing, but rather as a set of examples of how
such investing practices are being developed and
applied around the world. The paper’s intent is not
to provide a single answer for all investment
challenges, but to demonstrate how groups of
investors are mobilizing capital on new terms to
meet the challenges of emerging investment
opportunities, as well as the demands of investors
seeking out new asset classes in which to place
their capital. 
While the paper presents part of the history of
groups and individuals who have worked to
advance these practices, it is does not present a
history of the field or a comprehensive overview
and should not be taken as such. Other
documents by CGAP, ACCION and related groups
should be sought out by readers looking to
understand how, specifically in the area of
microfinance, various instruments and approaches
have evolved.
This paper presents innovations in capital finance
that promise to bridge market-rate interests with
strategic opportunities to create blended value that
benefits shareholder and stakeholder alike. The
following examples speak to an evolving capital
convergence wherein mainstream capital markets
and investing will increasingly become drivers of
new solutions to historic problems. Blended value
investing funds and instruments offer financing
strategies from a set of tools that go beyond
traditional philanthropy or market rate investing and
which complement the vision we all share of a
world with greater equity and opportunity for its
members.
This paper also identifies several areas of research
that would help advance the field of blended value
investing. In summary, those projects include the
following:
• An in-depth survey of blended value investors
that would ultimately segment the market and
identify strategic investor groups and categories;
• An inquiry into blended value portfolio theory to
understand how investors have applied modern
portfolio theory concepts and analytics to
building diversified blended value portfolios;
• A deeper inquiry into applying lessons learned
from microfinance to other blended value
systems.
Finally, the paper concludes with words of caution
that suggest a prudent approach to developing
blended value capital markets. It offers a critique of
the state of the markets, presents a strategic vision
for the blended value capital markets, and
suggests specific steps that participants might take
in moving toward the ideal.
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Fortunately, a growing number of microfinance
institutions possess the business fundamentals
necessary to access those capital markets. Before
commercial capital may fund the microfinance
industry on a large scale, capital markets will
require investment products capable of meeting the
needs of both microborrowers and investors of
capital. This section examines several very
promising early examples of these products, which
may represent the path toward a suite of
investment instruments offering truly blended
returns that maximize social and financial value.
The Microfinance Success Story
In the thirty years since the Grameen Bank,
ACCION and other MFIs showed the rest of the
world that small loans to poor women could
dramatically improve the lots of families and
communities, microfinance has become a widely
celebrated model of economic development. Many
sources document the growth of the sector over
recent decades, and this paper’s Appendix A
presents a brief review of key microfinance
innovations. Those innovations have made
microfinance securitization possible. Much of this
section explores how securitization has opened
new options to capitalize on and invest in both
financial performance and social impact.
Among many blended value investing strategies,
microfinance is one of the most mature. Its
sustainability and replication have introduced
innovations that are not only enhancing the
fundamental value proposition of microfinance, but
now appear applicable to other blended value
investment programmes. These innovations
continue to bring microfinance to new levels of
large-scale efficacy, and may eventually find
application in other areas in order to bring those
areas to a similarly substantial scale. Since other
publications have explored the current state of the
field, this section will not examine the overall state
of the microfinance industry.1 Though the section
will discuss several innovations in the sector, more
complete explorations of those innovations can be
found in other sources cited later in this text. 
The following narrative examines the structure and
actors in several microfinance securitization deals,
delving more deeply into one particular deal to offer
lessons learned and help identify emerging issues
associated with successfully securitizing debt to
MFIs. 
Introduction to Microfinance Debt
Offerings and Securitization
Many blended value investors’ primary goal is to
achieve real social returns together with financial
returns that are not concessionary to the risk-
adjusted rate investors could otherwise attain.
Investments meeting that goal would be fairly easy
to trade and have investment terms that are
understood by the average investor. Such
characteristics would generate significant demand
from all sorts of investors—especially those who do
not now take account of how they might create
blended value in making capital investment
decisions. For these reasons, the practice of
securitizing loans to microfinance institutions (MFIs)
is a very promising prospect for many involved in
BVI. 
Built on hundreds of millions of dollars in donated
and concessionary-rate (which is to say, below
market rate) capital, microfinance has proven to be
a sound and powerful investment in blended value.
However, despite wide-spread growth in
microfinance around the world, the industry has
now reached a critical point: many funds have lent
all or most of their available capital; they must
either sell some of the debt on their balance sheets
or otherwise secure substantial new funds in order
to expand their lending activity. 
Those investing philanthropic capital for social
returns have supported microfinance institutions in
becoming viable, in proving that poor people make
good customers for financial services, and in
reaching a remarkable scale. Nevertheless, the size
of the microfinance industry has the potential to be
dramatically larger, and philanthropic capital alone
will not be sufficient to achieve this potential. To
extend microfinance to a substantial majority of the
world’s poor, a new kind of capital must enter this
market, and that capital will most likely come from
the mainstream capital markets, where the majority
of funds are currently invested without regard for
social or environmental returns.
Innovations in Debt Financing:
Advances in the Fields of Microfinance and Community Development
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Direct Lending to MFIs 
Investors with sufficient scale and knowledge of the
sector may loan funds directly to MFIs (often on a
concessionary rate basis, and foundations can
structure such capital as programme-related
investments). Nevertheless, there are limits to the
effectiveness of these lending practices. Such
lending is difficult to scale and offers only limited
access to mainstream capital markets. Each loan
requires a separate due diligence process, which,
in the case of direct lending, is not leveraged over
many investors. Diversification is very difficult and
requires considerable investment scale (i.e., the
investor must initiate several direct loans to various
MFIs, each requiring a separate due diligence and
investment process). Furthermore, once such loans
have been made, they cannot easily be transferred
or exited. Accordingly, such lending practices tend
to be limited to the few institutions that have deep
knowledge of microfinance and have made an
investment commitment to the sector. In truth, this
strategy is not likely to attract mainstream capital
flows.
In response to the various limitations of direct
lending practices, a number of actors in the MFI
arena have begun exploring how intermediaries
could work to aggregate loans to MFIs and provide
access to more mainstream capital by creating
investment vehicles with greater market appeal and
availability to mainstream investors. Such products
have a variety of features:
• They can offer investors a measure of broader
diversification; 
• They can leverage due diligence and similar costs
across multiple investors; 
• They offer potential investors a standardized
product with attributes that are familiar to them; 
• They have the potential to be transferred. 
Driving the increasing scale of microfinance
(engendered by replication, the growth of MFI
networks and improved transparency) is a
tremendous demand for microloans—and an
equally large attendant need for capital. Jennifer
Meehan, Director of Capital Markets, Grameen
Foundation USA, explains:
Some MFIs have scaled dramatically to achieve
greater coverage. For example, Meehan reports
that the number of Grameen Bank clients grew at
an annual rate of 33.7% between 1983 and 1996,
while the bank’s portfolio grew at an exponential
rate while maintaining its high quality. Grameen
Foundation USA estimates that ten percent of a
potential US$ 300 billion microfinance market has
been penetrated. In order to approach that
potential or even to grow appreciably, Meehan
indicates that philanthropy alone will remain
inadequate: 
Individuals and institutions wishing to finance
microlending can provide capital to MFIs directly, or
investors can syndicate their capital, forming funds
or other investment instruments that can share risk
and invest in multiple MFIs. Whether they are
investing directly or through funding intermediaries,
microfinance investors can deploy their funds in
four ways:
1. Donate to an MFI (and any number of reputable
programmes for doing so can be found with
little effort); 
2. Leverage assets through loan guarantees to
MFIs (an investment vehicle addressed in
Section Two of this paper); 
3. Purchase MFI equity; 
4. Loan money directly to MFIs. 
Thus far debt investments have shown
considerable promise and, after donated funds,
make up the bulk of capital that has flowed to
MFIs. The following section describes a range of
approaches to debt investments in MFIs.
Access to Capital Markets
“Around the globe there are 2.8 billion people, approximately 560 million
families, who are considered poor, living on less than US$ 2 per day in
purchasing power parity (PPP). Of those, 1.2 billion people live in abject
poverty; the ‘poorest’ surviving on less than US$ 1 per day PPP. Despite
recognition of microfinance as a proven poverty reduction tool, fewer than 18%
of the world’s poorest households have access to financial services.” 2
“Despite the important and catalytic role played by the
international donor community in promoting
microfinance, it has invested only US$ 1.2 billion in the
sector and allocates an incremental US$ 800 million
to US$ 1 billion per year in new financing." 3
Microfinance Bonds and Securitization:
A Primer
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This paper assumes that the reader comes to this
discussion with an introductory level of knowledge
regarding this area of capital finance. The following
section is offered to ensure a shared baseline of
familiarity with the concepts in order to help the
reader make the most of the examples that follow.
Securitization Defined
Securitization in general refers to pooling many
financial assets and “packaging” them as new
securities that can be purchased and sold by
investors unable to invest in each fund individually.
Most commonly, loans are aggregated into notes,
the cash flows of which are provided by many
underlying loans. Housing mortgages are
commonly so packaged by investment banks. The
practice has been extended to all sorts of debt
instruments, including credit card receivables and
car loans. 
The following example of mortgage-backed bonds
illustrates the securitization process.
The microfinance capital markets are approaching
securitization as a means of bringing more funds to
microentrepreneurs. Most of these investment
structures cannot, strictly speaking, be considered
securitizations, though they have many features of
that type of asset. In most of these examples,
securities are sold to investors and the proceeds
lent to MFIs. Cash flows to bond investors are
derived from payments being made on existing and
new microloans to MFI clients. Unlike the
mortgage-backed securities described in the
example above, most MFI bond offerings have not
been linked directly to specific, individual loans.
Instead, they are structured as obligations of the
MFIs, which, in turn, are supported by the
individual loans made to microentrepreneurs. As
such, the microloans stay on each MFI balance
sheet as loans receivable, and the MFIs also
undertake financial obligations that they must
record on their balance sheets as notes payable. A
securitization (in the technical sense) would enable
the MFI to bring in cash without increasing its own
liabilities (though in doing so, the MFI would need
to sell the loans receivable). Increasing cash
without increasing liabilities, as is the case with
securitization, allows the MFIs to loan more money
without raising additional equity to meet capital
adequacy requirements.
Loan Tranches
Many loans are structured in multiple layers,
referred to as “tranches.” Each tranche is a set of
securities that has a particular risk-reward profile
and is then marketed to investors seeking that type
of investment opportunity. The most senior
tranches are the safest, that is, they are first in line
to receive cash flows from the underlying loans.
Consequently, they bear a lower interest rate than
the more junior tranches. The junior tranches’ cash
flows are only passed through to investors when
the senior tranches have been paid. Any defaults in
the underlying loan portfolio are assigned to the
most junior tranches first. These junior securities
carry a higher interest rate in exchange for
assuming greater risk exposure associated with this
characteristic. 
The ability to offer multiple tranches has been an
essential feature of the more sophisticated
microfinance debt issues to date. Those structures
allow investors to purchase securities with the risk-
reward profiles best suited to meeting their
investment needs. In the existing deals, the very
most junior tranche is called an equity tranche. It is
termed such because the cash flows are so
unpredictable that they cannot be assigned a
coupon rate (namely, a fixed rate of return an
investor receives when participating in any given
round). The equity investors have a residual claim
on cash flows after all of the other investors have
been satisfied. Such investors will not know the
return on their investment (if any) until all of the
other tranches have matured: they are assigned the
first (and potentially all) losses in the investment
portfolio. 
Blended Value Investing: Capital Opportunities for Social and Environmental Impact
A bank will initiate a large number of home
loans, lending the bank’s money to home
buyers. The bank can then package the debt
into new bonds, and the coupon and principal
payments associated with these bonds are
passed from the home owners through an
intermediary and eventually to the purchasers
of the security. Typically, banks will sell those
bonds (and the homeowners’ associated cash
flows) to third parties that can manage the
various cash flows and can distribute or resell
the bonds. Doing so effectively converts a
bank’s loans receivable into cash immediately,
and the bank can then loan that cash to new
home buyers, starting the cycle anew. 
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2. Investment Due Diligence: The fund must
examine the likely MFI investments, interviewing
management, observing operations, speaking
with clients, and closely scrutinizing financial
records.
3. Investment Monitoring: After the loans have
been disbursed, the managers observe the
MFIs for any signs of distress or other trouble.
Should such difficulties arise, the fund
managers are likely to provide technical
assistance and counselling, helping the MFI get
back on track, or, when necessary, working out
of the investments.
The sponsors and fund managers may serve other
roles, depending on the specific situation.
Investment Advisers and Professional Service
Providers: An investment adviser may bring critical
skills of structuring and placing investment
instruments. The advisers’ structuring expertise
makes possible the packaging of underlying loans
in ways that are most beneficial to both the
borrowers and the ultimate investors in the
securities. Usually, the adviser that structures the
security also “places” the final product, actually
selling the notes to investors. The investment
advisers typically work with legal and accounting
professionals to structure and place the securities.
Investors: In the case of the examples reviewed
for this document, investors have included high net
worth individuals, foundations (investing a portion of
their corpus in some cases and in others using
programme-related investments to qualify these
investments as portions of their philanthropic
payout), international development banks, socially
responsible investment funds, and others. Some
organizations are working to make investment
products available to an increasing number of
smaller investors. Investors’ motivations and
appetites for risk vary widely, making the
investment advisers’ placement expertise
particularly important (as the advisers must have
keen insight into the various investors in order to
package and sell the bonds appropriately). Most of
the investors in these offerings do share an interest
in pursuing multiple returns on their capital, returns
that are both financial and social. Further
segmenting these investors, understanding their
risk-reward propensities, and investigating their
other concerns vis-à-vis blended value investing
would be a fruitful subject for future study. 
Microfinance Bonds and Securitization:
Key Parties
MFIs and Their Clients: At the most fundamental
level of a debt offering deal is the microfinance
institution that makes loans to extremely low-
income entrepreneurs. These microborrowers make
interest and principal payments to the MFI, which
reinvests those cash flows or passes them on to
investors.
MFI Networks: Numerous but certainly not all
MFIs are affiliated with one of many highly reputable
MFI networks such as CASHPOR, ACCION and
others. These networks are key components to
achieving underlying loan diversification. Personnel
in those networks also offer deep expertise in the
realm of microfinance: they may be enlisted to
perform some of the due diligence and monitoring
of the underlying portfolio, and they may also assist
in providing oversight, ensuring that the borrowers
(in this case the MFIs) maintain their covenants and
other commitments associated with the
securitization deal. 
Sponsors and Fund Managers: The securities
are typically managed by a corporate entity that
disburses funds to the MFIs, collects the cash
flows from the MFIs, and coordinates all of the
other actors. The fund managers are responsible
for screening, due diligence, and monitoring of MFI
investments (either performing it themselves or
contracting with other organizations to provide it).
Fund managers may work closely with partners
(MFI networks for example) in dispatching their
responsibilities, depending on the nature of their
experience. They manage the administrative and
reporting functions associated with note offerings.
In the first of several deals, the sponsors have
purchased all or part of the equity tranches. 
The fund managers and sponsors perform at least
three very significant tasks, each of which requires
deep knowledge of the microfinance sector. 
1. Screening MFIs: The fund must determine the
profile of potential MFI investments that will be
eligible for the funds. Often the screens include
parameters of the socioeconomic profile of
microborrowers and geographic coverage of the
MFI. The screens also include financial metrics
and thresholds that determine a minimum
quality potential investment.
Microfinance Bonds and Securitization:
A Primer
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First Case Study: ACCION International’s
Domestic Market Bond Offerings 4
The earliest examples of MFI bond issues have
transpired in their own domestic capital markets.
Elisabeth Rhyne, Senior Vice-President of ACCION
International, reports that in many cases, ACCION
particularly favours domestic financing deals over
international transactions (which are described at
length later in this document). She notes that
domestic transactions offer the following benefits:
“Foreign exchange risk is not an issue; sovereign
risk does not limit the bond rating; the magnitude
of the funds raised is appropriate [to local MFI
needs]; local investors are looking for good
placements." Such MFI bond issues allow those
investors to deploy their capital in ways that also
generate local social value. “Moreover,” she
continues, “there is a contribution to deepening
local financial markets when MFIs seek local
financing.”
Two of ACCION’s affiliates, Mibanco in Peru and
Compartamos in Mexico, conducted notable
domestic debt offerings. 
Mibanco 5
After financing microentrepreneurs for over a
decade as an NGO, Mibanco transformed itself into
a commercial microfinance bank in 1998. By 2001,
Mibanco had established links with commercial
financial institutions that helped finance Mibanco’s
lending activities through certificates of deposit and
lines of credit, which amounted to relatively
expensive and short-term financing that was unduly
concentrated in a small number of financing
institutions. Buoyed by an improving capital market
environment in 2001, Mibanco’s directors began to
explore financing the bank’s operations through a
corporate bond offering. Selling such a security had
the potential to reduce the cost and concentration
risks in Mibanco’s existing financing vehicles.
Peruvian securities regulators approved Mibanco's
demand to issue debt offerings up to 50 million
soles (approximately US$ 15 million) and agreed to
consider further offerings if the first 50 million soles
in debt were successfully placed. In addition to
domestic securities experts, Mibanco hired
Peruvian Citigroup affiliates to structure and place
the offering. The investment advisers began
marketing an initial 20 million sole issue with a two-
year maturity and 12% yield. USAID contributed a
guarantee of up to 50% of the principle (thus
investors would be protected against losses of up
to 50% of their initial investments), which helped
the issue earn an AA rating by two local credit
rating agencies. 
Mibanco ultimately offered the bonds through a
Dutch auction, which was ten percent
oversubscribed. Though investor interest (much of
it on behalf of local pension funds) was healthy, the
notes’ yield was relatively high, 690 basis points
above the domestic inter-bank lending rate.6 The
issuers posited that the interest rate premium
would shrink as the capital markets became more
comfortable with the concept of an MFI issuing
corporate paper. 
Indeed, their conjecture was confirmed when
Mibanco issued a second 20 million sole tranche in
September 2003. Structured similarly to the first
issue, the second relied on a 50% guarantee from
a regional commercial bank. These 27-month
maturity notes yielded 5.75%, reflecting a 225
basis point drop in its interest premium. (Note that
in the intervening months between the first and
second issues, the inter-bank lending rate fell from
5.1% to 3.5%.) Furthermore, the investor base
became more diversified, including Peruvian banks,
insurance companies and other entities. ACCION
and Mibanco estimate that Mibanco’s net cost for
the second issue totalled 7.01% after factoring in
the costs of the credit guarantee and other banking
and legal fees.
Ultimately, in October 2003, one month after the
second issue and based on the favourable
reception of its previous issues, Mibanco offered a
third issue. This 10 million sole issue had no third-
party guarantees to enhance the issuer’s credit;
nevertheless, it received ratings of AA- and A+ from
local credit rating agencies. Again, the notes
yielded 5.75%, this time with an 18-month maturity,
but this issue was oversubscribed by 70%.
Notably, Mibanco’s effective cost including fees
was 6.1%; the lower cost reflected, in part, the
obviated need to purchase a credit enhancement. 
ACCION reports that the three note issues helped
Mibanco match the maturity of its assets and
liabilities and reduce its average cost of funds by
more than 50 basis points. At the same time,
Mibanco also reduced the average interest rates it
charged its clients by more than 700 basis points,
thanks in part to its new access to lower-cost
funds.
Microfinance Bonds and Securitization:
A Primer
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Financiera Compartamos
Like Mibanco, Financiera Compartamos is an
ACCION International-affiliated MFI that began as
an NGO. Operating in rural and urban Mexico,
Compartamos converted to a regulated financial
intermediary in 2000. Under Mexican regulations,
Compartamos could raise funds through inter-bank
borrowing and through the capital markets, though
it was not permitted to take deposits from the
public. Between 2000 and 2002, Compartamos
had been capitalized with equity and short-term
lines of credit, but by mid-2002 the bank’s 100%
annual growth rate had outstripped the capital
supplied by those sources. The terms on which
Compartamos accessed short-term credit required
the institution to maintain a significant reserve that
effectively increased the cost of borrowing and
limited the MFI’s ability to serve its customers. 
Compartamos turned to the capital markets to
provide the funds that could support its growth.
After obtaining regulatory approval, Compartamos
contracted a local investment bank to structure the
100 million peso (approximately US$ 10 million),
three-year issue that included no third-party credit
enhancements. A Mexican-A1 rating from a local
branch of Standard and Poor's allowed
Compartamos to fix the yield at 250 basis points
above the Mexican short-term treasury bills at the
time of issuance. Though the yield was 13.1%, it
was still 450 basis points below Compartamos’s
prior cost of borrowed funds. A local brokerage
(affiliated with Banamex-Citigroup) privately placed
the notes with local institutions and investors. 
Given the success of its first offering, later in 2002
and then again in 2003 Compartamos offered two
more 50 million peso issues (with a longer maturity
but similar coupons to the first offering). Between
the two private offerings, Compartamos was able
to fully finance 35% of its lending portfolios with
these lower cost liabilities. 
By 2004, Compartamos’s growth had continued,
and it looked again to the capital markets. After the
success of the three privately placed issues, the
MFI opted to offer securities to the public market.
Public offerings are often synonymous with higher-
risk, less liquid securities due to fewer investors
and higher placement costs. Offering notes to the
public would allow Compartamos to reach many
more investors, though many of them would need
additional assurance that indeed this new type of
security bore predictable (and relatively low) risk
characteristics. Accordingly, Compartamos
arranged a partial guarantee on the bond’s principle
from the International Finance Committee (IFC). 
The five-year, 500 million peso offering was
structured in a series of tranches. The 190 million
peso senior tranche enjoyed the benefit of a 34%
guarantee from the IFC, which, in turn, helped
garner an AA rating from local Standard and Poor's
and Fitch-affiliated credit rating agencies. 
Examples Outside of Latin America: Approaching
Securitization
In 2004, Indian MFI SHARE Microfin Limited (SML,
also an NGO that had converted to a regulated
financial institution) and ICICI, one of India’s largest
mainstream banks, initiated a transaction wherein
the commercial bank purchased 25% of SML’s loan
portfolio for US$ 4.3 million. Through the
transaction, SML was able to borrow funds at
approximately 8.75% (versus the 12-13% that it
had previously paid to access commercial
financing). The transaction was facilitated by a cash
deposit (made by other partners, including the
Grameen Foundation) that functions as a first loss
provision. ICICI later resold the loan portfolio to
another Indian bank.7
Though this transaction did not “productize” the
loan portfolio to the extent that the commercial
mortgage-backed securities productize their
underlying securities, it is a notable and rare
example of a secondary market transaction for MFI
debt. The SML transaction also differs from the
Mibanco and Compartamos note issues in that the
deal packaged and sold existing loans, whereas
the ACCION affiliates sold securities to initiate new
loans. All of these transactions depend on the
fundamental soundness of microentrepreneurs’
ability to be good financial customers who can
generate financial value with small loans and can
assiduously honour their loan commitments. From
the perspective of an investor buying the securities
issued by these MFIs, an investment in the
Mibanco and Compartamos notes are first
investments in the MFIs themselves. They will only
meet their financial obligations if the MFIs fulfil all
aspects of their business—from identifying
customers to initiating business to administering
loans—efficiently and competently (and, of course,
through it all, the customers must pay their loans).
The investors in the SML portfolio purchased loans
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that already had established track records, and so
the success of that portfolio would have little to do
with SML’s ongoing lending and other business
practices (though SML remained the collecting
agent for the loan portfolio). 
Barriers to Full Securitization
A number of obstacles currently make it difficult for
MFIs and their investment advisers to offer true
securitization deals. These securities require
considerable financial engineering and so such
deals must be of a sufficiently large scale before a
mainstream bank would devote its structuring and
advisory services to such a deal. Microloans also
require relatively expensive and active
administration, and the MFIs themselves have the
greatest expertise in this realm and in most cases
can perform that maintenance at the lowest cost.
Accordingly, it would be difficult for an MFI to sell its
loans and then have nothing to do with them
without third parties to continue administering
those loans. The SML-ICICI deal overcame this
obstacle by contracting SML to continue
administering the loans even after it had sold them
to ICICI. Finally, the maturity of the microloans
(often less then one year) can limit the maturity of
any securitized notes. 
None of these obstacles should prevent the
ultimate securitization of microloans, and those
challenges can be met with the sort of financial
engineering that mainstream investment banks
deploy in their regular business. As mainstream
investors become more comfortable with the
investment prospects of microentrepreneurs and as
the cost of administering microloans continues to
fall (through adoption of technology and sharing of
best practices), full microfinance securitization deals
will become reality.
An Introduction to International Debt Offerings
The examples above were confined to the
countries in which the MFIs operate: the
microentrepreneurs, MFIs, banks and investors
were all in the same countries. Structuring such
deals where the borrowers and lenders operate in
different currencies magnifies the complications,
particularly in that such international lending
introduces foreign exchange risk, along with
regulatory complications. Nevertheless,
Figure 1: BlueOrchard Microfinance Security I Capital Structure
Transaction Structure 
(Millions US$)
Source: BlueOrchard and Developing World Markets, BOMFS-I Investor Presentation
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international financial transactions have the
potential to open a still-larger pool of available
capital to microfinance and other blended-value-
creating systems. 
One of the largest and first international
securitization deals was completed by BlueOrchard
Finance (BOF), a Swiss microfinance consultancy.
In addition to offering BlueOrchard Microfinance
Securities (BOMFS), BOF manages the Dexia
Micro-Credit Fund and serves as a sub-adviser to
the ResponsAbility Global Microfinance Fund, both
of which work to link capital markets with MFIs.
The first and second closing of the BOMFS-I
securities in 2004 and 2005 respectively brought
the total capital raised to US$ 87 million. Structured
and privately placed with the assistance of
boutique investment adviser Developing World
Markets (DWM, discussed further below), the
securitization deal included five tranches, all with a
maturity date of 2011. The transaction structure is
detailed in figure 1. Notably, the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation (OPIC), an agency of the
US government, guaranteed the senior tranche of
the offering. The success of BOMFS-I has led both
BOF and DWM to consider future offerings of
similar securities.
Writing after the first closing (but before the second
closing) of BOMFS-I, Meehan reports:
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“There were a total of 66 total investors: 12 foundations, 15 MFI
practitioners/investors, 11 socially responsible investment (SRI)
managers, 3 SRI funds, 22 private investors, and 3 institutional
investors. … Equity investors …include BlueOrchard Finance
…Developing World Markets … .[Grameen Foundation USA],
Omidyar Network, and Skoll foundation.” 8
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Second Case Study: Global Partnerships’
International Debt Offering 9
The Global Partnerships Microfinance Fund 2005
was not the first international microfinance debt
offering, nor was it the largest or the highest profile,
but it is remarkable for a number of other reasons:
• First, Global Partnerships (GP) has made an effort
to extend the financial product to MFIs that
would not likely have had access to commercial
capital; 
• Second, the very recent issue facilitated by GP
demonstrates some of the trends toward a more
efficient, broader market for these sorts of deals;
• And finally, the issuers are already considering
another similar offering, which has thrown the
lessons learned into sharp relief as they move
forward. 
Introduction to Global Partnerships
Seattle business professional Bill Clapp and his wife
Paula founded Global Partnerships as a private
foundation in 1994 after they saw the
transformative power of microfinance in El Salvador.
Their organization set out to support microfinance
institutions in Central America, particularly in
Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala.
In particular, GP supports “innovative microcredit
programmes that incorporate components such as
education or healthcare, or programmes that are
working to solve challenges faced by the growing
microcredit industry."10 In addition to financial
support and technical expertise, GP has
inaugurated a policy initiative to make poverty
elimination a top American priority. 
GP’s programmes cover a range of issues and
initiatives, but all intend to remove the barriers that
prevent poor Central American families from
exercising their inherent entrepreneurial ambitions.
Beyond supporting microfinance-related
programmes, GP also advocates for policy change
and international dialogue that will enhance the
economic and political environment for
microfinance in Central America.
In over a decade of supporting its Central American
microfinance partners, Global Partnerships has
developed a distinct expertise in helping scale and
support growing MFIs and related programmes.
Over the course of this work and in its close
relationships with American donors, the
organization recognized that Central American
MFIs' need for additional capital (and their
remarkable ability to deploy it for social and
economic value creation) exceeded their donors’
capacity to provide it. They turned to the capital
markets to generate those funds. 
International debt offerings are the product of many
different partners, each bringing specialized skills.
Global Partnerships brought its deep knowledge of
Central American microfinance and the ability to get
capital in the hands of MFIs very quickly. While the
organization had close connections with donors
and other potential investors, it lacked expertise in
structuring investment products. Gary Mulhair,
Global Partnerships' managing partner, found that
expertise in the Developing World Markets (DWM),
a boutique investment advisory in Connecticut,
USA, and in Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, an
international law firm.
Developing World Markets
DWM was founded originally as an emerging
markets investment fund, a line of business that
later led to investments in initial public offerings in
developing markets. DWM partners Peter Johnson
and Judy Kirst-Kolkman found their entrée to
microfinance in 1999, when they invested some of
the profits from their successful investment funds
into a revolving loan fund for Pro Mujer, an
organization that establishes and supports Latin
American MFIs. What began as a philanthropic
venture became a business proposition as DWM
increasingly focused its attention on providing
professional financial services for MFIs. In the early
2000s, the partners began to conceive of a new
mission for DWM, one that would deploy their
extensive finance and investment expertise in the
microfinance field.
DWM’s first high-profile deal closed in 2004, when
it replaced a “white-shoe” investment bank in
structuring BlueOrchard Finance’s first international
microfinance debt offering. Though the
BlueOrchard deal totalled over US$ 87 million
(including the first and second closings), Johnson
indicates that such debt offerings are still too small
to appeal to large-scale investment banks.
Accordingly, such deals are ideal for boutique
investment advisories like DWM, which now
devotes the majority of its management attention to
these specialized financial services. 
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Johnson and his colleagues have learned to
communicate with fund managers like BlueOrchard
or Global Partnerships as well as potential investors.
In structuring these securities, they have become
experts in creating financial models of cash flows
from MFIs and understanding the risks associated
with those cash flows. DWM has learned the needs,
concerns and interests of its potential investors, who
include high net worth individuals and their private
wealth managers, foundations, socially responsible
investment funds, other institutional investors, and
international development banks—each with their
own needs, concerns and interests. Johnson and
Roger Frank, DWM managing director, suggest that it
is not easy to segment these investors whose
appetites for investment risk and reward and those
whose understanding of the microfinance sector vary
widely. The new dimensions of microfinance
securities and the awakening of the investment
community to them make DWM’s expertise all the
more valuable. 
Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP (Orrick)
As Mulhair planned to launch a securitization deal to
meet the demand he saw in Central America, he also
turned to international law firm Orrick, which had
provided legal advice for the BlueOrchard
Microfinance Securities. For Global Partnerships,
Orrick was instrumental in structuring the entity that
would manage the securitization fund. Without careful
planning, managing an investment fund would make
GP appear to have extremely high overhead on its
financial reports. Such a condition would not interfere
with GP’s legal and responsible management of the
funds; instead, it would make GP unappealing to
donors (the equivalent of dramatically reducing the
net margin percentage of a for-profit corporation). GP
could not afford to hamper its ability to raise
donations, which fund various microfinance projects
that are not appropriate for commercial financing.
Orrick’s solution for GP appears to be a replicable
model for organizing an American non-profit
microfinance fund management organization. 
In essence, Orrick and GP created a limited liability
corporation called Global Partnerships Microfinance
Fund 2005, LLC (GPMF) in which GP is the only
member. All activity and cash flows associated with
the securitization pass through the LLC. Specifically
how this corporate structure resolves GP’s financial
reporting concerns is beyond the scope of this paper,
but it also resolves some investors’ concerns. Mulhair
expressed that indeed it is important to create an
investment vehicle that is familiar for investors, and
the LLC serves that purpose. Whereas “investing”
in a non-profit may be a foreign or confusing
concept for some investors, the LLC is common to
many private investments. 
Screening Potential MFI Investments
Mulhair developed a distinct profile for potential MFI
investees. He focused primarily on MFIs growing at
20-40% per year and that would likely continue to
do so for several years. All of the funds under
consideration for participation in the offering had to
demonstrate that they were profitable on a
sustainable basis. For funds in this category,
growth comes from three sources: 
• They are making more loans in the communities
where they are operating; 
• They are making larger loans to established
customers;  
• They are expanding into new geographic
markets. 
The first and particularly the last means of growth
require the MFI to invest additional resources in
initiating those new loans. 
In order to be eligible for GPMF’s consideration, the
MFIs had to be sufficiently well run and have the
systems in place to scale with their growth in
lending. Finally (and related directly to the last
point), Mulhair only considered MFIs that had a
track record of rapidly deploying their capital. He
did not want his investors’ money sitting idle; he
wanted it working immediately for poor
entrepreneurs. 
This profile is remarkable in that it does not target
the lowest-risk, first-tier MFIs (which have better
access to capital than do the institutions GPMF
targeted). The profile likely increases risk to some
extent, as growth can hide problems. Nevertheless,
the exhaustive due diligence process, the loan
agreements’ covenants, and the post-investment
monitoring allow GPMF to understand and manage
the risk. Mulhair reports: 
“These MFI’s are the most rapidly growing providers of capital to the
poor, and they are doing it with sustainable business models. They
are the future leaders of the microfinance industry.”
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Structuring the Investment
Mulhair was highly engaged in creating a structure
for the GPMF investment that would satisfy both
the MFIs and the investors. Beginning in autumn
2004, he first went to potential MFI investees to
discover what borrowing and repayment structures
made the most sense for them. Eventually, Mulhair
tailored the fund to their particular needs as best he
could. 
First, Mulhair discovered that the MFIs were hungry
for capital. Many estimated that they had only
penetrated five to ten percent of their potential
markets, and the most established groups
indicated that they had only reached 20% of their
potential borrowers. He inquired into MFIs’
alternative sources of capital and discovered that
the target MFIs could afford—and would be
willing—to pay eight to twelve percent interest on
funds borrowed from GPMF. The MFIs also
expressed a desire for long-term loans that would
not require frequent renegotiation. MFIs growing at
rates of 20 to 30% per year found that shorter term
loans imposed a painful fundraising burden: not
only were the MFIs raising debt to fund expansion,
they had to raise funds to replace maturing debt.
Finally, the MFIs expressed that they wanted their
investors to become long-term partners with whom
they could establish trust and track records that
might be leveraged in future rounds of financing.
Accordingly, GPMF anticipates that future
funds will make additional investments in the
MFIs that received earlier loans.
After discovering what the MFIs needed,
Mulhair approached potential investors
suggested by DWM. He first identified their
common concerns, which included the level
of investment concentration in single country
or MFI, the duration of the notes, and the
levels of debt subordination available.
Understanding those general concerns,
Mulhair hosted a series of focus groups with
potential investors, testing various structures
until he arrived at the fund’s ultimate
structure. His research paid off in making the
issue fairly easy to place. Mulhair indicated
that it took only 45 days to place the entire
offering, which closed in September 2005. In
offering the securities, GPMF discovered a
greater-than-expected demand for the higher-
yield subordinated notes as well as that the
market might bear senior notes with a lower risk
premium—an important insight for possible future
offerings. 
Unlike the BlueOrchard securitization, GPMF’s
investment structure did not include the
participation of any government entities to lend the
issue their credibility. Thanks in part to other
pioneering securitization deals like BlueOrchard’s,
many potential investors had become sufficiently
comfortable with the investment structure that they
were willing to invest without having co-investing or
credit-enhancing agencies to signal the offering’s
safety. In early 2006, at least one other group was
preparing a securitization deal that will considerably
exceed GPMF in size and will do so with minimal
credit enhancements.11
Mulhair and GPMF deliberately kept this first fund
at a relatively manageable US$ 2,000,000. All of
the notes had a five-year maturity and a fixed yield
based on the four-year US Treasuries rate at the
time of issuance. 80% of the offering’s value, US$
1,600,000, was senior notes with a yield premium
of 1.5% over the applicable US Treasuries. Ten
percent of the offering, US$ 200,000, was
subordinated notes with a yield premium of 2.5%
over the US Treasuries. The remaining ten percent
of the offering was the equity tranche. GP (the non-
profit, not the fund management entity) contributed
the entire equity tranche, and in the process agreed
to accept first losses up to US$ 200,000. (See
figure 2 for a graphical representation of the fund’s
structure.)
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Figure 2: Global Partnerships Microfinance Fund 2005 Capital Structure
Fund Capitalization
Source: Global Partnerships and Developing World Markets,
Global Partnerships Microfinance Fund, 2005 Investor Presentation
* Not shown: cash build-up during life transaction
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Though the fund’s offering memorandum stipulated
that GPMF could take up to six months to disburse
the funds to MFIs, Mulhair reports that the funds
were disbursed within 60 days, thanks to GP’s
fluent knowledge of potential MFI investees gained
in part through a due diligence process that began
before GP even closed the fund. Though it is too
early for GPMF to have a proven track record,
Mulhair sees enough demand from both MFIs and
potential investors that he is already working on
structuring GP’s next fund. That fund, he says, will
be larger, and he aims to have it entirely disbursed
to MFIs within a month of his collecting it from
investors. Mulhair and DWM have returned to their
potential investors for input on the next fund’s
structure. He anticipates raising that fund in the first
half of 2006 and then raising a series of other larger
funds over the following five years.
Microfinance Bonds and Securitization:
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Goal: Efficient Capital Markets
Mulhair (along with many others) looks forward to
the day when MFIs have access to a wider variety
of capital sources funded by myriad investment
products. Those MFIs will be able to choose
among many sources of capital, including selling
equity, borrowing on various terms, deploying their
own retained earnings, and mobilizing their clients’
savings. More diverse financing sources offering
capital on different terms will allow MFIs to
structure the capitalization that best suits their
needs and the needs of their clients (just as
businesses in the developed world have great
flexibility to structure their own capitalization to the
benefit of customers and shareholders). The world
he describes is also known as an efficient capital
market, and it certainly does not exist yet. 
Many professionals in the field look forward to the
time when mainstream financial investors recognize
microfinance investments as legitimate and useful
asset classes with measurable and attractive risk-
reward characteristics, asset classes that can add
valuable dimensions to a portfolio of investments.
They envision a range of reasonably standard
investment products that can be dynamically priced
and traded in secondary markets. Looking at the
fundamentals of the securities that they are
structuring, DWM and other professionals believe
that microfinance securities will eventually be able
to stand on their own, appealing to investors
without needing a “socially responsible crutch”, and
without any concession to the risk-adjusted market
rate of return. Many feel that these products will be
very desirable because they are both safe and
relatively uncorrelated to other asset classes.
Obstacles to Efficient Microfinance Capital
Market
Raising Capital: Obstacles Facing the
Microfinance Capital Supply 
Currently, many potential investors remain ignorant
of the existence of microfinance investment
products, and many potential investors are
unfamiliar with the existing underlying microfinance
industry. Potential investors may not understand
the risk profile of these products, nor may they
understand the potential benefits (financial and
social) of investing in them. All these factors work
together to create obstacles to expanding investing
in this arena.
Those investors who have expressed interest in
these products are very fragmented in their
investment needs and interests. A high net worth
individual who has previously donated funds to
MFIs and wants to advance the state of the art of
microfinance would have fundamentally different
motivations and expectations than would a pension
fund manager interested in a fixed income security
that will be relatively insulated from American
macroeconomic cycles. Roger Frank of DWM
simplifies the variety of investors’ interests by
drawing a three dimensional grid, which he
acknowledges does not have enough dimensions
to plot a single investor’s profile. On the x-axis he
draws a risk-reward continuum; on the y-axis he
plots geographic exposure; on the z-axis is an
investor’s interest in social returns. Every investor’s
point in that three-dimensional space is different,
and so each investor’s demand for investment
products is also relatively unique. If Frank were to
plot all of their potential investors in that three-
dimensional space, there would be points all over
the space. Accordingly, each new potential investor
needs to be looked at individually.
Because they are a relatively new investment class,
microfinance notes currently lack well-established
data on their performance as securities. Portfolio
managers whose investment decisions are data-
driven simply do not have access to historical
return and volatility measurements for these
investment products, and so they will avoid them
altogether. Academics will find it challenging to
gather enough data to analyze how these securities
are correlated with other investments, though many
believe that the securities will prove to be largely
uncorrelated. The obstacles continue: mainstream
credit ratings are rarely available for these
securities, and with so few of these securities
having been issued, a viable secondary market
does not yet exist. 
Those obstacles notwithstanding, the fundamentals
of the underlying loans to poor microentrepreneurs
appear remarkably firm. Frank claims: “I can
soundly win any arguments about the fundamentals
of the underlying assets, but I simply cannot
counter arguments about liquidity of the notes or
about the lack of ratings standards. Solid
fundamentals are the best insurance policy.” Given
his finance background and proximity to these
investments, the notes’ quality is evident to him.
Fortunately, strong fundamentals portend both
transparent ratings standards and, ultimately, a
potentially vital secondary market.
Emerging Issues in Microfinance
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Concerns about Microfinance-Backed Securities
Some microfinance experts raise concerns that the
abundance of debt capital available to MFIs could
distract them from mobilizing their borrowers’
savings as a source of capital. If an MFI can accept
deposits, it can access those funds to make
additional loans. Unfortunately, it takes considerable
effort and cost to offer these products, and in many
parts of the world an MFI must be regulated by the
state before it can accept deposits. These
requirements preclude many of the not-for-profit
and informally organized MFIs from developing this
source of capital. (It should be noted that such
MFIs are also at a disadvantage in seeking
commercially available debt financing.) Savings
accumulate gradually, so that source of capital may
not be immediately available to finance growth.
While an MFI may be consumed with securing debt
capital and be distracted from establishing savings
programmes for poor clients, there is ample
evidence that strategically minded MFI managers
are planning on capturing future savings once they
are regulated and are using debt as an interim
source of capital.
Many microfinance experts also raise concerns
about US dollar-denominated loans to MFIs. When
investors loan in dollars, they also expect
repayment in dollars, while the MFIs must make
microloans in local currency. This arrangement
exposes the MFIs to currency fluctuations (because
they must undertake the conversion from hard to
soft currency). While such variation can
occasionally work in the MFIs’ favour, many fear
that such fluctuations—especially those caused by
drastic local currency devaluations—will work to the
MFIs’ detriment. US dollar-denominated loans tend
to be appealing because they carry a nominally
lower interest rate. On the other hand, loans
denominated in local currencies usually place the
foreign exchange exposure on parties other than
the MFIs (and their clients); nevertheless, these
loans tend to carry higher interest rates. Within the
MFI establishment there is a vigorous debate about
whether hard-currency or soft-currency loans are
preferable. Engaging this debate’s nuances remains
beyond the scope of this study, though this
document includes additional discussions of foreign
exchange risk management. Ultimately, MFIs need
access to all manners of capital, including hard and
soft currency loans. The MFIs themselves should
be able to choose the financing instruments and
capital structures (that may blend hard and soft
currency loans) as the MFIs themselves deem
appropriate.12
Other critics suggest that widely available
commercial financing could encourage MFIs to
move up-market, making larger loans to less-poor
people. Such loans tend to be less costly to
administer and are perceived to be lower risk
(though many would argue that they are not). An
MFI that moves up-market could run the risk itself
of changing the fundamental underlying assets
such that the non-correlation benefits are eroded—
not to mention that moving up-market could
include abandoning the poorest customers who
need microcredit the most.
Similarly, some microfinance professionals express
concern that emphasis on directing investment-
grade capital to MFIs could staunch the flow of
donated capital into the microfinance sector.
Microfinance was built on grants, which still make
up the majority of the capital that is ultimately lent
to poor entrepreneurs; choking the flow of donated
capital would have a disastrous effect on MFIs and
their clients. Even if the volume if investment capital
(in the form of debt and equity) rises dramatically to
meet the expansion needs of established MFIs,
grant capital will still play important roles in
founding new MFIs, funding innovation and helping
manage market inefficiencies that may persist in
certain geographies or business models. (For
example, one can imagine an isolated, small
community that could benefit from microfinance but
lacks infrastructure, scale and proximity to
established financial institutions. Grant funds will
likely always be necessary to bring microfinance to
such communities and to establish whether
microlending can be conducted sustainably therein.
If for any reason the practice is not sustainable,
grantors may choose to continue funding this
microfinance initiative to create social value even if
it cannot return financial value to the financial
backers.) Microfinance generates value in multiple
dimensions, but different microfinance
arrangements can generate very different blends of
those returns. In some cases, microloans generate
significant social value but cannot generate returns
for investors—even when the programmes are
administered efficiently.13 Such programmes should
be funded by donated capital (or through some
other form of financially risk-tolerant investment) by
investors who value that particular blend of social
or economic returns. 
As this capital market is new and emerging, there
are also concerns that the risk associated with the
products has not been appropriately priced.
Wrongly priced risk can amount to a hidden
subsidy or quota that could distort the market,
Emerging Issues in Microfinance
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resulting in either too much or not enough capital
flowing into these investments. Some fear
microfinance securitization could become a victim
of its own success. If too much capital flows to
MFIs, lending practices may become sloppy,
resulting eventually in unforeseen defaults. (See
Nurcha in the following section for an example of
this phenomenon.) If the risk of any given
investment remains wrongly priced, perhaps
through the subsidies provided by socially
conscious investors willing to accept concessionary
financial returns, over the long run not enough
capital will flow to the sector and worthy MFI
investments will go unfunded.
Signs that the Market Is Becoming More Efficient
The nominally low cost of capital associated with
mobilizing clients’ savings may well serve as a
sufficiently strong motivation for MFIs to make
additional savings and deposit facilities available to
their clients (provided that organizational structure
and regulatory environments permit this).
Furthermore, such products engender social
benefits by making the MFIs’ clients more
financially sustainable, which amounts to strong
motivation. 
As these products become more widely available,
the market will become more proficient at pricing
the risk associated with each deal. Experts are
learning how to price these securities, and what is
now something of an art will over time become a
science as investment advisers and fund managers
offer more microfinance securities. Likewise, these
experts are developing more sophisticated and
increasingly appropriate structures, as can be seen
in GP’s plans for future offerings with new equity
and subordinated tranche features. As more
investment banks grapple with structuring and
pricing issues, there will need to be an efficient and
transparent forum for communicating pricing and
structure information, which will be essential to
price risk. 
While international debt offerings are not yet
applicable to the majority of MFIs, this condition
shows signs of changing. While the BlueOrchard
securitization worked primarily with top-tier, high-
performing MFIs, Global Partnerships has
demonstrated that the product is moving down
market, funding MFIs that are still maturing.
Johnson of DWM is confident that the trend can
continue, as mainstream investment bankers have
ample experience securitizing higher-risk loans like
credit card receivables and potentially risky auto
loans.
The number and variety of products in the planning
or placement phase seem to be increasing daily.
Many of these products have not been made
public, but there are a number of innovative,
intelligent and socially motivated professionals
devoting their time and energy to giving MFIs
access to mainstream capital markets. At the
current rate of creativity, a report of this nature
might be issued semi-annually, each time featuring
a new path-breaking approach to linking poor
microfinance customers to mainstream financial
capital markets. 
Looking to the Future
The number and variety of securitization deals
seems likely to increase exponentially in the next
several years. The causes of this growth are many,
but underlying all of them are two strong
fundamental conditions: microfinance works, and
there is very powerful demand at the bottom of the
pyramid. With millions of impoverished potential
microentrepreneurs and an ever-increasing number
of MFIs arising to meet their financing needs, there
will be unmet demand for capital into the
foreseeable future. That demand will drive financial
innovation and forge connections between those in
the developed world who control capital and those
in the developing world who only need a small bit
of it to improve their lives profoundly. 
Microfinance has the potential to bring millions of
people out of deep poverty. To do so, the industry
needs a new group of financiers capable of
increasing the amount and various forms of capital
available in this market by an order of magnitude—
and to do so without stemming the flow of donated
capital to MFIs where such capital is the most
appropriate fuel for their development. 
While the power of microfinance to expand
economic opportunity for very low-income
individuals is key, microfinance also holds the
potential for achieving something more. In
demonstrating its effectiveness, the organizations
profiled in this and other documents are
demonstrating how to achieve financial
performance together with significant social impact. 
Microfinance professionals are not the only
innovators in debt financing. In the United States,
several decades of community development
investing have driven financial innovation as well.
The following case study examines how community
development investors in the US have contributed
their innovations to a unique programme fostering
the development of free democratic societies.
Third Case Study: Community Investing,
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Media Development Loan Fund
Media Development Loan Fund (MDLF) invests in
independent news media outlets in emerging
democracies, offering what Deputy Managing
Director Harlan Mandel calls “direct economic
investment in democratic change.” MDLF’s
investors, managers and investees share the
fundamental belief that independent media are
essential to the development of productive
democratic societies. In countries establishing the
institutions of a participatory government and the
open expression of a free society, independent
media can begin to right the wrongs of oppressive
regimes, giving voice to ethnic, political, or socio-
economic groups that had previously been
silenced.
Independent media and news outlets in emerging
democracies often face a host of market and non-
market obstacles to sustainability—and sometimes
to their very survival. Licensing requirements and
other regulatory restrictions can impede the free
publication and broadcast of independent ideas
and views. When those media organizations are
free to operate, they often face competition unfairly
subsidized by political and economic elite.
Furthermore, financing vehicles are often
unavailable to companies facing those sorts of
risks, and capital that is obtainable may impinge on
an outlet’s editorial independence. 
Founded as an American not-for-profit corporation
in 1995, The Media Development Loan Fund
provides below-market rate financing with technical
and managerial assistance to the fledgling media
outlets crucial to many countries’ transformation to
free democratic societies. MDLF primarily offers
concessionary rate loans and lease financing
arrangements to newspapers, publishers, television
and radio stations, and digital media outlets. It also
tailors the financing arrangements to the needs of
its clients, and it will even initiate equity financing
under certain circumstances. With headquarters in
New York City, an operations centre in Prague, and
offices across the world, MDLF manages a pool of
capital provided by donors and by programme-
related investment (PRI) lenders. 
The organization adds the engagement of a venture
capital investment—often taking a board seat,
offering strategic consulting, and monitoring
operations closely—to its debt financing. Mandel
explains that debt financing encourages clients,
which are locally owned small businesses, to plan
for sustainability and to aim for reliable cash flows
that will cover the interest and principal payments.
That discipline forces the client to respond to their
audiences and to sell products. MDLF observes
that the obligation to make regular payments forces
clients to write business plans and then to adhere
to them—a valuable outcome that standard grants
would not necessarily confer. 
MDLF tends to avoid financing working capital,
instead aiming to finance assets that will help
clients achieve financial independence. Commonly,
clients purchase a key piece of production
equipment like a printing press, audio-visual
production equipment or information technology
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“While independent news organizations are
commercial enterprises, at the heart of MDLF’s
work is the notion that the best are much more
than that: they are social enterprises, committed
to truthful and ethical journalism, and their
development is a prerequisite for any functioning
democracy. They provide information needed for
citizen participation in the democratic process
and for the functioning of market economies.
They play an essential role in economic
development, and in extending the benefits of
development to those in poverty. As MDLF
describes it, they give a voice to the otherwise
unheard and open the government and the
economic affairs of a nation to public scrutiny
and debate. They expose corruption and shine a
light on issues critical to countries in transition:
health, economic development, treatment of
minorities and the environment.”
Source: Calvert Foundation Case Study of MDLF.
Unpublished. October 2004.
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infrastructure. A printing press, for example, not
only frees a newspaper from depending on state-
controlled printers, it can improve a newspaper’s
quality such that it wins new advertisement income,
allowing it to produce a less expensive and more
attractive product. Many clients will be able to sell
excess capacity on the new presses, bringing
additional income. 
MDLF’s Investment Process
MDLF’s deal flow varies by region. In the Balkans,
Russia, Ukraine and elsewhere, MDLF has
established a reputation that brings unsolicited
potential investments to the fund. In other
locations, especially as the fund expands into new
geographies, MDLF depends on other media-
support organizations or its own prospecting for
eligible independent media investments. 
Fund staff screen potential investments for both the
sophistication that engenders sustainability and the
independence that advances democratic progress.
The organization’s directors have established the
following guidelines for potential investments.15
Once a potential investment meets these criteria,
having passed through a screen for social value,
MDLF pursues financial due diligence. MDLF’s staff
will only recommend investments that affirmatively
create social value and that appear well positioned
financially. An independent investment committee
makes the ultimate investment decision. 
MDLF’s Investment Portfolio
By late 2005, that process led to about US$ 45
million in investments to nearly 50 different
companies. With approximately US$ 15 million
returned through principal payments (and then re-
lent), the organization was managing a loan
portfolio of about US$ 30 million financing about 30
different media outlets. MDLF has made loans
ranging in size from US$ 100,000 to US$ 7 million
with a typical range from US$ 500,000 to US$ 1
million, and it has initiated an average of 12 to 15
loans per year. 
The loans and leases, all dollar or euro-
denominated, carry interest rates between 5.5 and
7.5% and as high as ten percent (though the funds
earliest loans were in the 1-3% range), and they
typically have five- to seven-year maturities. About
80% of the loans have been committed to media
outlets in the former Soviet Union and the former
Yugoslavia, but the fund is expanding in Africa, Asia
and Latin America. MDLF maintains a loss reserve
equal to approximately 18% of the total loan
portfolio. Close monitoring and involvement have
led to write-offs amounting to approximately two
percent of total invested, low delinquency rates and
significant recoveries of delinquent payments. 
Historically, MDLF’s work has been financed by
foundation grants, individual donations, and
approximately US$ 10 million in PRI debt from the
Open Society Institute, the MacArthur Foundation,
the Swedish government and other European
foundations. Recently, the fund has made debt
financing vehicles much more widely available
through its Free Press Investment Notes.
Structured by the Calvert Social Investment
Foundation, which is itself an MDLF investor, these
notes make blended value investments available to
individual investors, institutions and foundations
interested in a relatively simple way to support
independent media and earn a financial return in
the process. 
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To be considered by MDLF for debt, lease finance or
equity investment, a media organization must fit the
following profile:
1. It must be legally registered according to all
applicable laws. It must have licenses required by
local laws for media of its kind and, if the applicant is
an electronic media, it must have a valid frequency
license. 
2. It must have been in operation for at least a year. The
Board of Directors may, in extraordinary
circumstances, waive this requirement.
3. It must have a record of promoting democratic
institutions and practices in its country and must be
nationally or internationally known for promoting and
exercising principles of free, independent and
responsible press. 
4. A significant part of the applicant's programme must
be news, current events, photojournalism, photo-
imaging and documentary programmes driven by
editorial staff to exercise fact-based, honest,
unbiased, fair, non-partisan, investigative and
responsible journalism, independent from the
influence of the government or of any other interest
group.
5. News, current events and documentary programmes
must have a proven record of offering coverage of
different political opinions, promoting human rights
and the rights of ethnic minorities, and promoting
inter-ethnic coexistence.
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Calvert Social Investment Foundation 
One of the first socially responsible mutual fund
managers, Calvert Group offers individual investors
a variety of screened socially responsible portfolios
of public equities, bonds and other money market
products. In the late 1980s the company began to
explore investment strategies that not only
screened out social value destruction but sought
actively to create social value with its investments.
This discussion eventually led the fund to commit
to investing one percent of its assets in community
development finance intermediaries.
To facilitate this style of investing, Calvert Group
eventually founded the Calvert Social Investment
Foundation (Calvert Foundation) in 1995 with the
support of national foundations including Ford,
MacArthur and Mott. The Calvert Foundation aims
to affect community investment in the same way
that Calvert Group built SRI: the foundation aims to
refine the practice and productize investments so
that individual investors can actively participate in
community investing. In essence, the foundation
has been charged with creating investment
products that generate blended value. Overseeing
this mission is Shari Berenbach, the president of
Calvert Social Investment Foundation.
The Calvert Community Investment Note
Calvert Foundation’s flagship investment product is
called the Calvert Community Investment Note.
Structured as general recourse obligation of the
foundation, the notes are designed to make it safe
and convenient for average investors to direct
capital to community development and other
blended value-generating projects and enterprises.
The Notes are highly customizable and can be
purchased in increments of US$ 1,000 (with a US$
1,000 minimum investment). Investors can choose
the profile of the investments underlying their notes,
targeting specific geographic regions and
programmatic areas. Investors can also select the
maturity of their Notes (ranging from one to ten
years) and the interest rate (from zero to three
percent). Calvert Foundation will build completely
customized community investment portfolios for
investors deploying over US$ 50,000 in capital.
In the ten years since the Notes’ inception, Calvert
Foundation has nearly US$ 100 million in
Community Investment Notes outstanding. This
capital has been deployed across a US$ 84 million
portfolio of 195 borrowers, including American
community development financial intermediaries,
affordable housing developers, microfinance
institutions, fair trade cooperatives and other
domestic and international social enterprises.
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Investment case study 
An example of a successful portfolio company is Altapress in Russia:
Altapress is a newspaper publisher in Barnaul, a city in Siberia close to the Kazakhstan border. 
In 1990 five journalists left Barnaul’s communist paper to set up Altapress, the first independent news outlet in the heavily
Communist region of Altaiskii Krai, southern Siberia. Beginning with the award-winning, general-interest Svobodnyi Kurs (Free
Course), circulation 35,000, the company today is the 5th largest regional publisher in Russia, with 350 full-time employees and
six newspapers, including a successful weekly business publication. It has a powerful printing business: its two printing presses,
both bought with MDLF financing, are the only high-quality, non-state newspaper printing facilities in the area. Its distribution
system manages some 250 sales stands around the town and region. A modern new building, built partly with an MDLF loan,
hosts most of the company’s employees, as well as its training centre, which trains over 400 local students every month in
journalism, business, advertising, management and PR. In 2003, Altapress won the Die Zeit Young Press Eastern Europe
Award. In 2001, Altapress General Director Yuri Purgin was selected as Best Media Manager by the Russian Union of
Journalists.
MDLF began working with Altapress in 1999, providing lease financing for purchase of a web offset press for printing
newspapers and a loan for construction of company premises for a printing house and all its other operations. In 2002, MDLF
provided a second finance lease for the purchase of a sheet-fed press for commercial printing. Altapress has been a problem-
free borrower and has served as a training ground for all subsequent MDLF newspaper clients in the former Soviet Union. In
recent years it has gained wide recognition as the best managed regional newspaper company in Russia.
In 2004, Altapress gained international recognition for its public protest against government pressure to publish false articles
slandering an opposition politician. In a rare act of courage and integrity in today’s Russia, Altapress published an open letter
signed by all its journalists, and many others from the region, detailing the government’s pressure and refusing to accede to it.
Time Magazine cited the event as a first sign of the potential for democratic change in Russia.15
Source: Shari Berenbach and Harlan Mandel 
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The underlying portfolios are very carefully
screened, monitored, and managed. Calvert
Foundation has put in place significant security
enhancements that lower the notes’ risk such that
the foundation has never defaulted on its
obligations to any Community Investment Note-
holders. The notes currently have a three percent
loss reserve, and they are further collateralized by
Calvert Foundation’s balance sheet, which holds
substantial assets that are junior to the Community
Investment Notes. With the portfolios’ average loan
size at approximately US$ 400,000, five average
size loans would have to be complete losses to
exhaust the loss reserves, and then realized losses
would have to be substantially larger before they
exhausted the cushion provided by the
subordinated assets on Calvert Foundation’s
balance sheet. By late 2005, Calvert Foundation
had over 2,400 Community Investment Note-
holders. The largest note-holders are the Calvert
Funds. 2,200 of those investors have invested less
than US$ 50,000, and 1,000 have invested US$
5,000 or less. Many of the 200 investors who have
invested more than US$ 50,000 are family
foundations and high net worth individuals.
Building the Community Investment Field
Calvert Foundation has helped to build the
community investment market place by teaming up
with partners to support their access to investors’
capital. The first strategy used by the foundation
has been to “private label” the Community
Investment Note, thereby allowing organizations to
wrap the investment instrument in their own brand,
effectively piggybacking on existing note
registration and administration. Private label notes
direct capital to specific loan portfolios or borrowing
sectors. These notes stay on Calvert Foundation’s
balance sheet like all of its Community Investment
Notes, and the private label products have the
basically the same structure as Calvert’s own note
product. Calvert prepares the prospectuses,
manages the registration tasks, handles investor
administration, and collaborates with its partners to
reach new investors and investees. 
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Calvert Foundation limits the aggregate size of
each these private label arrangements because its
risk management regime precludes it from investing
more than five percent of its portfolio into any one
organization. Furthermore, the foundation works to
meet internally defined capital adequacy guidelines
in proportion to the liabilities created by the notes.
These restrictions cap the amount of capital that
can be invested in these customized products.
Establishing the Free Press Investment Notes
Calvert Foundation and MDLF had considered
structuring the Free Press Notes within the Private
Label programme, but MDLF wanted to offer its
own notes with an open-ended size. Accordingly,
Calvert Foundation has supported MDLF through
its Community Investment Partners programme.
The Community Investment Partners programme
makes Calvert Foundation’s securities expertise
available to other non-profits. For MDLF, Calvert
Foundation prepared an “independent offering,”
performing the role of an investment adviser in
structuring a security that is similar to a Community
Investment Note offering that would affect MDLF’s
balance sheet, not that of  Calvert Foundation. The
two organizations launched the Free Press Notes in
December 2005.
Following MDLF’s Free Press Notes, Berenbach
reports strong demand for other similar independent
offerings, with several projects in the pipeline. With
many products that have a standardized structure
(the foundation’s own Community Investment Notes,
MDLF’s Free Press Notes and the variety of private
label notes), the foundation and its partners are
fostering a uniform set of expectations for this
manner of community investment product.
“Dematerializing” the Community Investment
Notes
In its quest to make the notes more ubiquitous and
accessible to more investors, Calvert Foundation is
actively establishing partnerships with financial
institutions and securities brokerages. To make these
relationships possible, the foundation has had to
render the notes compatible with the financial
industry-standard electronic transaction systems—a
significant challenge that reveals a subtle but
important obstacle that many blended value
investment products will likely face as they become
more accessible and productized. 
Many financial firms transfer and clear investments
through the Depository Trust Company (DTC), which
maintains the electronic system through which most
American securities transactions are processed.
DTC’s website explains: “The depository brings
efficiency to the securities industry by retaining
custody of some 2 million securities issues, effectively
‘dematerializing’ most of them so that they exist only
as electronic files rather than as countless pieces of
paper."17 DTC makes securities easily accessible to
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Investment notes established through Calvert Foundation’s Private Label programme
Gulf Coast Recovery Initiative Directs community investments to help those who were hardest hit by Hurricane
Katrina and other recent devastating hurricanes.
Jubilee Investing Initiative Directs faith-based community investments to non-profit lenders worldwide.
LGBT Community Investment Notes Supports lenders that provide important community facilities and services for the
lesbian/gay/bi-sexual/transgender community
National Peace Corps Association
Microenterprise Program
Invests in microcredit organizations, primarily FINCA, to offer working capital and
financial services for the economically active poor around the world.
Oikocredit World Partnership programme Oikocredit was founded 25 years ago as an alternative investment instrument for
churches to provide credit for poor and disadvantaged people around the world.
Grameen Investments Has directed capital to Grameen Foundation USA to help working poor in
Bangladesh develop sustainable businesses.
MicroVest mPower Investment Program Allows investment in microfinance institutions through the purchase of Community
Investment Notes.
Source: http://www.calvertfoundation.org
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mainstream financial institutions that maintain their
clients’ portfolios in electronic format. Without
being a part of the DTC system, Calvert
Foundation’s Community Investment Notes were
not easily accessible through most investors’
securities brokers. Compatibility with DTC would
likely enlarge the market for the Community
Investment Note products, and it could enlist a new
sales channel when retail brokers are able to
provide the product as an integrated portion of their
clients’ investment portfolios. 
Unfortunately, gaining access to the DTC was no
small task for Calvert Foundation, and Berenbach
reports that it took nearly seven years to
accomplish it. A key reason for the delay points
directly at subtle but important differences between
traditional retail investment (strictly for financial
returns) and philanthropic investment (strictly for
social or environmental returns). Efficient
transactions of most liquid financial products are
accomplished so that buyers and sellers remain
anonymous to one another. The products must be
completely fungible, and DTC’s “dematerializing”
promotes those characteristics. 
That level of interchangeability and anonymity
stands in contrast to the norms of philanthropy,
wherein donors often customize their investments
and remain in close contact with recipients
(philanthropic donors often want anything but
anonymity). The Community Investment Notes
bring some of the practices of philanthropy to bear
on blended value investing, giving investors
extensive capacity to customize their investment
products. 
Because the DTC system has been built specifically
to exchange fungible retail investment products, it
was very difficult to make the Community
Investment Notes, with their highly variable
characteristics, interface with the DTC system.
Fortunately, in late 2005 Calvert and DTC
established procedures for clearing the Community
Investment Notes electronically. Clearing through
DTC allows Calvert Foundation to establish
relationships with new securities brokers, which
Berenbach predicts will triple the size of its portfolio
over the next five years. 
The Future of Calvert’s Community Investment
Notes
Currently, Calvert Foundation’s Community
Investments include a large range of underlying
investment strategies including affordable housing
finance, microfinance, community facility funds,
small-business loans, fair trade investments and
investments in social enterprises. Looking to the
future, Berenbach anticipates that in the next
several years the foundation will be investing in
environmental projects, the health sector and off-
grid power and telecommunications. 
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Introduction
At an increasingly rapid rate, blended value projects
are becoming blended value investments that allow
new capital to generate blended returns with
reduced transaction costs and increased
transparency. Thoughtful people often do not agree
on exactly how to measure and then price the risk
associated with the new investments. Many such
investments look foreign or downright speculative
to investors who oversee mainstream capital. In
many cases, other actors will view that risk
differently and will be more willing to expose their
capital to that risk if doing so will encourage other
investors. In some cases, the risk-tolerant investors
have unusual insight into the potential investment’s
fundamentals. Other risk-tolerant investors may
have philanthropic motivations for taking on the risk
in that they view a loss of capital on such an
investment the same way they would a grant
invested in developing new socially beneficial
investment products. A number of actors have
explored how to share the risks — both real and
perceived — between different parties through the
use of loan guarantees and related strategies for
structuring credit enhancements. 
A Loan Guarantees Primer
In a standard loan agreement, the borrower
provides some manner of collateral, giving the
lender a claim on the borrower if he or she cannot
meet the obligations of the loan. In collateralized
loans, the borrower’s assets are pledged to satisfy
the lender in the event that the borrower cannot
meet the obligation. (In a microcredit context, the
collateral may not be property or assets but “social
collateral”, or the future loans of others in a lending
group.) In a situation where a borrower may not
have sufficient collateral, another party may pledge
assets or its general credit to meet the loan
obligation if the borrower defaults. The party
pledging the assets is the guarantor, and often it
must place securities or other assets in an account
that can be easily accessed by the lender in the
event of a collateral call. This is called a loan
guarantee or credit enhancement. 
In some situations, an entity perceived to carry a lot
of risk (such as an MFI or a young company) can
reduce its cost of borrowing by having an entity
with a lower risk rating (such as a foundation or
investor) guarantee all or part of the loan. That
added safety should then lower the cost of
borrowing, though the entity directly benefiting from
the loan guarantee often must pay a fee to facilitate
the arrangement. Beyond lower-cost borrowing, a
loan guarantee encourages follow-on financing
both by removing some of the borrower’s risk and
by signalling the borrower’s quality. 
Guarantee arrangements vary dramatically. Many
government-backed programmes, for example, are
guaranteed by the full-faith and credit of the
country’s government, in which case the guarantor
does not specify any assets to serve as collateral,
though a borrower can still make a general claim
against the guarantors. Most guarantee
arrangements require that specific assets be
pledged. Often pledged financial assets are
segregated from a guarantor’s other assets in a
special bank or brokerage account, and real assets
will be subject to some form of contract
determined by the guarantee agreement. 
If the guarantor pledges financial assets, the
guarantee agreement may limit the kinds of
investments that are eligible for investment, but the
guarantor receives the benefits of any capital
appreciation (or the exposure to any losses)
generated by the investments. Accordingly, many
guarantee agreements allow the guarantors to earn
market-rate returns on their investments while
facilitating further third-party investments in the
borrower. Since the guarantor is exposed to at
least part of the borrower’s risk, the guarantor
accepts a higher risk for the returns that the assets
would generate without securing the borrower’s
loan. Guarantees are commonly governed by a
relatively standardized arrangement called a
standby letter of credit, which can be issued by
banks to enable a guarantor to guarantee the debt
of a borrower easily. Banks may extract fees for
maintaining guarantee arrangements, and a
borrower may compensate the guarantor for
accepting additional risk. 
Loan guarantees have been a feature of lending
and international development for years, and
blended value investors have explored a variety of
innovative ways to apply guarantees in their
investments. Dating back at least as far as 1984,
when ACCION International launched its Bridge
Fund (which offered loan guarantees that helped
Latin American MFIs borrow from commercial
lenders), investors have pledged their assets to
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guarantee and thereby accelerate the work of
blended value-generating projects.18 When applied
to blended value investments, a guarantee
arrangement can generate social returns by
facilitating and reducing the cost of financing for
blended value projects. Furthermore, a
guaranteeing entity may provide technical
assistance or consulting to help the investment
succeed.
It should be noted that, in the United States, loan
guarantees structured as standby letters of credit
do not receive any favourable tax treatment when
committed to philanthropic investments (unless the
guarantees are drawn upon, in which case they
may in fact receive different tax consideration).
Luther Ragin, Jr, Vice-President for Investments at
the F.B. Heron Foundation, a noted leader in
blended value investing in the United States,
indicates that such tax treatment has prevented the
loan guarantee from seeing more widespread
application in US domestic blended value investing.
Nevertheless, Ragin notes that the John D. and
Catherine E. McArthur Foundation, the Annie E.
Casey Foundation, and a number of other
foundations in the United States have supported
this type of strategy to achieve financial leverage.19
Characteristics of a Blended Value Loan
Guarantee
While the loan guarantee structure is versatile, it
can only be applied to a project that can be
leveraged with debt; that is, the project must have
relatively predictable cash flows. A loan guarantee
might be used to launch a new project that may be
somewhat speculative. The histories of
microfinance bond offerings and loan guarantees
are profoundly intertwined (as noted in the section
of this paper addressing innovations in debt
finance), and loan guarantees were essential to the
first issues as well as some of the most recently
offered securities. 
Loan guarantee arrangements are suitable in a
variety of situations. Specifically, they can be useful
to spur investment in new financial products, the
likes of which mainstream commercial lenders have
never seen. Another advantage of loan guarantees
is that they can reduce exposure to currency
fluctuations and, in the process, shift exposure
from the borrower to the guarantor. Under this
arrangement, one need only convert currencies in
the event of a default that results in a capital call. 
Introduction to the Blended Value Loan
Guarantee Case Studies
The following case studies demonstrate a variety of
ways loan guarantees and similar approaches
might be applied to international blended value
investing. The first example, Nurcha, a South
African low-cost housing finance company,
demonstrates how a guarantee may be used to
overcome market inefficiencies and spur the
development of an entire economic sector. In
Nurcha’s ten years of operation, the company’s use
of loan guarantees has evolved as both the
company and the low-cost housing sector have
matured. While many of the examples cited thus far
have supported microfinance as the fundamental
vehicle for creating value, Nurcha demonstrates
that these blended value investment strategies can
effectively support other fundamental investment
strategies.
The second case examines a fund initiated by
Deutsche Bank to encourage the growth of
microfinance institutions. The vehicles deployed by
the Deutsche Bank Microcredit Development Fund
are not, strictly speaking, loan guarantees, but they
serve a similar function. Deutsche Bank’s
programme demonstrates a replicable model for
enhancing the growth of either MFIs or similar
financial institutions operating in other sectors. 
The third case explores how MicroCredit
Enterprises has made the loan guarantee strategy
available to individual and institutional blended
value investors. MicroCredit Enterprises effectively
leverages its guarantees to direct, hard-currency
loans to MFIs. (The capital input is a guarantee,
and the fund’s outputs are direct, hard-currency
loans, like those of the securitization deals.)
Notably, the programme has been developed such
that it can be easily replicated by other institutions
through its “open-source development” model.
While MicroCredit Enterprises leverages its
guarantors’ commitments into direct loans to MFIs,
Grameen Foundation USA’s recently launched
Growth Guarantees programme uses investors’
guarantees ultimately for loans in local currencies.
(The capital inputs are guarantees, and the outputs
are also guarantees, which, in turn facilitate soft-
currency loans.) 
The fifth case study examines the recently launched
Global Commercial Microfinance Consortium,
which combines some features of the microfinance
debt offerings with flexible credit guarantees. 
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Together the case studies demonstrate the flexibility
and leverage associated with guarantee and credit
enhancement strategies. In each case, the
guarantee encourages institutions working with the
poor to form stronger connections with commercial
or mainstream banks that are not necessarily
investing with a blended value agenda. In the long
run, these catalysts can eventually render the
projects more viable for investors and help the
mainstream financial sector understand and work
with the institutions creating blended value through
their management of capital. 
First Case Study: Nurcha and the Open
Society Institute20
Today, Nurcha (originally called the National Urban
Reconstruction and Housing Agency) is South
Africa’s leading institution providing bridge financing
for the country’s low-cost housing sector. After a
decade of operations, the company is preparing for
a dramatic expansion in its scale and magnitude of
impact. The company was founded by the Open
Society Institute and the newly elected government
of South Africa shortly after the fall of apartheid.
From its inception, Nurcha has aimed to expand
access to housing for South Africa’s poorest
citizens, especially those who suffered terribly
under apartheid. 
Low-Income Housing in South Africa: Unmet
Needs and Broken Systems
Cedric de Beer, Nurcha’s Managing Director and a
member of Nurcha’s founding team, recalls the
extent to which housing was a politically charged
matter in the mid-1990s. Apartheid policies had
severely restricted where people could live, and
displacement and property rules ensured that many
people of colour could not settle in habitable and
safe communities, let alone build equity in real
assets. De Beer, his colleagues in the
Johannesburg city council, and a group of
progressive bankers and community activists
began formally grappling with the problem of
housing low-income families as apartheid crumbled
in 1992. 
The magnitude of the problem was enormous.
Several million people lacked stable housing
arrangements, and no plausible plan existed to
house them. At that time, the conservative South
African banking system was cautious about
financing low-income families. Private philanthropy
did not appear up to task of resolving all aspects of
this tremendous problem and it was not clear that
the government would ever be able to tackle the
problem alone. De Beer and his colleagues
recognized that a market-based solution would be
required, and could eventually be linked to the
mainstream capital markets. 
When apartheid fell, the newly elected Mandela
government found itself with a raft of monumental
social and economic problems in addition to the
massive housing gap between blacks and whites.
The government had to improve education,
address the lack of employment opportunities for
black South Africans, build fully participatory
democratic institutions, and confront myriad other
problems. De Beer suggested the new government
needed to produce a “quick win” to demonstrate
that it could tackle some of these looming issues.
Relative to other seemingly intractable problems,
low-income housing appeared to be closest thing
to that quick win. The returns on investments in this
sector would become evident more quickly than in
other sectors, and outcomes would be more
quantifiable. Furthermore, housing sectors all over
the world offered robust and proven markets.
South Africa had to discover how to make those
proven markets function within the context of its
own difficult circumstances. 
From 1995 the government offered subsidies for
housing low-income families and worked to
develop a market in low-cost housing mortgages.21
Nevertheless, houses and residential communities
suitable for low-income families were simply not
being built. The banking and construction sectors
both feared that the rule of law was too weak in
these communities to extend credit in them.
Originally a means of protesting apartheid, a
tradition of civil disobedience had seized the
townships during the 1980s and 1990s. Residents
frustrated by the pace of change refused to pay
utility bills and taxes. After 1994, the fear that such
civil disobedience would extend to mortgage and
rent payments choked off the supply of capital to
build housing for newly enfranchised South
Africans. The risk of loan delinquency seemed
overwhelmingly high to banks that neither
understood this market nor had an appetite to take
large risks in an uncertain economic and political
environment. It seemed like a vicious cycle. The
new government needed to promote economic
sustainability, and home ownership would go a long
way toward doing so, but until the townships were
stabilized, no one would provide the capital to
create that housing. 
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Though Nurcha was involved in various
programmes, its core activity was guaranteeing
bridge financing for low-cost housing projects.
Through 1999, Nurcha would help builders and
contractors secure commercial financing that it
then supported with a 60-70% guarantee. Thus, a
bank loaning money to a Nurcha-supported
contractor was guaranteed to recover at least 60-
70% of the loan in case the borrower defaulted.
These guarantees were subject to a set of
specifically developed prudent lending protocols
involving screening applicants, performing due
diligence, and monitoring the loans.
A Victim of Its Own Success
To the great benefit of poor South Africans, the
Nurcha-facilitated lending model introduced a flood
of capital into the low-cost housing sector. By
1999, Nurcha had financed the construction of
over 50,000 new housing units. With the loan
guarantees in place, the risk-reward profile became
manageable, and low-cost housing contractors
were able to find bridge financing. By most counts,
Nurcha and South Africa’s low-cost housing market
appeared to be an unmitigated success—until the
wave of economic and currency crises of the late
1990s hit South Africa in 1999.
In three months, the over-draft rate of Nurcha-
supported projects rose by more than 50%. The
South African Rand fell in value relative to other
currencies, and domestic South African inflation
interest rates shot up. When low-cost housing
contractors could not manage their interest
payments in the inflationary environment, defaults
quickly mounted, and the banks withdrew from
lending with Nurcha. In the case of one major
lender, many loans had not been issued in
accordance with pre-established protocols, and
these claims against the guarantees were rejected.
While Nurcha was fortunate in that its guarantee
reserves were not overwhelmingly exposed, the
banks’ losses led them to exit the low-cost housing
construction market dramatically more quickly than
they entered. 
By 2000, Nurcha was faced with a dilemma. With
its guarantee programme, it had proven that
lending to low-cost housing projects could be both
profitable and vastly beneficial to low-income
families. Thanks to its willingness to accept risk
when most banks viewed the risks as untenable,
Nurcha’s work eventually revealed the lower cost of
risks associated with those loans. Nevertheless, the
banks continued to misprice the risk, convinced
An Approach to Breaking the Vicious Cycle
Investor and philanthropist George Soros made
grants in South Africa in the 1970s, but he did not
continue in the 1980s and early 1990s. The
election of the Mandela Government in 1994
opened opportunities for Soros to again invest in
South Africa. In consultation with trusted adviser Dr
Van Zyl Slabbert, Soros’s Open Society Institute
(OSI) began seeing philanthropic investment
opportunities in South Africa.22 Slabbert suggested
to de Beer that Soros might invest in a low-cost
housing catalyst, as long as it could be set up as
an independent entity that would involve the
government as an investment partner (but not as
the service provider). Soros and the leadership of
OSI saw an opportunity to normalize economic and
financial relationships and help the market function
in a place where it had not previously worked. 
In due course, Slabbert arranged a meeting
between George Soros and Nelson Mandela. When
they emerged from that meeting, the two had
agreed to co-sponsor an initiative that would help
bring the formal banking sector into low-cost
housing finance. They then asked de Beer and his
colleagues, in consultation with Slabbert and
representatives of the OSI, to determine the
structure and strategy of this new entity. 
Founding Nurcha
Officially founded in February 1995, The National
Urban Reconstruction and Housing Agency
(eventually shortened to Nurcha) was born of their
deliberations. OSI and the government of South
Africa each contributed US$ 5 million in grants to
found and initially capitalize the company. OSI also
pledged a loan guarantee of up to US$ 50 million,
with a required 3-to-1 match; that is, Nurcha had
to raise US$ 150 million in guarantees in order to
access the full US$ 50 million offered by OSI.
Nurcha successfully raised matching guarantees as
required, but by October 2005 it had drawn down
no more than US$ 20 million of the available OSI
guarantee.
Using OSI’s loan guarantee as a catalyst, Nurcha
began to guarantee loans from South African
commercial banks to low-cost housing developers
and contractors. With those banks leery of lending
to developers, whom they thought especially risky
borrowers, the banks initially required significant
fully secured third-party guarantees. Nurcha’s
mandate was wide: to “encourage broad banking
involvement in the low-cost housing market.”
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that financing low-cost housing was an exceedingly
risky proposition. In truth, had the lending process
been more disciplined, the banks’ exposure to the
low-cost housing sector would have been
significantly insulated from macroeconomic
changes. 
Nurcha’s Business Model Evolves
If you know that the lending can be profitable
without being too risky, and you have the financial
resources to manage the remaining risk, the next
step is obvious: you begin lending directly. In its
first five years of cultivating the low-cost housing
sector in South Africa, Nurcha had learned a great
deal about structuring loans, screening applicants,
performing due diligence and monitoring bridge
financing. 
Thus, in the early 2000s Nurcha moved from
guaranteeing loans by other lenders to becoming a
direct lender itself. Banks, realizing that Nurcha was
more proficient at lending than they were at
managing low-cost housing loans, began loaning
funds to Nurcha, which then lent the funds to
contractors and developers. Though Nurcha had
demonstrated its ability to manage risky loans, the
guarantees produced by the OSI and others
continued to further reduce the company’s cost of
borrowing funds. In October 2005, de Beer
indicated that Nurcha was still “working a few old
guarantees out of the system”, but had otherwise
shifted entirely to the direct lending model, which
was still supported by guarantees from OSI. It now
relies on partners it calls “intermediaries” to
administer loans, and they perform quality control,
manage disbursements, and ensure compliance
with regulations. The intermediaries invest a portion
of their own capital in the programme, ensuring
that they will manage projects effectively. Nurcha
structures its own loan products, screens
borrowers, performs due diligence, and takes
responsibility for initiating work-out proceedings for
loans at risk. 
Nurcha’s customers range from medium and some
large construction operations to sole proprietors,
including many new entrepreneur contractors,
particularly women and black South Africans. The
company has developed specific programmes to
support these entrepreneurs, many of whom have
built vital medium-sized enterprises out of
microentrepreneurial ventures. Nurcha also
expanded in other directions, launching a variety of
programmes to encourage a culture of savings. By
2004, the company recognized that its core
business was financing low-cost housing
construction, and it exited those programme areas
that did not reside in that core business. It has
further refocused its business by financing the
construction of community assets such as schools,
roads and utilities infrastructure. Its Annual Report
indicates that this expansion “is in line with our
social mission—sustainable communities not only
require houses but clinics, crèches, and community
halls as well.” 23
A Dramatic Impact, a Dramatic Expansion
By October 2005, Nurcha had financed the
construction of over 160,000 homes. Increasingly,
the OSI permitted Nurcha some flexibility in the
uses to which its US$ 50 million commitment could
be put. OSI has funded some of Nurcha’s overhead
over the past ten years. Stewart Paperin, Executive
Vice-President of OSI, estimates that each of those
homes effectively cost OSI US$ 25-30 a piece in
subsidizing Nurcha’s overhead. With that track
record and the company’s business model
sufficiently refined, Nurcha aimed to scale up
dramatically. In December 2004, de Beer presented
that expansion plan to the South African Housing
Ministry.
Paperin proposed new structured financing for
Nurcha that would enable the company to
capitalize the construction of over 190,000 new
homes plus nearly 400 community assets (beyond
the 160,000 houses and other community
infrastructure projects it had already financed) by
2008. De Beer’s report puts the company’s
financing needs into perspective:
Given the volume of lending projected into the future, it is
clear that Nurcha will not be able to depend on
government or donor agencies to provide this lending
capacity free, as grant money. Most of the money will
need to be raised from commercial sources.24
While Nurcha had extensive experience raising
capital from commercial sources, it sought an
equity investment both to build institutional capacity
and to improve the company’s balance sheet
position. The portion of the equity intended for the
balance sheet would serve as a first-loss provision
for the commercial loans that would provide the
capital for Nurcha’s core business. Effectively, the
equity destined for the balance sheet will serve as a
loan guarantee for the commercial lenders.
Nurcha’s track record has significantly reduced the
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size of that guarantee relative to the company’s
borrowing; nevertheless, the size of that guarantee-
like loss reserve further lowers its costs of borrowing.
As the company has sufficiently prepared for a
dramatic expansion of its business, the South African
government has created an environment that requires
domestic banks to channel funds to areas of the
economy that had been historically overlooked by
many commercial banking institutions. Much as the
Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 encouraged
large amounts of new capital to flow into community
development investment in the US, Nurcha hopes
that the banking charter can do the same for South
Africa.
The Conditions that Made Nurcha Possible
The Open Society Institute’s Stewart Paperin sees
four fundamental conditions that permit Nurcha to
succeed.
1. The Right Management: First and foremost,
Paperin stresses that an organization like Nurcha
must be managed by deeply knowledgeable
people “on the ground”, grappling with the
problems directly and understanding the needs of
the ultimate recipients of the funds. Trust in those
managers is absolutely essential, and their
competence is the best insurance policy that the
guarantee will not be needed.
2. A Sophisticated Financial System: A
guaranteed lending arrangement like Nurcha
requires that the partners and customers be able
to move funds easily and inexpensively. A
developed consumer financial sector makes
monitoring the loans far easier, thus reducing the
likelihood and cost of defaults.
3. Rule of Law: Nurcha could not operate in a
country where contracts are not enforceable or
where egregious political or social unrest could
imperil the financial industry. These characteristics
affect the fundamental quality of investments,
thereby making them more (potentially prohibitively)
expensive to guarantee.
4. Political Will: Though Nurcha is not a government
programme, the South African government has
been very involved in founding it and in providing
an environment in which it can operate. In addition
to the US$ 5 million start-up financing, the
government has also contributed guarantees
totalling nearly US$ 15 million. Furthermore, the
government supported the industry in a variety of
ways, including making mortgages available to
low-income families. 
While Paperin believes that the approach might be
applied in a number of other economic
development situations where risk is not
appropriately priced, others in his organization are
not as sanguine about the model’s potential for
replication. While the four conditions above are
stringent, it is the first that many think will be the
hardest to overcome.
Concluding Observations
While loan guarantees continue to facilitate
Nurcha’s role in financing the low-cost housing
industry, they have become less central to Nurcha’s
ability to meet its mission—and this condition
suggests the long-term successful application of
those initial credit enhancements. As Nurcha, its
successes and failures revealed the true risks
associated with its customers and lending
products, the commercial markets were
increasingly able to price that risk. In turn, Nurcha
could reduce the credit enhancements as investors
became increasingly comfortable with the
investments’ sound underlying economics.
Second Case Study: Deutsche Bank
Microcredit Development Fund 25
Deutsche Bank’s Microcredit Development Fund
(DB-MDF) has extended the loan guarantee model
to several institutions and has made such vehicles
accessible to donors. 
The Basic Structure of DB-MDF
In 1998 Deutsche Bank (DB), in partnership with
clients from its private bank, established a fund of
donated capital that it invests as de facto loan
guarantees. DB’s clients make donations to the
fund, but the fund intends to reuse that capital
through an innovative investment strategy for the
benefit of MFIs that lack access to adequate
capital. DB-MDF’s goal is to strengthen linkages
between MFIs and their local lenders. 
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DB-MDF makes deeply subordinated, non-
amortizing loans at concessionary rates (1 to 3%).
The loans have a one- to five-year maturity,
depending on the circumstance. The fund
stipulates that these loans are not to be used to
fund overhead or to be re-lent to clients; thus, they
can be maintained as hard-currency deposits. They
are intended to improve the MFIs’ balance sheet
position and augment loss reserves so that they
can more easily borrow funds from local banks.
Much as OSI required Nurcha to leverage its
guarantee, DB-MDF requires its MFI investments to
match the loans with additional borrowing at a ratio
of at least 2:1. The fund does make exceptions in
particular circumstances as long as the borrower
can achieve the desired ratio within two years.
Furthermore, the MFIs can often earn market rate
interest that exceeds the concessionary rate at
which it secures those funds from DB-MDF.
DB’s Community Development Group in New York
manages the fund, screening for MFIs that can use
these products to reach economies of scale that
would otherwise be unavailable to them. Acting as
fund managers, the Community Development
Group has developed expertise in the field of
microfinance, and it has used that expertise to
launch other innovative investment opportunities
that direct capital to MFIs. 
DB-MDF began strictly as an American not-for-
profit, accepting donations (with a minimum
amount of US$ 50,000) from American clients. The
enthusiastic response to the fund has led DB to
expand the programme to Europe and the UK.
Recently, DB-MDF has started accepting
programme-related investments (PRIs) from
foundations. The fund makes loans in the US$
50,000 to US$ 150,000 range, with mean loan
investment of about US$ 125,000. In its first five
years of existence, the fund had invested and
reinvested over US$ 3 million, which, it reports,
enabled over US$ 42 million to be leveraged
through additional financing. The fund has made
loans in 18 different countries around the world.
Placing DB-MDF in Context
While the DB-MDF strategy is not, strictly speaking,
a loan guarantee, in many ways it functions very
similarly. First, it has demonstrated the successful
application of relatively sophisticated financial
investments to small, often unregulated MFIs that
would not likely have access to mainstream capital
and that need assistance forging relationships with
the local banking sector. The success experienced
by DB-MDF suggests a variety of ways that the
model might be altered to suit MFIs and investors. 
Furthermore, it has demonstrated that the private
sector can assist smaller, riskier MFIs. Though the
financial product is funded by donations, a similar
model might deploy blended value investments
(likely concessionary rate loans) for a similar
purpose. (The lack of favourable tax treatment for
this sort of investment could limit the appeal for
many investors.) One might also be able to change
the characteristics of the loans to the MFIs so that
the cash flows permit a variety of other investment
products. 
Third Case Study: MicroCredit Enterprises26
Like DB’s Microcredit Development Fund,
MicroCredit Enterprises, LLC (MCE) makes loan
guarantee strategies available to individual
participants, but this programme allows MCE to
leverage the assets of guarantors, while allowing
them to retain their capital and invest it. Not only is
this programme among the first to offer a
guarantee strategy to a variety of participants, it
has been developed by entrepreneurs employing a
decidedly open-source model that makes its
structure easily replicable and highly scalable. MCE
waives the copyright to its working documents,
which are available on its website,
http://www.mcenterprises.org, where they can be
downloaded and used as the basis for other similar
programmes. MCE enables guarantors to leverage
their liquid financial assets, which can be held at
almost any financial institution, to secure loans to
MCE, the proceeds of which are, in turn, loaned to
MFIs. The parameters of the guarantee agreement
are elaborated in MCE’s Comprehensive
Informational Memorandum and Philanthropic
Guarantee Agreement (both available on MCE’s
website), which establishes how guarantors’ assets
will be exposed to the risks of default.
MCE: The Organization
MCE was founded by CEO Jonathan C. Lewis as a
limited liability company; it is not a non-profit entity
as defined by the IRS, but the organization is
governed by the principle that its residual earnings
will not be used to enrich private persons (see LLC
Operating Agreement on their website). It has
pledged to minimize expenses and to facilitate
microlending only. Though its officers and
professional service providers have all worked on a
pro bono basis to date, MCE will transfer in 2006
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to a professional model wherein a small paid staff will
supervise the MFI loan portfolio, conduct due
diligence and manage operations. Any expenses,
including salaries, are paid out of the spread between
the cost of borrowing funds and the interest received
from making loans to MFIs. Any excess earnings
beyond MCE’s operating costs are committed to a
loan loss reserve fund that adds a loss cushion for
the guarantors. The programme, described in detail
below, is not an investment opportunity: the
guarantors’ capital is at risk as it secures MCE's
loans, and the guarantors are not offered any upside
potential by virtue of their participation in the
programme. Nevertheless, the guarantors’ assets
facilitate the flow of capital to MFIs and their clients.
MCE: The Investment Vehicle
Guarantors elect to participate in the programme in
US$ 1 million increments. Each guarantor signs a
Philanthropic Guarantee Agreement and other
documentation in which he or she pledges the assets
in a specific brokerage to guarantee loans of up to
US$ 600,000 to MCE, which then re-loans the funds
to MFIs. The guarantors maintain control of their
assets, though they must remain in “permitted
investments”, which, the Information Memo explains,
“typically are limited to cash, mutual funds, stocks,
investment grade bonds, money market funds,
publicly traded shares of real estate investment
trusts." 27 The assets must be relatively liquid in case
they must be sold to repay a defaulted MFI loan.
Guarantors also pledge to keep the value of their
guarantee accounts at a minimum value of US$ 1
million. Any gains or losses in an individual’s account
accrue to the investor. In essence, the guarantor can
continue to manage his or her money as usual,
earning full market-rate returns, while at the same
time allowing MCE to leverage his or her assets by
facilitating the flow of capital to MFIs. Guarantors do
accept a pro rata portion of the risk that MFIs default
on their loans from MCE, which could cause MCE to
default on its borrowings, which, in turn, could create
a capital call on the guarantors.
MCE’s model allows it to partner with a number of
foundations and financial institutions to borrow funds
that are collateralized by guarantors’ accounts. To
loan funds to an MFI, MCE borrows first from the
collaborating foundation or financial institution that
extends it the most favourable terms, though it
pledges to distribute any losses pro-rata among all of
its programme guarantors. Assume, for example, that
MCE has three US$ 1 million guarantee accounts at
Bank A and one US$ 1 million at Bank B. If Bank B
would loan funds on more favourable terms than
Bank A, MCE may borrow US$ 600,000 from Bank
B. However, each of the four guarantee accounts is
exposed to losses up to US$ 150,000. The terms of
MCE’s agreements with collaborating financial
institutions stipulate that the financial institutions will
extend credit for up to 60% of the US$ 1 million
minimum for each account. Thus, if MCE had US$
10 million in loan guarantee accounts, it could
borrow up to US$ 6 million. Accordingly, the loans
are significantly overly collateralized, providing the
partnering foundation or financial institution with
greater security, which, in turn, may provide MCE
with more favourable loan terms that can be passed
on to MFIs. 
Once MCE has borrowed funds in the US, it then
makes and administers loans to MFIs. MCE’s due
diligence and loan monitoring is shared between
MCE and established MFI networks. Essentially, MCE
takes responsibility for a thorough fiscal analysis of
each MFI loan application (a “desk review”), but
primarily invites referrals or “MFI loan nominations”
from established and respected MFI networks.28
Avoiding the costs of a field investigation, MCE taps
into longstanding MFI alliances and working
relationships in order to make the qualitative
assessments about management, board,
governance and transparency. 
MCE has developed relationships with many
networks on different continents with different lending
philosophies or approaches, all of which present
opportunities for loan portfolio diversification. Lewis
indicates that MCE intends to loan funds primarily to
MFIs that serve the poorest client populations and to
MFIs that do not have the same access to capital
that the first tier MFIs have. Though the MFI
borrowers may not have the same access to capital,
MCE will not compromise on their financial heath; all
must be financially sustainable or demonstrably
moving toward self-sufficiency. The programme
makes loans to MFIs with a range of legal structures
(private, cooperative, non-profit, etc.). Furthermore,
MCE carefully monitors the loans, ensuring that it
does not lend beyond the MFIs’ capacity to absorb
new debt capital.
MCE’s loans to MFIs typically mature in three years
and have very flexible payment terms. Most of MCE’s
loans will be directed to MFIs serving the poorest
microborrowers, a practice that will generate the
most blended value leverage. Lewis estimates that a
US$ 1 million guarantee can translate into as many
as 20,000 microloans in the first year alone. 
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Proof of Concept
After demonstrating the general concept by
securing seven US$ 1 million guarantors in 2005,
MCE temporarily stopped actively seeking
guarantors. Though MCE can borrow up to US$
4.2 million against those accounts, it aims to make
loans to MFIs totalling US$ 3 million in its first full
year of operation, commencing 1 January 2006. Of
the first seven guarantors, two are not-for-profit
institutions (Oxfam America and Freedom from
Hunger) that have pledged portions of their reserve
accounts and the other five are high net worth
individuals. In the next year, Lewis plans to secure
guarantees totalling US$ 20 million, and within a
few years, he envisions that the guarantee pool can
reach US$ 100 million dollars—money that will be
working financially for its guarantors while
facilitating US$ 60 million in new capital flows to
MFIs.
Surprisingly, the first loan to MCE was difficult to
secure. Though the loans to MCE are over-
collateralized as mentioned earlier, several major
banks balked at participating in the programme.
Their concerns were not related to financial risk;
instead, they were related to the reputational risk
associated with these new types of loans to a new
entity without a proven track record. The banks
offered to make the loans only if the guarantors
would be jointly and severally liable for the entire
loan (in excess of their US$ 1 million collateral
account value), which would essentially allow the
lender to choose which guarantors it would pursue
in the case of an MFI loan default. Such an
arrangement would have violated one of the
cornerstones of MCE's programme, which is that
guarantors can participate in the programme and
incur relatively finite risks that will be shared among
all of the guarantors.
Instead, MCE established a new borrowing model,
sourcing a US$ 3 million loan from the Calvert
Social Investment Foundation. According to Lewis,
as the collateral base grows, MCE will diversify its
lenders by establishing similar borrowing
relationships with other foundations and financial
institutions, depending on where it can secure the
most favourable terms. 
In January 2006, MCE made its first loan, directing
US$ 700,000 to an MFI in Bolivia with an average
client loan size of US$ 185.
Building the Product 
Professional Service Providers
Lewis and MCE worked very closely with John
Ferguson, a partner resident in the New York office
of Goodwin Procter LLP. Ferguson and his
colleagues, all financial transaction and capital
markets specialists, were eager to participate in the
project, which offered a relatively rare opportunity
to deploy the partners’ financial transactions
expertise in a pro bono setting. In addition to
professional and functional input from multiple law
firms, financial professionals, graduate students
and others, MCE drew deeply on the opinions and
interests of potential guarantors. Many of the
programme’s features arose directly from the
guarantors’ input. Uniting all of these contributors,
Lewis reports, are both a drive to help
microborrowers and a desire to build a robust, new
financing strategy that can be freely adopted by
other practitioners.
Characteristics of the Guarantee Agreements
Duration of the Guarantees: Initially, Lewis had
envisioned a relatively short-term guarantee that
would require minimal notice (possibly as short as
only 90 days) before a guarantor terminated the
agreement. Prospective guarantors eventually
persuaded him to make the standard guarantees
longer term. As a result, the guarantee agreements
now require that a guarantor provide 18 months’
advanced notice before ending the agreement and
exiting the programme. 12 months after the initial
notice, the guarantors may remove 50% of their
collateral assets, and six months later they may
withdraw the remaining 50%. This arrangement
ensures that all guarantors will have relatively
consistent, predictable risk exposure to defaults.
When a guarantor exits, the risk exposure for the
remaining guarantors increases until the
outstanding loan balance is decreased or additional
guarantors are added. The 18-month provision also
gives MCE the ability to line up new guarantors to
replace exiting guarantors or to manage its loan
portfolio so that guarantors’ risk exposure remains
stable.
Loan Performance Contingency Account: At
the suggestion of the guarantors, MCE has
negotiated with its MFI networks to provide a five
percent first-loss reserve for any loans that they
administer. This provision offers some protection
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against moral hazard, the risk that the MFI
networks will channel capital to their own MFI
partners or allies that can least afford to repay it.
With their own capital at risk, the networks have
incentives to carefully monitor MFI loans. 
Ponzi Protection: MCE and potential investors
intentionally tried to determine how this investment
vehicle might be misused if applied maliciously or
incompetently. By making all of their work open-
source, the guarantors and MCE effectively
pledged to make the structure available to anyone
wishing to use it, whether for good or ill. They were
concerned both with the potential that people
could do harm with their new structure and with
the potential that this new strategy could be sullied
by such harm. 
One of their greatest concerns was that this
structure could be used, more or less, as a
pyramid scheme. An unscrupulous guarantee fund
could acquire new guarantors to support new loans
that would be used to pay back non-performing
loans (instead of taking a loss and invoking a
collateral call on existing guarantors). To prevent
this and to demonstrate the integrity of the model,
MCE forces itself to realize and allocate losses to
guarantors if a loan to an MFI is past due beyond a
certain grace period. Though it has not happened
yet, MCE can imagine a case in which it recognizes
a default on a non-performing loan that is later
recovered. Should such an event happen, it will
refund any related collateral calls it makes on its
guarantors. 
Standby Letter of Credit Functionality: MCE
and its prospective guarantors obviously loathe the
possibility of defaulting on loans to foundations or
bank lenders. If a loan to an MFI does not perform,
MCE is the party that defaults on its loan to the
foundations or banks. To avoid MCE’s defaulting on
one of its borrowings, the guarantee agreement
includes a provision that resembles a standby letter
of credit. The guarantors pledge to fund loan
deficiencies (pro-rata) above any first loss
provisions proffered by the MFI. Thus, the
guarantors can meet any collateral call with liquid
assets not held in the guarantee account. In the
event that losses get allocated to guarantors and
the guarantors cannot honour the standby letter of
credit feature of the agreement, MCE would then
be forced to default on one or more loans, and only
then would the lenders to MCE seek direct
recourse against the guarantors and their pledged
accounts.
Future Opportunities
Beyond dramatically increasing the scale of its own
operations, MCE sees vast opportunities for the
pooled guarantee model to magnify the flow of
capital to projects in developing economies.
Ferguson suggests that multinational banks would be
well-situated themselves to create a similar
programme (alone or in partnership with MCE) and
then, with its existing customers and international
infrastructure, execute it more efficiently. With those
strengths, a bank has the potential to pool
guarantees from many more clients, which, in turn,
might permit a smaller minimum guarantee, below
US$ 1 million.
Nevertheless, a potential limitation may eventually be
the availability of creditworthy MFIs capable of
productively absorbing more debt capital, especially
debt capital that is sourced internationally.
Furthermore, the still-developing infrastructure to
deploy and monitor MFI loans may not be able to
keep pace with the new capital entering the sector. It
should be noted that this constraint is not binding
now. Some actors in the microfinance capital
markets do not believe that the “boots on the ground
constraint” will become a major concern. They
suggest that as more capital continues to flow into
the sector, the MFI networks and other infrastructure
providers on the ground will expand their work at
least as quickly. 
Fourth Case Study: Grameen Foundation
USA’s Growth Guarantees Programme 29
Grameen Foundation USA (GFUSA) recently
launched its Growth Guarantees (GG) programme,
which is structured similarly to MicroCredit
Enterprises’ guarantee programme. However,
GFUSA’s programme uses those dollar-denominated
guarantees to support local commercial bank lending
and capital markets transactions in local currencies.
The lending products that GG makes available to
MFIs are very flexible, but all of them intend to forge
connections between the MFIs and their local banks
or other local investors. 
The Origins of GFUSA-GG
The idea for the Growth Guarantees programme
arose from a meeting of high net worth individuals
who had already supported GFUSA’s work. These
individuals came together to develop new ways to
channel capital into the sector, particularly into
GFUSA-affiliated MFIs. From this meeting, the pooled
guarantee fund was born. 
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GFUSA’s Capital Markets Group, which is led by
Jennifer Meehan (whose work is cited elsewhere in
this study) manages the GG programme. Donor-
guarantors’ minimum guarantee is US$ 1 million,
pledged for five years to Citibank in the form of a
standby letter of credit (SBLC).30 The donor-
guarantor’s SBLC is backed by a portfolio
approved by the donor-guarantor and the issuing
bank. Donor-guarantors continue to realize the
returns on their portfolios. These guarantees are
pooled to support SBLCs issued by Citibank (in the
amount of US$ 100,000 to US$ 5 million and for
durations up to 4.5 years) to financial institutions in
the countries where the MFIs operate. Grameen
charges the MFIs benefiting from GG-arranged
financing a 1.5-2.5% annual fee for providing the
guarantee and associated services. 
Local Currency, Local Connections
The SBLCs enable a variety of financing strategies
that aim to build relationships between MFIs and
their local banking institutions and other capital
markets players. GFUSA believes that the MFIs
gain by learning more about their local suppliers of
capital. Not only should local banks learn more
about the microfinance sector, GFUSA hopes that
Citibank-supported guarantees will eventually help
the local banks price the risks associated with
loans to MFIs and other financing organizations
more appropriately, thereby making more capital
available to all. 
In the MFIs’ domestic markets, the
GFUSA/Citibank supported financial transactions
can take a variety of forms, including direct loans
from local banks to MFIs, securitization of MFI
portfolios (wherein the GFUSA/Citibank SBLC
offers investors some manner of first-loss cushion),
partnerships between MFIs and local financial
institutions, and any number of other potential
transactions. These guarantees are vetted and
managed by the GFUSA Capital Markets Group
and approved by an independent investment
committee. 
GFUSA’s capital markets group has developed a
robust screen for “high growth, professionally
managed MFIs that have a documented poverty
focus."31 While many of the products and services
will go to MFIs already associated with Grameen,
GFUSA has also developed a strategy to work with
poverty-focused MFIs outside of the GFUSA
network. 
Regardless of how those products are structured
for the MFIs, GFUSA stipulates that they must be
leveraged at a minimum rate of 2:1. Furthermore,
those financings must be devoted to growth
through new loans, not to overhead or capital
expenditures. Ultimately, GFUSA estimates that
US$ 50 million in guarantees could guarantee up to
US$ 300 million in microloans.32
Investor enthusiasm for the GG product propelled
the first closing in October 2005 to US$ 31 million,
US$ 11 million more than its managers had
anticipated. GFUSA aims to reach US$ 50 million in
guarantees by its second closing in 2007.
Fifth Case Study: Global Commercial
Microfinance Consortium33
Organized and placed by Deutsche Bank’s
Community Development Group, which administers
the bank’s Microcredit Development Fund, the
Global Commercial Microfinance Consortium is
remarkable for its flexibility with respect to financing
MFIs, its capital structure sophistication, and its
degree of collaboration between major financial
institutions. Ultimately, the Consortium bodes well
for the future involvement of mainstream investors
in financing international blended value
investments.
The Consortium closed in November 2005 at US$
75 million in committed capital. The press release
announcing the consortium’s closing lists 26
consortium partners.34 They include mainstream
financial institutions, foundations, socially
responsible asset managers, pension funds, state-
supported aid agencies and high net worth
individuals. (See box for the complete list of
investors.) The Consortium’s sophisticated structure
permits the participants to select the risk-reward
profile of their investment. By the time that the
fund’s closing was announced, it had already
committed US$ 30 million to MFIs in Peru, Kosovo,
Nicaragua, Azerbaijan, Columbia, Pakistan,
Mozambique and India.35
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made in hard currency, while interest payments can
be in hard or local currency, depending on the
nature of the arrangement. See figure 3 for the
Consortium’s visual representation of this financing
arrangement.
Deposit Structures: These investments are the
same as used by the Deutsche Bank Microcredit
Development Fund. Figure 4 presents the
Consortium’s graphical representation of this
strategy.
Loan Guarantees: Working through commercial
banks that issue standby letters of credit, the
consortium will also make deposits to serve as
guarantees, much as MCE’s and GG’s guarantors
facilitate investments. See figure 5 for the
Consortium’s representation of these
arrangements. 
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Flexible Financing for MFIs
Similar to GFUSA’s Growth Guarantees
programme, the Consortium structures its financial
products specifically to suit the needs of borrowers
(and the regulatory environments in which they
operate). Though not limited to these examples, the
Consortium will deploy the following financing
mechanisms. 
Co-Lending: Under such an arrangement, the
Consortium provides a portion of the capital to
make local-currency loans through local banks.
Such arrangements bring new capital to MFIs while
sharing the exposure to foreign currency fluctuation
with the local bank. Local banks initiate and service
local currency loans to MFIs. The consortium then
purchases a portion of those loans from the local
bank, stipulating that principal payments must be
Credit Guarantees and Enhancements: 
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Figure 3: Co-Lending Mechanisms
Source: Deutsche Bank Global Commercial Microfinance Consortium Investor Presentation,
28 November 2005
1. Agence Française de Développement
2. AXA Group
3. Calvert Social Investment Foundation
4. CNP Assurances
5. Deutsche Bank
6. Geisse Foundation
7. General Board of Pension and Health Benefits of the
United Methodist Church
8. Gray Ghost Fund
9. Hewlett-Packard
10. Kaminer Foundation
11. Left Hand Foundation
12. Merrill Lynch
13. MMA
14. Munich Re
15. Rauenhorst Foundation, 
16. Standard Life
17. State Street Corporation
18. Storebrand
19. The Church Pension Fund
20. The Co-operative Bank Plc 
21. UK Department for International Development
22. US Agency for International Development
23. David Fitzherbert
24. Elizabeth and Steve Funk
25. Deepak Kamra
26. Janet A. McKinley
Global Commercial Microfinance Consortium Members
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Just above the DFID’s first loss provision are Class
B equity holders, who committed a total of US$ 5.5
million. (Deutsche Bank has also committed US$ 1
million to this tranche.) In the event that loan losses
exceed US$ 1.5 million, Class B equity holders will
absorb the losses to the limit of their capital
commitments. In exchange for this exposure, Class
B equity will earn a yield of up to 12% annually
after the senior tranches are satisfied. 
Capital Structure
The essential structure of the fund has a US$ 60
million tranche of five-year notes cushioned by
three tranches of equity totalling US$ 15 million.
(Please see figure 6 for the Consortium’s capital
structure diagram.) The most deeply subordinated
tranche is a US$ 1.5 million first-loss provision in
the form of a deposit by the UK’s Department for
International Development (DFID). Any residual
funds in this tranche that were not absorbed as
losses over the Consortium’s five-year life will be
committed to future similar financings. 
Credit Guarantees and Enhancements: 
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Figure 4: Deposit Structures
Source: Deutsche Bank Global Commercial Microfinance Consortium Investor Presentation,
28 November 2005
Figure 5: Loan Guarantees
Source: Deutsche Bank Global Commercial Microfinance Consortium Investor Presentation,
28 November 2005
Senior to the Class B equity is a Class A equity
tranche, totalling US$ 8 million in committed capital.
Class B equity holders are next in line to receive losses
should they exceed US$ 7 million. They are
compensated for this risk by earning a yield of up to
seven percent, distributed periodically after the note
holders are satisfied. 
The notes in the senior tranche will pay the London
Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR) plus 1.25%. Not only are
the notes cushioned by US$ 15 million in subordinated
tranches, USAID has pledged a US$ 15 million loss
guarantee on top of that provided by the equity
tranches. Thus, the consortium can incur up to US$
30 million in losses before the note holders lose any of
their principal. Even in the event of total loss, note
holders will still benefit from the USAID guarantee,
receiving at least one-fourth of their principal. 
Scale
While not the largest MFI-financing offering
(BlueOrchard’s fund totalled US$ 87 million), the scale
of this offering is significant. Asad Mahmood, Director
of DB’s Community Development Finance Group and
General Manager of DB’s Microfinance Funds,
suggests that size of the fund plus the resources
afforded by the consortium partners will facilitate
his group’s due diligence and monitoring of the
Consortium’s investments. That scale advantage
further enables the consortium to engineer financial
products best suited for the MFIs in which it
invests.
Mahmood and his colleagues had originally
targeted a fund size of US$ 50 million, which had
grown to US$ 75 million by November. The
oversubscription bodes well for MFIs that need
access to capital, and it suggests significant
demand for sophisticated and versatile large-scale
offerings. The deal size remains small for
mainstream investment banks; nevertheless, the
consortium members include Deutsche Bank,
Merrill Lynch and Calvert Foundation, all of which
have the capacity to structure future investments.
Many of the other consortium members, including
insurance companies and pension funds, are
institutional investors of large amounts of capital.
Mahmood believes in convening and collaborating
with diverse actors and investors, and he suggests
that one function of the consortium is to bring
together investors, bankers and other parties to
exchange ideas and build momentum behind this
sort of innovative financing. 
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Figure 6: Global Commercial Microfinance Consortium Capital Structure
Source: Deutsche Bank Global Commercial Microfinance Consortium Investor Presentation, 28 November 2005
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The flexibility with which the Consortium deploys its
capital indicates how accommodating financial
instruments can be when they combine aspects of
debt, equity and the risk-sharing of credit
guarantees. It does not take a very large leap to
imagine how this sort of sophisticated financial
engineering could be applied to other development
finance projects including low-cost housing finance,
the construction of utilities infrastructure in
developing economies, or any number of other
international economic development projects. 
In conclusion, the loan guarantee is a powerful and
versatile tool. The case studies in this section
demonstrate that loan guarantees generate more
than money: they forge partnerships, eventually
help mainstream financial institutions understand
and accurately price risk, and demonstrate blended
value projects’ viability—all while giving the
guarantor market rate returns.
Concluding Thoughts 
Mahmood argues that most participants are not
buying Consortium’s product because it offers an
appealing financial risk-reward opportunity or
because the investment’s value will be uncorrelated
with other investments. He sees investors seeking
products like the Consortium because they care
about where their capital goes, and they want to
deploy it for good. His observation suggests a
future for blended value investing that will include
more, larger, increasingly sophisticated investors
seeking multiple returns and deploying their capital
in ways that ever-more accurately reflect a
multidimensional approach to value.
Credit Guarantees and Enhancements: 
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Introduction
The universe of international blended value private
equity investments is enormous, ranging from
informal micro-capital investments by individuals all
the way to professional private equity funds
investing hundreds of millions of dollars in
developing economies. Investment strategies range
from social-value maximizing approaches to
blended-value investment methodologies to strictly
profit-maximizing investing. Given the broad range
of investors, funds and deals in this realm, this
section cannot be exhaustively comprehensive.
Instead, it examines a range of methods deployed
in the United States, followed by three very different
international investment approaches, each
deliberately adapting standard private equity
practices to generate blended value returns.
The Crucial Role of Private Equity Investment in
Developing Economies
Private equity investment is essential to building
robust private sectors that create employment,
improve living standards and produce tax revenues.
Equity investors are usually more risk-tolerant than
debt investors. They commit their capital for an
uncertain term and have a residual claim on
earnings only after all debt obligations have been
satisfied. Equity investors face a host of other risks,
several of which are explored below.
Equity investments are particularly suitable for early
stage companies that will have unpredictable cash
flows and accordingly are not suitable for debt
investments. Unlike lenders, who maintain an
arm's-length relationship with their borrowers in
most circumstances, private equity investors can
mitigate some of their risks by exercising a large
measure of influence or control over the
investments, and such investor engagement often
encourages transfers of best practices and
organizational capacity building. That involvement
can help businesses build better, more efficient
business processes, improve their corporate
governance, forge partnerships with other
businesses, and work more productively with other
local institutions. The investors can also advocate
for and/or support the entrepreneur’s efforts to
create, social and environmental value that, in turn,
often builds enhanced economic value. 
A Survey of Risks and Challenges
Private equity investors in developing economies
face a variety of formidable risks that tend to be
more severe than similar investments in developed
economies. Savvy investors can deploy tactics to
minimize some of these potential hazards, but
many of them cannot be eliminated; all of them can
challenge the likelihood of fully risk-adjusted market
returns. 
Corporate governance: Many cultures and
economies lack a tradition and expectation of
corporate governance that protects all
stakeholders. Small enterprises particularly are
often not subject to regulations that would
encourage optimal governing practices. Remote
investors not steeped in local culture may find it
difficult to implement prudent governance.
Management competence: Frequently,
entrepreneurs do not have the opportunities to
work in well-run companies before starting their
own businesses. Without widely available
management training or relevant previous
experience, enterprises in developing economies
often lack well-trained managers.
Multiple ways of extracting value: Developed
economies have established (and narrowly defined)
means of extracting value from specific companies
through interest, dividends or a sale of business. In
many cultures, returns are generated in other ways.
Examples include directing business to other
companies controlled by a business’s principals or
hiring family and friends (in the developed world,
such practices would be decried as self-dealing or
cronyism). Such practices are by no means
confined to developing economies, but in many
cultures, these practices are considered legitimate
ways of distributing value.
Corruption and graft: Certain countries and
economic sectors face this obstacle more severely
than others. Operating a business that does not
engage in such practices can engender a very real
competitive disadvantage when competing against
business that do.36
Bureaucracy: In many parts of the world,
businesses face great bureaucratic regulatory
hurdles when founding and operating businesses.
Particularly when bureaucracy and corruption
interact, the effect can dramatically chill a country’s
investment climate.37
Innovations in Private Equity Investing
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Country risk - political and macroeconomic
volatility: With less political and economic stability
in developing countries, private enterprises face a
grave range of hazards from coups d’etat to
currency devaluations. The duration of equity
investments and the extraordinary difficulty in
building currency hedges make currency exchange
fluctuations a significant risk. 
Rule of law and enforcement of contracts:
Many investors take a well-developed code of
corporate law and a relatively functional judiciary for
granted. Such conditions make contracts
enforceable and give recourse to entities that have
been wronged. Without them, an enterprise must
carefully attempt to do business only with entities
that will honour their contracts and obligations. In
many emerging economies, the law and judiciary
are not dependable, which increases transaction
costs and risks.
Exits: Realizing a return either through a sale or
public offering can be especially difficult when such
strategies are rarely practiced or supported by a
robust financial sector. Sales and ownership
transfers depend not only on the presence of
buyers and sellers (which may be relatively thin in
emerging economic environments), but also require
supporting professional services and infrastructure,
including banking, accounting and legal services.
Such support may also be in short supply in less
developed economies.
Innovations in Private Equity Investing
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As venture capital (VC) has generated spectacular
financial value in the United States and other
developed economies, many investors have sought
to deploy risk capital with VC-like models that
deliberately seek returns in multiple dimensions. In
a number of locations in the United States,
innovative blended value investors have sought to
link community development investing to venture
capital.38 These investors make equity investments
available to small enterprises that would create
local employment opportunities and otherwise
enhance the local communities. As many of these
funds are dedicated to a specific geographic or
municipal area, they significantly limit the number of
companies in which they can invest. Furthermore,
the nature of the returns they seek often renders
their financial returns concessionary. 
The Community Development Venture Capital
Alliance, an investors’ trade association, offers a
variety of tools for exploring these investment
strategies and the funds that deploy them.39 RISE
Capital Market Report: The Double Bottom Line
Private Equity Landscape in 2002/2003, published
by the Columbia Business School’s Research
Initiative on Social Entrepreneurship (RISE) in
January 2004, remains an excellent starting point
for further examination of blended value venture
capital investing in the United States.40
Pacific Community Ventures
Founded in 1999, Pacific Community Ventures
(PCV) has become a leader in the area of
community development venture capital. PCV
enhances and invests in businesses that bring
economic opportunities to low-income
communities in California. PCV manages two
venture capital funds, PCV Investment Partners I
and II. The organization also offers “Business
Advisory Services”, capacity-building assistance for
area businesses and social purpose enterprises
that corroborate the organization’s mission. 
PCV invests in companies that operate in or near
low-income communities and employ the residents
of those communities. The investment screen
assesses the quality of employment opportunities
that the company offers, including the quality of
benefits and potential for advancement. The funds
measure multiple returns on a variety of
parameters, which they then make available to the
public.41 The fund makes US$ 1 million to US$ 5
million in equity investments in companies that
realize annual revenues of at least US$ 5 million
and have the potential to grow in ways that enrich
their employees. The funds will invest alone, but
often they invest in syndicates that include
investors not using blended value investment
frameworks.
PCV recently realized significant gains when
portfolio company Timbuk2 was acquired by a
private equity fund. The liquidity event triggered
significant cash payouts to local, non-management
employees, many of whom live in economically
depressed areas, in some cases doubling annual
salaries. While this sort of event is usually a very
good thing for investors, it rarely touches
employees. 
Environmental and Clean Technology Funds
Another relevant class of venture capital funds
directs investments at an industry or sector that will
generate multiple returns. A significant number of
such funds direct their capital to renewable energy
or clean technology. Many of these funds do not
make substantial changes to the standard venture
model, and may be managed in a fashion all but
indistinguishable from their peers on Sand Hill Road
in Palo Alto, California—the difference, however, is
their focus on leveraging environmental value
through the application of market rate capital
investments.
Expansion Capital Partners, LLC
Expansion Capital Partners (ECP) invests
specifically in clean technology, which it defines as
“[t]echnologies that offer dramatic improvements in
resource productivity, creating more economic
value with less energy, less materials and less
waste. These technologies significantly lower cost
and improve profitability, with short payback
periods."42 Expansion offers a compelling
investment thesis for focusing on this sector, noting
that these markets are growing quickly, that
companies in the space have been under-invested
to date, and that venture investments in clean tech
offer investors a measure of diversification beyond
the typical venture capital industry foci. Expansion
seeks equity investment opportunities in companies
realizing US$ 2 million to US$ 20 million in revenues
with the potential to grow considerably larger. Its
target investments range in size from US$ 500,000
to US$ 2 million, and the fund aims to realize an
IRR in excess of 25% (before subtracting fees and
carried interest). Investors in ECP include an array
of both individuals and private foundations.
Variations on Traditional Venture Capital
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Solstice Capital
With offices in Boston, Massachusetts and Tucson,
Arizona, Solstice Capital bills itself as an “early-
stage, diversified, positive-impact venture fund”
investing in alternative energy, environment, life
sciences, education and information technology.
The partners have committed to investing 50% of
their two funds in socially responsible investments.
Solstice notes that “socially responsive investments
can generate superior venture capital returns and
make a positive contribution to the natural and
social environments.”43
Solstice is affiliated with Village Ventures Partner
Funds, a network of affiliated venture capital
investors focused on investing in American
geographic areas that have been typically
overlooked by venture investors. Village Ventures
centralizes many of its partners’ administrative and
operational services, allowing the partners to focus
on their core investment responsibilities. Affiliation
with Village Ventures also improves Solstice’s deal
flow exposure. Solstice’s two funds, formed in
1995 and 2001, manage a total of US$ 85 million.
Solstice’s early stage investments tend to range in
size from US$ 500,000 to US$ 1 million, and the
firm is committed to syndicating its investments
and regularly co-invests with other firms. 
Blended Value Angel Investing
Many businesses are not suited to venture capital,
which, particularly in its established and widely
practiced forms, only invests in a relatively narrow
type of business. Most businesses take too long to
mature before a liquidity event, are not likely to
achieve the financial return hurdles that VCs
require, or are in industries that garner little
attention from venture capitalists. 
Entrepreneurs not able to secure venture capital will
turn to angel investors, individual private equity
investors who commit their personal capital and
assistance to private enterprises that do not meet
venture capitalists’ investment profile. In the US,
angel financing remains a loosely defined
investment class that can be difficult to assess.
Angel investors have a wide range of motivations
and approaches to their investments, but most
invest in ventures operating in the industries where
they have had previous success, where their
human capital can be as helpful as their financial
capital. 
In the United States, the angel investor capital
market, such as it is, in many ways remains an
inefficient and somewhat localized market; that is,
investors and angel investors are often connected
through interpersonal networks, not through any
kind of market intermediary. Because an angel
investor is accountable only to him or herself (and
does not have a fiduciary duty to maximize financial
profits for limited partners), an angel can invest in
ventures as they suit him or her. Accordingly, one
might expect that angels would be a fruitful source
of capital for entrepreneurs deliberately generating
blended returns—if they could find one another.
Investors’ Circle (IC) aims to help blended value
private investors find ventures that will corroborate
the blend of returns they seek. Though its
members are both individual private equity
investors and venture-style funds, Investors Circle
describes itself as “a leading social venture capital
intermediary whose mission is to support early-
stage, private companies that drive the transition to
a sustainable economy. Founded in 1992, IC has
become one of the nation’s oldest and largest
investor networks, and the only one devoted
specifically to sustainability.”44 A brief survey of the
Investors' Circle website will present the reader
with an array of funds making blended-value private
equity investments in the US. 
First Case Study: ProFund 45
By the end of 2005, ProFund, the first commercial
microfinance equity fund, had exited its
investments, distributed the profits to its investors,
and closed its doors—all according to plan.46 Over
the course of its ten-year life, ProFund
demonstrated irrefutably that one could generate
profits by investing in MFIs even through
exceptionally challenging economic and political
conditions. Whereas ProFund was the only investor
of its kind when founded in 1995, by the time the
fund distributed its gains ten years later, at least 20
other MFI equity funds had embarked on similar
investment strategies.47 In 2003, the proliferation of
this investment strategy led to the creation of the
Council of Microfinance Equity Funds, a
membership organization aiming to advance the
field of microfinance equity investing.48
Not only is Profind’s financial return, at the end of
the day, an illustrative example, the fund’s
administration and the sponsors’ public “post-
mortem” examinations have revealed a variety of
nuanced lessons. 
Variations on Traditional Venture Capital
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ProFund’s Founding Premises
ProFund was predicated on a clear fundamental
need: MFIs in Latin America needed more capital.
The fund proposed to meet that need through equity
investments. Between the need and ProFund’s
solution was the fundamental principle that a social
mission and financial value creation are not only
compatible, but they can be mutually reinforcing. 
Sponsors ACCION International, Calmeadow,
FUNDES, SIDI and Mr Fernando Romero invested in
ProFund to generate social returns, to capture
financial returns, and to demonstrate a model that
had the potential to magnify the social and financial
gains created by microfinance. Those sponsors
contracted with Costa Rican fund manager and
consulting firm Omtrix, SA to manage the fund, and
Omtrix president Alex Silva became the CEO of
ProFund. Silva’s work has been central to the
development of the ProFund approach and he is
referenced throughout the balance of this discussion.
In founding ProFund, the sponsors articulated a
preference for equity investments in MFIs for a
variety of reasons. First, some MFI managers would
prefer equity investments, with their longer-term
investment horizon and lack of regular cash
outflows. Nevertheless, the higher risk associated
with equity investments made such capital scarcer
than other sources. Second, financial institutions can
only borrow up to a certain multiple of their equity
investments (a requirement that varies by regulatory
regime), so equity investments can facilitate follow-
on debt investments. Third, the equity investment
encouraged engagement and influence that could be
exercised through membership on the investees’
boards of directors, where ProFund’s directors could
introduce best practices where appropriate. Finally,
in order to accept equity investments, MFIs had to
acquire a certain level of sophistication. If an investee
MFI was not already a private financial institution, it
would either need to become one or would need to
work with ProFund to craft a quasi-equity investment
structure. Accordingly, the presence of ProFund
encouraged MFIs to become more professionally
managed. 
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In founding the fund, the investors stipulated that
ProFund would have a finite lifespan, ceasing
operations in ten to twelve years after exiting all of
its investments. The requirement forced the fund
managers to deal with one of the most persistent
barriers to private equity investment in microfinance
and in developing economies in general: the lack of
easy opportunities to liquidate investments.
(ProFund’s operational solutions to this challenge
are elaborated later in this case study.) The
founders also recognized that the fund would only
spur similar investments if it could demonstrate
realized returns for the whole portfolio, and
stipulating the fund’s ultimate liquidation guaranteed
that ProFund would produce a conclusive,
indisputable initial rate of return (IRR).
According to standard investment funds’ practice,
ProFund employed an investment committee that
was ultimately responsible for investment decisions.
The fund’s professional staff uncovered and
screened potential deals, negotiated and then
monitored investments, identified exits, and served
as a technical assistance resource to portfolio
investments. Between the staff and investors,
ProFund had extensive microfinance experience,
and it could assist investees through the full range
of their financing, strategy and operations
challenges. 
Though the professional staff had extensive
responsibilities, the fund’s charter ambitiously
restricted administration to three percent of
committed capital. At the fund’s launch, this cap
afforded ProFund only two full-time professional
staff (plus an administrative employee and the input
of paid consultants and other professional services
service providers). Eventually, when the fund’s size
increased (reaching US$ 22 million in 1998 with
more than 15 shareholders), Omtrix was able to
bring in an additional full-time staffer. Eventually, the
fund reduced full-time staff size as it began to exit
investments. 
Quickly, Omtrix recognized that the initial premise of
minimal investment engagement and relatively
hands-off management was impractical. Many of
the fund’s initial investees were “NGO conversions”,
MFIs that were moving from not-for-profit models to
independent financial institutions capable of
handling equity investments. Over the fund’s first
three years, these conversions required significant
attention from the staff. In later years, the investee
profile evolved such that many investments were in
“ProFund does not perceive a conflict between poverty alleviation and
profitability. In fact, it believes that financial viability is a necessity for the
long-term success of poverty alleviation efforts in microfinance.
Accordingly, while most of ProFund’s shareholders are interested in the
development of the microfinance industry, the fund seeks primarily to
receive an adequate return on its investments, which it considers the
most efficient way to entice commercial capital into the sector.”49
newly created financial institutions, which also
compelled highly engaged management. When
macroeconomic turmoil began to sweep Latin
America in the late 1990s, the staff found itself
further stretched, making at least one deal that
saved a healthy MFI from defaulting as a result of
temporary macroeconomic shocks.51 ACCION and
other sponsors readily acknowledge that the staff’s
extraordinary commitment and industry are largely
responsible for the fund’s positive results. Their
experience reveals that close engagement is critical
to such a fund’s success, and, of course, high
engagement requires a commitment of
administrative costs. 
Given the risk associated with equity investments, a
soundly diversified portfolio was indispensable to
ProFund’s success. The resulting portfolio achieved
diversification in countries, organizational forms
(NGO-administered, existing financial institutions,
and conversions from NGO to financial institution),
market penetration and organizational maturity.52 To
protect against undue investment concentration,
the fund set a US$ 4 million cap on any single
investment. While the fund aimed to hold a
substantial equity position in each investee (at least
ten percent of its outstanding shares), ProFund
opted not to take controlling positions; a 20-30%
target became the norm.
ProFund’s operations grappled with a profound,
large-scale shift in the microfinance world, as the
centre of gravity for MFIs’ organizational forms
shifted from NGOs to independent financial
institutions. Not only did the fund develop expertise
in effecting NGO conversions, it also learned to
create near-equity investment structures in
circumstances where the MFI could not accept
equity investments due to its corporate form, by-
laws or regulatory environment. Cataloguing the
specific nature of those investment remains beyond
the scope of this paper, but the resulting
investments typically resembled subordinated debt
or preferred equity. In some cases, they involved
periodic cash flows, and many such investment
vehicles included redemption clauses that provided
investment exits on pre-arranged terms.
Once the fund finished liquidating its investments
and distributing the proceeds to its shareholders,
ProFund had realized a net IRR of 6.65%.
Key Lessons
Over the ten-year life of ProFund, its investors and
staff learned numerous lessons about managing a
microfinance equity fund. Silva explores many of
those operations lessons in his essay, “Investing in
Microfinance: ProFund’s Story”, and readers are
encouraged to refer to that document for a more
detailed exploration of those themes.53
In its survey of microfinance, “The Hidden Wealth of
the Poor”, The Economist said of ProFund’s returns
(before the fund had exited the last of its
investments):
At first sight, its returns look unexciting: just six percent
annually, despite lots of risk. But on close examination
this was a remarkable performance. All of ProFund’s
capital was contributed in dollars and then invested in
local currency. In every country it operated in, its dollar
returns were reduced by local currency depreciations,
reflecting the economic chaos in Latin America during
that decade. Two of the countries in which it had
investments, Paraguay and Ecuador, suffered system-
wide financial collapse. Haiti, Venezuela and Bolivia faced
riots and revolutions.54
In spite of significant currency losses, Silva
indicates that “in most cases . . . the subsequent
operational gains and intrinsic appreciation were
more than enough to offset currency related losses
and provide for the fund’s positive overall yield.”
Silva attributes the net gains to a number of critical
factors. The first is the operational excellence of the
investees’ own management as measured by their
ability to lend to more customers and do so with
increasingly lower overhead costs. Silva has also
acknowledged that ProFund’s early entry into this
market place enabled it to “cherry pick” the best
investments at a lower investment cost, thanks to
its lack of competition for deals. (Interestingly, Silva
observes considerably more financing activity and,
in turn, competition for deals in 2006. He has
stated that he would not run ProFund II in the same
geography because funding alternatives now exist,
diminishing the likely success of a new fund—and
further proving the success of ProFund as an
inspiring demonstration of concept.) 55
Silva further identifies two other necessary
conditions for profitable microfinance equity
investing: the MFI must be located in a country that
provides a sufficient “enabling environment”, and
the MFI’s corporate governance must be sound
and independent. In referring to the appropriate
environment, he points to a country’s regulatory
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and legal milieu. He cites an illustrative example:
“[W]hen the Colombian government imposed tight
interest ceilings and thus prevented [ProFund
investee] Finamerica from recuperating the high
operating costs associate with microfinance,”
ProFund should have recognized the change in the
investment environment and exited the
investment.56 (Unfortunately, ProFund did not act in
time, and the fund eventually realized a loss on that
investment.)
Successfully planning for exits at the time of the
investments’ inception was another key success
factor. Silva notes: “No investment was approved
without some sort of negotiated exit possibility.”57
With liquidity events remaining an elusive goal for
most private equity in developing markets,
ProFund’s example presents a variety of
transferable operational lessons. The fund relied on
several such exit strategies, many of which are
suitable for liquidating minority positions, which can
be especially difficult to sell when most buyers are
seeking controlling interest.
• Put Options: These agreements gave ProFund
the right to sell shares in the investment to a
particular buyer, usually a larger co-investor, on a
particular date at a price determined by the
investment’s performance. The options typically
provided a guaranteed exit opportunity of last
resort that did not necessarily ensure a profit.
• Controlling Block Shareholders’
Agreements: Under such a contract, a number
of minority investors agree to coordinate in selling
their shares in unison so that a buyer can buy a
controlling stake by aggregating several smaller
shareholders’ stakes.
• Management buy-outs: ProFund also
negotiated provisions by which an MFI’s
management could purchase ProFund’s shares.
Such arrangements may also involve seller
financing, in which ProFund would arrange for
the managers to borrow the funds that they
would in turn use to buy out the investors. While
this arrangement ensures that an interested party
will purchase the shares, it also introduces the
potential of moral hazard.58
• Redemption: When ProFund relied on quasi-
equity structures, it typically included a
redemption feature that would coincide with
ProFund’s closure and liquidation date. 
Such provisions ensured that the fund would be
able to liquidate investments, though the preferred
exit remained selling the shares to a strategic
buyer. Potentially offering greater exit multiples,
such buyers also include “local financial institutions
. . . and international socially responsible investors
(including the equity funds).” Nevertheless, “[p]rivate
individual or corporate sector buyers, while present,
have not yet become a major force, and there is
some reluctance to sell to such buyers unless they
are convincingly socially motivated.” 59
Interpreting the Results and Looking to the Future
Particularly considering the macroeconomic
environment in which ProFund operated, its results
are remarkable—and they are made even more so
given the “experimental” nature of the fund.
Nevertheless, Silva observes that a similar fund, if
launched in 2005 in the same geography, would be
hard-pressed to replicate ProFund’s financial
results. Silva points to the “downscaling” of many
mainstream banks that have moved to
microfinance products and otherwise serve
previously un-banked poor people. He notes that
downscaling may have a profound impact on how
financial services are rendered to the poor. 
He notes, “Coupled with lower cost of funds and
underutilized infrastructure, the commercial banks
are clearly more professional and know financial
intermediation better than [most] MFIs. In many
countries, downscaling is already as big as all MFIs
combined.” Such developments help bring financial
services to more poor people by creating increased
competition for microentrepreneurial business. That
increased competition might cramp the returns of
MFI equity funds, but it might also introduce new
exit opportunities for MFI equity investors as
downscaling banks choose between building and
buying microlending capabilities. 
By 2005, a host of other microfinance equity funds
were investing with similar models (though all at
earlier stages in the funds’ lives). They will
eventually contribute their data to the discussion of
the asset class, and their experience will help
establish the extent to which ProFund’s financial
returns can be attributed to its being the first to
market or to other factors, including the quality of
the fund’s management and the overall nature of
the investment strategy. These funds will also
contribute to the body of best demonstrated
practices, which will help investors and managers
understand how to replicate and eventually improve
upon ProFund’s results. 
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Inescapably, ProFund’s experience throws foreign
exchange risk into sharp relief. Even when one
invests anticipating returns on par with mainstream
American private equity portfolios (in the realm of
30-40%), a major currency devaluation can quickly
eliminate hard-won investment returns. Of course,
developing markets and international blended value
investors are quick to point out that foreign
exchange rates can and do move in the other
direction, and in many markets in the mid-2000s,
they did just that. Nevertheless, the financial returns
on investments in developing economies remain
exceptionally sensitive to foreign exchange volatility,
which as yet cannot satisfactorily be mitigated.
Many well-informed would-be international blended
value investors have avoided such investments (in
equity and in debt) largely due to the uncontrollable
and vaguely predictable foreign exchange risk.
When financial services entrepreneurs and financial
institutions develop a mechanism that manages
some foreign exchange risk at a reasonable cost, it
will likely open these investments to dramatic
inflows of capital. 
Concluding Thoughts
Equity investing in MFIs is a critical investment
strategy, but it lacks single risk-reward profile.
Equity investors, even more than debt investors,
buy into the operations of the MFIs they support;
the strong fundamentals of microlending alone will
not generate MFI equity returns unless the financial
institution is well managed. With the equity
investors even further behind debt holders in their
claim on an MFI’s free cash flows, an equity
investor must be that much more certain that
sufficient cash flows will accumulate. The
extraordinary range of corporate forms, lending
models, and management strategies employed by
MFIs makes equity investing a complex proposition.
For example, the risk profile of an MFI converting
from NGO to independent financial institution will
differ significantly from an established financial
institution that is extending its conventional models
to new markets. Accordingly, perceptive, astute
fund managers with deep microfinance and capital
markets experience are absolutely essential to the
success of equity funds. 
ProFund has proven unambiguously that one can
create social and financial value by investing in MFI
equity, but investors have a long way to go before
truly understanding the risk-reward profile of some
of these investments. Fortunately, other blended
value investors have engaged in this investment
strategy and in due time will help reveal its nature.
Second Case Study: Aavishkaar India Micro
Venture Capital Fund 60
Founding Aavishkaar
Aavishkaar founder and CEO Vineet Rai discovered
the need for micro-scale equity investments as the
CEO of the Grassroots Innovation Augmentation
Network (GIAN), an incubator for rural ventures in
India. The entrepreneurs working with GIAN were
caught between established financing mechanisms.
Microfinance was not appropriate for these
inventors; many had grown too large for microloans.
Furthermore, these entrepreneurs were often
creative inventors who had developed novel ways of
addressing problems. Their inventions still required
investment before they would generate predictable
cash flows; accordingly, they were simply not suited
to debt financing. 
Rai’s entrepreneurs faced financial institutions that
were not equipped to help them grow. Many banks
simply did not have programmes for working with
small enterprises, especially those that were
dispersed throughout rural areas. While India has a
vital and growing venture capital market, most VCs
are located in the cities (to be close to the clusters
of innovation), and they operate almost exclusively at
a scale that is an order of magnitude larger than
GIAN’s entrepreneurs. Rural India simply does not
offer an angel network that could finance these
enterprises. 
Thus, Rai’s entrepreneurs faced a grave funding gap
between microfinance investment products (usually
well below US$ 1,000) and established venture
capital fund investments (typically beyond US$
1,000,000). The rural entrepreneurs being incubated
by GIAN needed flexible equity financing, patient
capital that would help them build their enterprises’
capacity and open further opportunities for growth.
After meeting with Indians living in Singapore, who
themselves were contemplating more sustainable
ways of supporting their motherland, Rai and his
associates conceived of a new financing entity to
address that gap, and Aavishkaar India Micro
Venture Capital was born. In Hindi, Aavishkaar
means innovation, and it invests in innovative rural
enterprises that are “socially relevant,
environmentally friendly, and commercially viable.” 61
Like traditional venture capital, Aavishkaar focuses
on innovations that have the potential to benefit from
economies of scale. Unlike the typical venture capital
model, Aavishkaar invests only in small enterprises
that could make a difference in the lives of rural
Indians. 
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Managing Regulatory Constraints
Beginning in 2002, Aavishkaar approached India’s
Securities and Exchange Board (SEBI) with the
intention of formally incorporating as a venture
capital fund. Formal incorporation posed a number
of obstacles, including a minimum fund size that
exceeded Aavishkaar’s initial capacity to invest. The
minimum fund size delayed Aavishkaar’s initial
venture investments while it worked to build a
sufficiently large fund. The founders opened a
Singaporean sister company, Aavishkaar
International, to pool overseas investors’ capital for
investment in Aavishkaar as a single entity, an
arrangement prompted by SEBI’s regulations. The
fund ultimately met its regulatory requirements and
formally incorporated in May 2002.
Dr V. Anantha Nageswaran, a member of
Aavishkaar’s management board, indicates that
Indian regulations do not encourage the flow of
capital into non-traditional VC investments. He
notes: “If banks could be allowed to contribute to .
. . non-traditional venture capital funds, and if such
contributions counted toward their obligations to
the priority sector, then the flow of funds to the
non-traditional venture capital industry would
increase.” 62 Furthermore, some flexibility in the size
and structure of the regulated venture fund would
encourage further growth. 
Fund and Deal Profile
Aavishkaar’s investors are mostly individuals, and
they have committed an average of about US$
16,000 to the fund. In late 2005, the fund totalled
about US$ 1.3 million, and it had placed six
investments, with several others nearing
completion.
Investments are scaled appropriately to the target
companies that Aavishkaar aims to support, and
the deals range in size from US$ 10,000 to US$
100,000 with the average being about US$ 30,000.
Aavishkaar seeks an ownership stake of
approximately 26%. While the investments are
smaller than those of a typical VC, Aavishkaar
targets VC-level returns for each investment, aiming
for a 32% internal rate of return (IRR). Nevertheless,
Rai anticipates a rate of enterprise failure that will
likely exceed the typical VC’s rate, and he
anticipates the overall fund’s IRR ultimately to be in
the range of 5 to 10%. 
He anticipates the duration of a typical investment
will be as long as seven to nine years, which is
considerably longer than the typical holding period
of a standard VC. Accordingly, the fund has not yet
exited a deal. Nevertheless, those exits are likely
ultimately to come in the form of a share buyback
(in which the entrepreneur repurchases shares in
his or her own company either with accumulated
earnings or with commercially available debt),
merger or sale of the enterprise, but Rai does not
rule out the possibility that one of these enterprises
will ultimately be sold on the public markets. 
Investment Example
One of Aavishkaar’s first investments was in Shri
Kamdenu Electronics Private Ltd (SKEPL) in April
2003. The fund invested about US$ 36,000 for a
26% stake in the company, which develops
appropriate technology for dairy cooperatives.
SKEPL’s product portfolio includes automated milk
collection and analysis systems that are suitable for
use in India’s tens of thousands of milk
cooperatives. The product has the potential to
make milk production safer and more efficient,
thereby potentially improving the lots of the millions
of milk co-op members.
Lessons Learned (or Lessons Learning)
Rai and everyone associated with Aavishkaar treat
their fund as a carefully executed, high-stakes
experiment. With a risk tolerance suitable to Silicon
Valley, Rai declares that even if Aavishkaar fails, it
will have been a success in that it will advance the
state of the discourse about financing innovative
rural entrepreneurs. He is confident that a private
equity market will eventually grow up around these
entrepreneurs, and Aavishkaar’s approach may
hasten the day it arrives. Nevertheless, he
acknowledges that the market is miniscule, and a
failure now could hobble the asset class for a long
time. 
In its several years of operation, Aavishkaar has
seen its deal flow improve gradually but
continuously, and the investment pipeline is now
better suited to the size of the fund than it was in
the early days. As Aavishkaar establishes a
reputation, it sees more potential deals, including
many that fall out of its focus area. Fund managers
must resist the temptation to make larger
investments that do not strictly fit the fund’s
investment focus. The temptation to move toward
larger deals is great, as larger deals are, from a
financial perspective, more efficient ways of
deploying capital. Rai ultimately observes that
Aavishkaar’s small investment scale will limit its
profitability, and it is difficult to imagine that the
returns can be sufficiently large to overcome the
costs associated with supporting the investments
(e.g.: due diligence, investment monitoring and
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technical assistance). Without substantial returns,
Rai raises concerns about retaining his capable and
passionate staff. He needs employees with
substantial professional financial experience and
the opportunity costs for such professionals can be
quite high.
In spite of these challenges, Aavishkaar has
launched a viable fund in an investment space that
has not yet had the benefit of competitors who can
address the same challenges that Rai faces. The
prospect of competition is very appealing to Rai, as
other funds will help wring out inefficiencies, attract
more capital to the sector, and ultimately make it
more viable for rural entrepreneurs to take risks for
the sake of building value. Though Aavishkaar still
has no direct competitors, the fund has attracted
the attention of other investors who are considering
similar investment strategies, with one similar fund
apparently close to launching.
Third Case Study: ShoreCap International
and ShoreCap Exchange63
ShoreCap International (SCI) is a private equity fund
investing in MFIs and banking institutions that
finance small- and medium-sized enterprises
(SMEs) in Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe. SCI is
not the only private equity fund investing in such
institutions. This document refers to other MFI
equity investors, but there is an increasing number
of funds investing primarily in financial institutions
serving SMEs in emerging economies. The Balkan
Financial Sector Equity Fund (managed by
Development Finance Equity Partners) would serve
as one of several examples. 
SCI adopts active roles in the companies in which it
invests. Its work is corroborated and advanced by
ShoreCap Exchange (SCE), an American not-for-
profit organization that provides technical
assistance to banks in SCI’s portfolio and to other
similar institutions. Both SCI and SCE were spun
out of ShoreBank Corporation in the US, and their
work draws considerably on ShoreBank’s path-
breaking and market-leading community
development banking model in the US. 
ShoreBank Corporation
ShoreBank began operating in Chicago, Illinois,
USA in 1973, practicing what is now commonly
called community development banking. The bank
has become a diversified, full-service institution
offering financial products and services designed to
enhance economic development in underserved
American communities. The bank expanded
outside of Chicago in 1986, and now it has
locations in communities across the United States
(including Detroit, Cleveland, Michigan’s Upper
Peninsula, Portland, Oregon, and Costal Oregon
and Washington). ShoreBank Advisory Services
extends the bank’s work to other financial
institutions outside of the ShoreBank network. In
1994, the bank entered the field of environmental
banking, bringing its investment practices to bear
on conservation and environmental improvement.
The bank now manages over US$ 1.7 billion in
assets committed to community development, and
its net income exceeds US$ 7 million per year. Jan
Piercy, a ShoreBank Executive Vice-President and
former US Executive Director of the World Bank,
notes that ShoreBank’s original bank in Chicago
now outperforms many of its peer banks that do
not have a community development investment
focus. 
The bank began working internationally in 1983
with the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh. And in the
1990s, its work expanded to Poland, Pakistan, the
former Soviet Union and elsewhere. 
Introduction to ShoreCap International
Funding SCI
SCI was launched in July 2003 with US$ 28.3
million in committed capital from 14 different
institutions. The fund is structured as something of
a hybrid between a permanent investment
corporation and a limited-life investment fund. It
has a mandate to invest funds for five years,
concluding its investment activity in 2008. SCI does
not have a terminal date or a requirement to
liquidate its holdings by a particular deadline. Until
2008, the fund’s directors can determine whether
to re-invest any realized gains or to distribute them
to investors. After 2008, investors themselves can
determine whether they would like to have those
gains paid out or reinvested. The fund managers
aim to invest US$ 23 million of the fund, reserving
several million dollars to make follow-on
investments and to support the fund’s expenses
(with very little current income, the fund must rely
largely on its committed capital to fund expenses).
SCI expects a seven percent IRR for the fund itself,
which is concessionary to the risk-adjusted market
rate.
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Investors 
The fund’s 14 investors committed an average of
US$ 2 million to SCI, and their investments range
from US$ 250,000 to US$ 4 million. They include
development finance institutions, socially
responsible investment funds, foundations and one
global commercial bank, ABN AMRO. The
Netherlands-based bank’s American subsidiary
LaSalle Bank had worked with ShoreBank to meet
its community investment obligations under the
Community Reinvestment Act. Spurred in part by
the investments made with ShoreBank’s
assistance, the LaSalle and ABN AMRO executives
recognized that community development clients
would be their future mainstream clients.
Accordingly, ABN AMRO invested in SCI to learn
more about its future mainstream clients in
emerging economies.
Investment Parameters 
SCI invests in financial institutions that provide
financing and banking services to
microentrepreneurs and small businesses that
create economic opportunities for poor people. The
fund invests in regulated banks, MFIs, and other
financial institutions as long as at least 50% of the
institution’s assets are dedicated to financing small-
and micro-sized enterprises that employ low-
income people. Typically, it invests US$ 500,000 to
US$ 2.5 million in equity with some convertible or
subordinated debt, and its investments are made in
local currencies. SCI’s hurdle returns on equity are
12%, and it anticipates an average holding period
of five to seven years. Though SCI does not take
majority stakes in any of its investments, it does
take board seats, often placing a top ShoreBank
executive on the bank’s board. The fund currently
operates in Africa, Asia and non-EU Eastern
European countries. 
Deal Flow
Paul Christensen, president and COO of ShoreCap
Management, the fund manager, indicates that it is
much easier to identify microfinance deals, given
the prominence of the sector and the fact that
there are other investors seeking similar deals.
Identifying investment prospects is more
complicated for institutions that finance SMEs.
ShoreBank’s Advisory Services often sources such
deals, and occasionally, existing SCI investments
refer other potential investments. In some cases,
Christensen and his team prospect by travelling
throughout Asia, Africa and Eastern Europe seeking
financial institutions that might be investment
prospects. SCI lists investment pipeline
opportunities in Ghana, Uganda, Afghanistan and
Azerbaijan, among other countries.
Measurement and Monitoring
SCI expected to have made eight investments BY
late 2005, totalling US$ 9.5 million, with several
other likely investments pending. Through its
regular monitoring and involvement of SCE, SCI
remains in close contact with the banks in which it
invests. Not only does it track the financial
performance of its investments, SCI also works to
assess its investments’ social impacts. Christensen
reports that tracking impact outputs for MFI
investments is easier than doing so for SME-
oriented investments. Some of SCI’s MFI
investments are already assessed by MFI rating
organizations that track metrics like number and
size of new loans and the gender mix of borrowers.
In measuring the fund’s SME investment impact,
SCI has deployed many of the tools that
community development banks use in the US. They
attempt to measure the number of small
businesses associated with the banks, along with
the total number and quality of new jobs created.
Nevertheless, the dispersed nature of the
investments and the cost of measuring both make
it difficult to compile accurate and complete data. 
Introduction to ShoreCap Exchange
SCE is an independent American not-for-profit
organization that operates internationally and is
funded primarily by grants. SCE supports many of
SCI’s investments by offering technical assistance
in the areas of organizational capacity-building,
best practices transfer and “banker-to-banker peer
exchange.” While donors support SCE’s work,
client banks must make co-payments (determined
on a sliding scale) for the services, ensuring that
they are fully invested in the capacity building and
knowledge transfer that SCE facilitates. SCE also
sponsors a variety of exchange programmes that
encourage knowledge transfer between bankers in
developed economies with their colleagues
operating in developing economies. SCE’s
involvement not only encourages positive
development outcomes, but it helps to lower the
risks associated with SCI’s investments.
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SCI Looks to the Future
Nearly halfway through the investment process at
the end of 2005, Christensen suggests that
ShoreCap’s future international private investment
funds will likely have a sharper geographic focus.
He notes that it can be a challenge to cover Africa,
Asia and Eastern Europe with a staff appropriate for
a US$ 28 million fund. Beyond regional
specialization, Christensen sees opportunities to
expand this investment model to the low-income
housing sectors of developing economies. He sees
both viable potential business models and the
opportunity to finance a substantial development
impact, and he predicts that more capital will flow
into low-cost housing finance in the next several
years.
Fourth Case Study: Actis 64
Whereas Aavishkaar and ShoreCap were both
founded as unorthodox approaches to private
equity investment specifically intended to create
blended value, Actis is a mainstream private equity
fund with over US$ 3 billion under management
and generating market-rate financial returns. With a
history stretching back to 1948, Actis’s ingrained
organizational values and investment strategies
have driven the firm to generate multiple returns
before it ever articulated a blended value
investment strategy. 
Actis’s History and Investment Focus
Until its management buyout in 2004, Actis was a
part of CDC Group PLC (formerly Commonwealth
Development Corporation), which was wholly
owned by the UK government. As the United
Kingdom left its former colonies in the 1940s, it
formed the CDC to begin establishing private
sectors in the nations it departed. Initial investment
vehicles were debt instruments with some private
equity investments, but over 50 years the fund
changed the balance of investments so that by
2005 its assets were almost exclusively private
equity (consistent with a standard private equity
fund’s allocation). 
Ultimately, CDC’s management and the UK
government pursued a privatization plan that would
allow existing management and employees to buy
out 60% of the company, thus converting it into a
conventionally organized private equity fund. The
management completed the buyout in 2004, when
the management company was renamed Actis.
While the government still owns 40% of the
management company, Actis now raises
investment funds in accordance with typical private
equity practice.
Actis has 16 offices, most of them located in the
developing economies where the fund invests,
including five offices in Africa, four in Central and
South Asia and one in China. Staffed by over 90
investment professionals, the firm has developed a
deep understanding of the markets in which it
operates. Being geographically close to their
markets, Actis’s investment professionals maintain
close engagement with their investments.
The deal sizes typically range from US$ 10 million
to US$ 50 million, and the fund invests only in
healthy, established enterprises with high growth
potential. It selects sectors on a local basis,
enabling it to choose those that offer the best
potential for growth and benefit for the local
economy, while avoiding those where corruption,
environmental liabilities or other potential hazards
make investments unappealing.
Between 2004 and 2005, Actis raised six regional
funds and an umbrella fund investing in the
regionally defined funds. If Actis meets its target
fund sizes, the new pools of capital will represent
over US$ 450 million directed to investments in
Africa, US$ 225 million to China, US$ 325 million to
India, and US$ 225 dedicated to South and
Southeast Asia. Since 1998, it has exited over 50%
of its South Asian investments, generating a gross
IRR of 34%. In the same time period, it exited
nearly half of its investments in Africa with a gross
IRR of 23%. Though it has exited only two of eight
investments in China, the realized gross IRR for
that portfolio has been 54%. 
Generating Multiple Returns 
Actis’s engagement in generating multiple returns
begins at the investment screen, as it avoids
companies that have poor reputations, will be
placed at competitive disadvantage by upholding
honest business practices, or will be potentially
resistant to Actis’s responsible engagement. Within
the company, Actis aims to improve corporate
governance, health and safety standards and/or
environmental practices. In some of the changes it
advocates, Actis resembles a progressive activist
shareholder. It does so because such practices are
ingrained in the firm’s values and because they
increase financial value. 
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When it has the opportunity, Actis advocates for
regulatory and legislative changes that will
encourage a healthy, competitive and responsible
private sector. The benefits of such advocacy
accrue to Actis in that its investments can pursue
their businesses with less friction. Furthermore,
Actis-supported enterprises are prepared to
compete successfully in competitive business
sectors, and the fund is betting that its ventures
can win on a level playing field. Naturally, the
benefits of such work accrue to the communities
and countries where Actis-supported ventures
operate.
Social Fusion mapped Actis’s approach into
frameworks presented in “Developing Value: The
Business Case for Sustainability in Emerging
Markets”, a white paper published by the IFC,
Ethos Institute, and SustainAbility 65, 66 The
“Developing Value” framework explains how
“environmental risk reduction” and “socio-economic
risk reduction” can be practiced such that they
engender improved economic returns for
shareholders as well as benefit other stakeholders.
(See figure 7 for a concise representation of that
framework.) The authors of the “Developing Value”
study map a series of risk-reducing actions that
generate medium- and long-term business results.
The framework then establishes how these results
confer benefits or returns on multiple stakeholders,
including employees, investors and the community. 
Social Fusion discovered that Actis’s investments
consistently fit this framework. The firm’s
investment professionals recognize the significant
risks inherent in investing in emerging markets, and
their systematic, thoughtful approach to mitigating
those challenges translates into concrete actions
that also create environmental and social value. 
Improving Exit Multiples
Managing Partner Jonathan Bond observes that
Actis regularly sells portfolio companies to large
European and global firms, many of which
recognize the risk engendered by environmental,
social, and corporate-governance-related liabilities.
Many companies will not even consider acquisitions
that do not meet or approach their own standards
for social and environmental practices. Accordingly,
Actis aims to build companies that will appeal to
such acquirers, and doing so engenders benefits
for the portfolio companies’ employees,
communities and economies.
Investment Example: Celtel
Bond reports that the firm sees a tremendous
appetite for capital in Africa, where one of the
highest-growth industries is wireless
telecommunications. The growth rate in wireless
services in Africa exceeds that of any other region
in the world. Actis entered the sector with a
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Figure 7: The Developing Value Framework
Source: Social Fusion and Actis, adapted from “Developing Value: The Business Case for Sustainability in Emerging Markets"
significant investment in Celtel, a pan-African
wireless service provider, shortly after Celtel’s
founding in 1998. By the time of the company’s
sale in March 2005, Actis had invested a total of
US$ 77 million, representing 9.3% of the
company’s shares. Kuwaiti wireless concern MTC
purchased Celtel for US$ 3.4 billion, giving Actis a
77% gross IRR. Of the US$ 3.4 billion purchase
price, Bond reports that some US$ 2 billion
represented goodwill, value the acquirers ascribed
to knowing that Celtel’s contracts were all
dependable, that the company had always
operated to the highest ethical standards, and that
it would not discover any fraud or hidden liabilities. 
While it owned Celtel, Actis had many opportunities
to advocate for multiple returns. The firm worked
with government officials in the African countries
where the company operated (particularly in those
where it was among the largest taxpayers) to
ensure that taxation and other business regulations
were transparent and uniformly practiced. Celtel
also instituted strong employee-development
programmes and strict environmental protections.
Furthermore, Celtel is active in many of the
communities it serves, sponsoring various
healthcare, education and other community
initiatives. 
Opportunities
In potential financial returns, Actis sees tremendous
opportunities for investing in emerging markets.
Especially in Africa, the firm is not wanting for
investment opportunities. While the risks remain
significant, the firm and other experienced private
equity investors with personnel in-country are well
positioned to reduce that risk, often in ways that
engender positive returns in other dimensions of
value.
Gillian Arthur is the head of Actis’s Operations
Group, which ensures that the firm’s approach to
health and safety, social and environmental issues
is integrated throughout the investment lifecycle.
She notes that Actis’s most significant and
immediate impact may be in the realm of employee
health and safety, and Actis pushes its portfolio
companies constantly to improve working
conditions and opportunities for their employees.
Actis will have ample opportunity to make such
improvements as it invests recently raised funds in
countries that have poor reputations for
safeguarding employee health and safety.
Interest in blended value investing is building
momentum. More and more capital is being guided
not just by a conscience but by a proactive,
sophisticated set of ethics. With the assistance of
Social Fusion, Actis is currently exploring how
investments in Actis can play a role in blended
value investment strategies. To that end, Social
Fusion has convened a series of “investor
roundtable” events that have brought Actis partners
together with potential blended investors in order to
exchange ideas and discuss opportunities.67 It
should be noted clearly that Actis does not
promote itself as a “socially responsible” investment
manager, per se. Instead, it is transparently
presenting its goals and practices to investors who
can then determine how or whether an investment
in Actis has a role in their portfolios.68
In conclusion, as this modest slice of the
developing private equity market universe
demonstrates, private equity investment can be
very flexible and can adapt to the variety of
opportunities arising in developing economies.
Making private investment work for international
blended value creation will require additional time to
build upon this initial track record to increase the
experience of those structuring these funds and
expand the capacity of both funds and supporting
intermediaries working in this area of capital
allocation. There are promising developments, such
as the launch of VantagePoint,69 a non-profit
working regionally with investors to help expand
venture capital options in emerging markets and
the ongoing work of Endeavor,70 providing support
to entrepreneurs in emerging markets, both of
which reflect the growing interest in and promising
developments of venture capital expanding into
these emerging markets.
Variations on Traditional Venture Capital
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Thus far, this paper has focused on the variety of
potentially scalable investment instruments and
capital structures one could deploy to generate
multiple returns. Each example demonstrates the
convergence of creative financial engineering and
the desire to expand access to capital for
organizations creating blended value. Such capital
innovation seems sure to continue and even
accelerate, but the investment vehicles are only
part of the story. 
In its pure sense, all investing activity has within it
blended value components of social, environmental
and economic value. What is striking to note,
however is that at the present time, as potential
investments mature and proliferate, investors are
increasingly combining them into carefully tuned
portfolios strategically positioned to generate
sophisticated and specific blended value returns.
Several such portfolios already exist. They may
differ from one another significantly, but they all
have in common a concerted and well-considered
aim of maximizing value in multiple dimensions. 
The next several pages suggest future investigation
spurred by the preceding inquiry into investment
vehicles. We briefly explore the opportunities and
challenges for investors who would build a
“blended value investment portfolio theory” into
their investment strategies. An introduction to two
notable examples suggests areas for future study,
including an inquiry into how these investors have
approached their work, defined opportunities and
addressed challenges.
Rethinking Portfolio Theory
Traditional portfolio managers map their
investments to a two-dimensional efficient frontier
that balances risk and financial reward. The
managers of BVI portfolios tend to view value in
multiple dimensions, which in turn requires
significant changes to standard portfolio theory and
management. These managers must begin by
addressing the challenge of translating their
investors’ conception of value into an investment
thesis, a detailed explanation of what the investor
believes to be true about blended value and the
high-level strategies that will responsibly maximize
value within that framework. Creating a durable and
versatile thesis is made particularly complicated by
the pace of change in blended value investors’
sophistication and, as this paper has documented,
the pace of the investment products’ evolution. 
Investment portfolios that aim to maximize blended
value must project a desired integration of financial
and other dimensions of returns. Then they must
also develop guidelines for many other investment
and portfolio variables, some of which are
interdependent. Such investors must address a
number of questions:
• Types of investment: Will the portfolio invest in
debt, equity, and/or other types of securities? Will
capital support for-profit and/or not-for-profit
investments? 
• Level of engagement: To what extent will the
investor and portfolio manager engage the
investments? Will they approach investment with
the hands-on perspective of a venture capital
investor, or will they adopt a more passive
approach to investees’ management?
• Investment concentration and target
allocations: How much of the portfolio should
be allocated to relevant segments of blended
value investments and how concentrated in any
one specific investment will the portfolio be? 
• Investment in research and development: In
addition to deploying capital to blended value
investments, to what extent will the fund invest in
advancing the field through research and
development around its BVI strategies? 
• Performance measurement: How will the
portfolio measure the value it creates and the
outcomes it engenders? How can these
measurements be used to adjust the portfolio
dynamically?
The F.B. Heron Foundation, based in New York,
has explored many of these questions in the course
of its work to restructure its assets along the lines
of a unified investment strategy. Their
documentation of how they have executed this
institutional transformation is very informative and
available on their website.71
Blended Value Portfolio Examples
While all capital has the potential to generate
blended returns and many investors have
integrated some element of blended value investing
principles into their practices, two funds stand out
as having been constructed and managed to
maximize blended value through the application of
innovative investing strategies. 
Building Blended Value Portfolios
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Acumen Fund
Formed in 2001 with grants from the Rockefeller
Foundation, the Cisco Systems Foundation, and
individual investors in Silicon Valley, the not-for-
profit Acumen Fund invests in market-based
solutions to problems associated with global
poverty. Acumen CEO Jacqueline Novogratz states
that Acumen is “agnostic” about whether it funds
for-profit or not-for-profit enterprises, but in recent
years it has moved away from grant-making as it
discovered the unmet need for financing market-
oriented solutions. Accordingly, the bulk of its
investments take the form of debt and equity
vehicles. While Acumen invests for blended returns,
anticipating a concessionary rate of financial return
on invested capital, its investors make charitable
contributions and do not expect to capture financial
returns. To date, the organization has made
investments in India, Pakistan, Egypt, South Africa,
Tanzania and Kenya. 
Two hallmarks of Acumen Fund’s approach are its
venture-capital style engagement and a portfolio
approach to BVI. The organization currently has
three investment portfolios, each with a specific
approach to creating blended value: heath
technologies (investing in technologies and
associated business systems that increase quality
and access to healthcare), housing and finance
(making investments in infrastructure and financing
systems to make home ownership more
accessible), and water innovations (improving the
quality and availability of fresh water supplies by
investing in purification, distribution and
conservation solutions). A portfolio manager
supervises the investments in each area, and he or
she works closely with an advisory committee
comprised of domain experts. Novogratz notes that
the portfolio approach helps diversify risks and
create “strategic networks to facilitate the overall
work of investment.”72
Each portfolio manager works with only a handful
of investments at any given time. Accordingly,
Acumen Fund can maintain close engagement with
investees, which facilitates investment monitoring,
strategic consultation and network building.
Portfolio managers and the entire staff deploy a
performance measurement system originally
designed in consultation with McKinsey and
Company. The organization notes, “[o]ur metrics
focus has grown to become an integrated part of
everything we do, both externally and internally.”73
On a regular basis the organization measures its
progress with financial metrics, social outcomes
and improvements in its investments’ internal
capacity. 
Acumen notes that over one million people have
benefited from the fund’s investments. Among
those whose lives have been improved, the
organization cites the following statistics: “more
than 500,000 people have been protected from
malaria, 12,000 women have received microfinance
loans, 5,000 farmers have increased their income
by purchasing drip irrigation systems, and 11,000
families have bought life-saving de-fluoridation
water filters.”74
The following diagram (figure 8), available on
Acumen Fund’s website, maps the evolution of the
organization’s investment thesis as it moved from
grant-making to blended value investing with
significant expected financial returns. Furthermore,
the diagram concisely presents Acumen’s
assessment of its social impact. 
ProVenEx: Rockefeller Foundation’s Diversified
Blended Value Portfolio
Formed in 1998, Program Venture Experiment
(known widely as ProVenEx) is the Rockefeller
Foundation’s experimental blended value portfolio
created, in part, to explore how the foundation
might advance its mission through investment
vehicles other than grants. ProVenEx also explores
how to scale up blended value investments while
“building in accountability for social outcomes.”75 All
ProVenEx investments create value within the
fund’s areas of interest.
Building Blended Value Portfolios
Acumen Fund’s Mission
Acumen Fund is a global non-profit venture fund
serving the four billion people living on less than US$ 4
a day. Our aim is to create a blueprint for building
financially sustainable and scalable organizations that
deliver affordable, critical goods and services that
elevate the lives of the poor. We adhere to a disciplined
process in selecting and managing our philanthropic
investments as well as in measuring the end results.
Source: Acumen Fund, http://www.acumenfund.org/About/ 
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ProVenEx’s US$ 13 million portfolio has been
deployed in 12 investments spanning a range of
investment vehicles, including equity, debt and loan
guarantees, and investments are made directly or
through financial intermediaries when appropriate.
Two of the twelve investments have been
international, representing five percent of the
invested capital. Specific notable investments
include early-stage investments in Ugandan and
Kenyan companies, investments in community
development venture capital, a real estate
development serving low-income neighbourhoods
in San Diego, California, and a loan and guarantee
to scale up Calvert Foundation’s Community
Investment Note programme. Among its outcomes,
ProVenEx counts a liquidity event from its largest
investment, significant loan repayments, the
employment of over 1,600 people and improved
seed supplies sold to 25,000 small farmers. 
Funds such as Acumen and ProVenEx may not
ultimately replace existing investor options, but they
provide excellent examples of how investors can
draw on the other tools and approaches outlined in
this paper, combining them with one another and
with other investment options to create value in
multiple dimensions. Ongoing research will help
explore how these and other investors are applying
financing approaches to BVI—and the returns
generated by such strategies.
Building Blended Value Portfolios
Figure 8: Acumen Fund’s Learning Curve
Source: Acumen Fund
ProVenEx Areas of Interest
• Creativity and Culture
- Mechanisms to support creativity and open communication across diverse cultures
• Food Security: Focus on small farmers in sub-Saharan Africa
- Ecologically sound strategies to increase stability of crop yields
- Business investments to promote local industry for fertilizers, seeds and ancillary agricultural services (storage, grain
handling, processing, etc.)
• Health Equity
- Products and health services delivery models to address major diseases affecting poor people, including HIV, TB and
malaria
• Working Communities: Focus on US inner-cities
- Community-directed businesses that create jobs for local residents
- Strategies to redress the imbalance of public funding to low-income school districts
- Innovative mixed-income housing projects in US inner-city neighbourhoods
Source: Jackie Khor, ProVenEx Associate Director. “Background Information” presentation dated May 2005.
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Of Opportunity and Risk
This paper has documented just some of the
improving prospects for applying mainstream
investing practices toward achieving social and
environmental goals. Strategies such as
microfinance and social enterprise, initially having
been launched primarily with philanthropic support,
are now approaching the status of “mainstream”
investment opportunities for banks, foundations
and high net worth individuals interested in doing
well while doing good. For those who believe in the
power of market forces and free enterprise—as
well as the need to create a more just world—these
are exciting times. 
These transitions from philanthropic capital to
financial investment capital are particularly unusual
and even anomalous events in the history of capital
markets. While investors may analyze and learn
from the “non-profit to for-profit” transformation of
hospitals as well as specific financing innovations
such as the affordable housing tax credit, there are
virtually no historical examples of wide-scale
economic initiatives that began on a philanthropic
(wealth transferring) platform and segued to a risk-
oriented (wealth creating) platform capable of
attracting private capital. In this nearly
unprecedented situation, one must carefully re-
evaluate the usual rules for gauging risk and return
as they apply to this major capital markets
transformation. 
In the context of a blended value capital market,
there is real risk and there is real return. However,
to an outsider trying to determine whether or not to
invest in or contribute to a microfinance entity or a
for-profit social enterprise, the investment decision
is quite simply not as straightforward as it would be
for investors considering traditional investment
opportunities. This complexity arises from capital
markets that heretofore did not reflect the true
nature of value; instead, they artificially broke value
into components that over simplified the goals of
creating value. Those capital markets
corresponded to two very different sectors (one
non-profit and the other for profit) that, of course,
still exist today. Each has its own rules, regulations
and relevant approaches to analysis. Nevertheless,
value is a more complicated construct, and
maximizing it with consistency will require that
investors revise their rules for investing capital. They
must be careful to combine the best aspects of
philanthropic and financial investing, and they must
be especially wary of combining the strategies in
ways that obscure risks and jeopardize overall,
long-term blended value creation. 
Developments in financial instruments, portfolio
theory, creative market-based problem solving, and
their underlying conceptions of value are very
encouraging. They should be supported, expanded
and celebrated as being revolutions in thought and
practice that create real value. At the same time, it
is critical to reflect on the risks present in any
emerging market and to define what mechanisms
should be in place to minimize those risks. If
efficient markets capable of attracting significant
capital to blended value investments are ever going
to emerge, would-be market participants must
observe and address the characteristics that
currently prevent the nascent blended value capital
markets from functioning as efficiently as more
established, efficient capital markets. 
Many of the extraordinary projects documented in
this paper—and so many other innovations not
addressed herein—are, quite simply, in jeopardy. At
this stage of development, blended value investing
strategies are poised either to become victims of
their own success or—with careful guidance—to
emerge victorious as new waves of capital are
prudently deployed in blended value investments.
Should significant new blended value investments
turn out to be founded on poor due diligence or
faulty risk-management, those mistakes could sour
the market for years to come. The collapse of any
of the initial funds and investment instruments
currently capitalizing the next stage of blended
value investing would not only spell the end of that
particular offering; it would make it extremely
difficult for future offerings to find investors. The
Chinese character for “change” is a combination of
those for “risk” and “opportunity”, and such is the
change in process.
Early financial failures would deal a significant set
back to all those around the world who are
attempting to bring new investment strategies to
other emerging areas of economic development.
Funds targeting small- and medium-sized
enterprises in emerging economies, newly seeded
renewable energy funds, community development
venture capital funds, and many others have
reason to be concerned and to ensure that early
investment decisions are made wisely. This concern
is not to say that mistakes cannot or should not be
made. If the risk associated with these deals is
appropriately priced and the markets are indeed
efficient, some investors will lose money. These
markets do not need to ensure that investors never
lose money (doing so would distort the market in
ways that would ultimately hurt value creation).
Instead, the emerging market participants must
ensure that every deal either succeeds or, in the
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words of Tom Peters, “fails forward”. Participants
do not need to prevent all losses of money, but
they must avert the catastrophic failure that arises
from incompetence, hubris or malfeasance. 
Looking to the Future of a Blended Value
Capital Market
For years the focus of a great deal of work has
been upon the challenge of how to build the
microfinance capital market—and many have
worked to address that challenge. At the same
time, another, broader question remains: 
How do we create investment strategies that are bankable
and socially valuable, capable of providing capital to
microfinance, social enterprise, small- to medium-sized
enterprises, community development finance and more?
Microfinance and other blended value creation
systems share challenges in gaining access to
mainstream capital flows, though each
programmatic area stands in a unique position—its
own particular distance from that ultimate goal.
Nevertheless, a series of approaches, principles
and concrete steps will help participants respond to
the common challenges shared by everyone
interested in applying financial investment strategies
for social and environmental gain.
Defining the “Push” Investing Past and the “Pull”
Investing Future 
Several decades ago, the hundreds of millions of
dollars initially needed to launch and grow
microfinance were provided with little or no
expectation of financial return to the initial investors.
One might characterize this investment as a “push
strategy,” driven by the suppliers of capital:
• It was pushed by donors, philanthropic
organizations (foundations) and governmental
organizations, which in turn created the MFIs to
deploy the funds.
• They pushed capital into microcredit because of
its remarkable ability to create sustainable
microenterprises started and owned by the poor. 
• Philanthropic investors pushed it with little initial
regard for whether the capital would be returned
and, in many cases, limited understanding of
whether it had been well deployed. 
And it has been a successful strategy! 
These early individual and institutional philanthropic
investments demonstrated that poor people in
developing countries could “help themselves” in a
sustainable manner. These early philanthropic
“investors” played the role of risk-tolerant angel
investors as they helped capitalize a new industry.
Nevertheless, they differed from traditional angel
investors in that they had no expectation of an
eventual liquidity event that would provide them
with not only a return of capital invested, but a
return on capital invested—a reward for their
assumed risk. 
Now, contrast this “push” flow of capital with the
typical risk-seeking capital flow, wherein instead of
being pushed, risk capital is “pulled” into a deal by
the demand for capital: 
• Entrepreneurs and investment opportunities pull
early investors into investments with upside
financial potential, and there is an expectation of
future liquidity events. Typically, venture capitalists
do not create the enterprises they fund; instead,
entrepreneurs approach them with opportunities
(and most venture capitalists reject more
proposals than they fund).
• The early successes are tempered by early
losses. 
• If early success is sustained and scaled, this
condition pulls even more capital, and mezzanine
investors buy out early-stage investors as a new
capital market is created. 
Where this system works well—and there are
numerous examples—great wealth is created, and
revolutionary businesses are born. Along the way,
the providers of capital come to learn about the
risks and returns associated with the new
businesses and investment strategies in part
because they expect, accept and analyze failed
investments. Furthermore, the investment
opportunities become more standardized and the
emerging markets form the necessary infrastructure
to facilitate future flows of capital.
In the rush and enthusiasm for creating new capital
markets that support blended value systems,
investors must not forget this axiom of investing:
Mainstream capital is not brave. It does not like going places
where the rules are unclear or subject to multiple
interpretations. It does not like to go where the expected
returns are not calculated clearly and plausibly and where the
risk is not fully detailed and explained.
A Cautionary Conclusion: Maximizing Blended
Value Returns by Embracing Market Fundamentals
61Blended Value Investing: Capital Opportunities for Social and Environmental Impact
Furthermore, mainstream capital does not flow to
investments simply because it might have positive
social impact. In fact, conventional wisdom
suggests that pursuing financial return on
investment (ROI) is agnostic at best and antithetical
at worst to social return on investment (SROI).
Blended value investing stipulates that investors
can generate both types of value as an integrated,
blended return, but it recognizes that investments
must provide the reasonably predictable potential
to generate financial ROI to attract (or pull) capital
into deals in the first place. Without the potential for
ROI that approaches the risk-adjusted market rate
return, investments will be confined to philanthropic
capital flows and will never have access to the
much larger mainstream capital flows that have ROI
as their highest priority. Importantly, such
investments do not necessarily need to offer large
ROIs; instead, it is crucial they have relatively
predictable returns subject to well-understood
risks. This mainstream capital currently is not
flowing to blended value investments in large
enough volumes, and the only way to pull it toward
these investments is to structure them so that they
can generate financial returns.
Blended value market participants must ensure that
the present enthusiasm does not eclipse the tasks
and disciplines required to build a functioning,
efficient, liquid, self-correcting capital market that
will provide ongoing, sustainable value for investors
and entrepreneurs. The balance of this paper will
present the core elements necessary for the
creation of an effective, vibrant emerging market
not simply for microfinance, but for the entire
blended value arena made up of microfinance,
social enterprise, for-profit social ventures and,
indeed, any alternative financial offering that seeks
to combine financial returns with social and/or
environmental value creation. 
Bringing such a global infrastructure into existence
will not be easy. While this paper sets out a series
of goals, the path to reach them is not clear, nor is
achieving them at all assured. All practitioners need
to assess what structures must be created and—
perhaps more importantly—what business and
investment principles must be maintained in order
to achieve these goals. As explained later, these
emerging markets require not only new and refined
investment products and infrastructure, they also
need participants to conduct their business with
greater transparency, being more publicly
thoughtful about failures and mistakes. A
fundamental first step in building this infrastructure
is for all potential investors in any investments that
aim to generate both financial and social returns to
vet each offering according to the degree to which
the investment under consideration meets the
relevant conditions described below.
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Creating an Emerging Capital Market Framework
for Blended Value Investing
It is especially useful to examine the infrastructure
of successful mainstream financial markets to
evaluate the blended value capital markets’
infrastructure. Mainstream financial markets work
for both investors and those seeking new capital
because they allow investors to evaluate potential
investment risk/return objectively. Virtually any
mature industry that has grown to scale and has
attracted private capital has in place the following
elements:
1. Common terminology
2. Transparency
3. Adherence to standard accounting practices
4. Regulation by third parties
5. Investment rating services
6. Fund comparison data
7. Insurance
8. Liquidity through secondary markets
Microfinance is the most well developed example of
blended value investing. The industry has grown in
30+ years such that at this time is has millions of
borrowers, thousands of lenders (MFIs), billions of
dollars in loan portfolios, and countless donors and
investors with a great deal of money looking for
“investment” opportunities. Further, perhaps as
many as 1,000 (an estimated ten percent of the
total) MFIs are profitable in one way or another. 
At first glance one might conclude that this industry
represents a “breakout” – an industry
delivering a true blended value return
and doing so at scale. Upon closer
examination, one must conclude that
as good as it is, microfinance still has
not developed the requisite
infrastructure needed to attract
mainstream capital. 
Tier-One MFIs and the Overall Market
Critique
Microfinance experts segment the MFI
market in a variety of ways, often
referring to different “tiers” of MFIs,
depending on their professionalism
and financial health. (See figure 9 for
one such segmentation.) Commonly,
these experts distinguish about two
percent of all MFIs as “tier-one”,
meaning that they have established
track records, highly professional
operations, healthy finances and,
often, many of the characteristics of commercial
banks. Many are affiliated with ACCION, Grameen
and other prominent MFI networks. Tier-one MFIs
have developed significant scale and expertise in
structuring capital to advance social and financial
returns. Through both leveraging subsidies and
loan guarantees effectively and by securing market
rate capital, these groups and their peers have lead
the overall field in its development and expansion;
they pioneered and disseminated microfinance’s
best practices. 
At the same time, there are many more
organizations—98% of all other MFIs—that may be
pursuing (but are still lacking) many of the
characteristics one would expect to find in formal
capital market participants. The MFIs not included
in the tier-one designation vary dramatically from
one another, and the diversity in their business
models, scale and financial health cannot be
understated. While the Tier One organizations have
succeeded in building networks and leveraging
capital, they are not even close to the entire
microfinance market. A vast majority of
organizations both make up this larger market and
fall well short of the operating capacities of tier-one
institutions. 
While some enterprises in microfinance and across
the blended value investing universe do
successfully exhibit market-leading characteristics,
the state of the overall market lags those leading
investments. 
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Figure 9: MFI Market Segmentation
Grameen Foundation USA
Source: Jennifer Meehan, “Tapping Financial Markets for Microfinance”,
Grameen Foundation USA, 2004
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The following section assesses the broad state of
play within the blended value investing arena by
focusing on the particular silo of microfinance. The
critique of the broad field should not take away
from the work and quality organizations that have
been created by many individuals, nor should it be
taken to apply to every MFI. Rather, this
assessment raises concerns about the overall state
of the market and its implications for achieving real
sustainable scale capable of tapping into
mainstream financial service sectors. 
Market Characteristics Explained
1. Common Terminology: Any industry must be
able to describe its inner workings to outsiders
wishing to evaluate performance. Microcredit
has done an admirable job of developing
terminology and metrics that facilitate description
and analysis of MFIs. Numerous industry
descriptive manuals and financial models are
available. Unfortunately, many of these
descriptions and associated metrics were
developed to identify, describe and quantify the
subsidies that are available to non-profit MFIs.
Most MFIs are still operating as not-for-profit
entities today and, as such, account for their
operating results using not-for-profit terminology,
this language can be confusing if not misleading
to potential investors, especially those who
typically invest only in for-profit entities. For an
investor to understand and evaluate the
operational performance of a given MFI, there
must be a clear delineation of subsidies and the
role they have played and will play in the future
performance of the MFI. 
Even the contemporary measures of financial
performance tend to evince MFIs’ non-profit
origins. The Economist’s recent survey of
microfinance makes this point clearly:
No matter whether those terms and acronyms
are defensible or not, they clearly befuddle
mainstream financial actors as represented by
the authors of the article, whose statements
suggest that microfinance’s vocabularies make
the industry appear parochial and quaint.
A second and more problematic issue with
terminology is that no consistent and objective
measure of impact is promulgated. As the
capital markets develop and capital is “pulled” to
microfinance, there should be objective
standards by which investors can judge the
social impact of their investment. Unfortunately,
what passes for impact measures today is
usually a simple tabulation of microborrowers
served and the average size of their loans. Many
MFIs have established their own impact
measurement regimes, but there appears to be
little successful effort to pull those measurement
schemes into a single unified approach.
Opportunities for improvement:
• Commercial financiers and regulated MFIs
could continue to develop a common set of
terminology that reflects the language and
assumptions of mainstream international capital
markets.
• After MFIs have standardized their language
around inputs and financial performance,
foundations and other NGOs might sponsor
impact-assessment studies by independent
third parties and academic research
professionals.
2. Transparency: As not-for-profits operating in
developing countries, many MFIs have few
public reporting requirements. The transparency
of the industry is driven primarily by two factors:
the decision of individual MFIs who voluntarily
make their results public and the mandatory
reporting performed by the MFIs that are
regulated and therefore obligated to report
results. Even with this level of transparency,
rigorous evaluation of MFIs is difficult. MFIs in
many parts of the world now voluntarily report
results to industry associations and these results
are aggregated and benchmarked. For investors
wanting to analyze an MFI and to compare
results to other organizations by size, geography,
product, etc., the transparency issue is
problematic. 
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“The foggiest place in the industry is ‘on the ground’ (another favourite
microfinance term), where familiar words suddenly become oddly
unintelligible. An item labelled ‘profit’ lets you keep mum about the losses
transferred to a money-losing charity affiliate. An 'operationally
sustainable' business is one that can pay for its running costs but not its
capital, which is often the largest single expense for a financial firm. But
the worst thing are the acronyms, which make learned analyses of
microfinance next to unreadable. All this may sound trivial, but industry
practitioners seem to care deeply.”76
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Organizations like the Microfinance Exchange
(MiX) are working to increase outsiders’ access
to the characteristics and performance of MFIs,
but that information is voluntarily provided and in
some cases may not be current. While many
MFI investment funds and MFI networks have
detailed information about the MFIs with which
they work, that information is not necessarily
being shared and aggregated in any one place
so that the MFIs’ initial transparency becomes
opaque.
Opportunities for improvement:
• Market participants can encourage efforts like
MiX and related efforts.
• Investors and MFI networks can combine due
diligence and isolated market intelligence from
various actors, making them available through
clearinghouses like MiX.
3. Adherence to Standard Accounting
Practices: Many MFIs operate as not-for-profit
organizations, and many control wholly owned
subsidiaries engaged in related endeavours.
Furthermore, most MFIs are not audited, and
those that are tend to use small, country-based
auditing firms. While many such firms utilize
International Accounting Standards (IAS),
application of these standards remains
questionable. For investors, this condition poses
a problem. 
Opportunities for improvement:
• Market participants can form a reporting
standards-setting board like the International
Accounting Standards Board used to
determine generally accepted international
accounting standards. Such a board can focus
on fitting international accounting standards to
microfinance instead of creating a new set of
microfinance-specific standards.
• Any emerging accounting standards must
incorporate means of tracking subsidies as well
as their intended outcome.
• Individual investors and funds can then
demand financial statements prepared in
accordance with those standards.
• Lobbying in appropriate legislatures can ensure
that the international accounting standards will
fit the emerging regulatory regimes for MFIs.
4. Regulation by Third Parties: In the developed
world, financial services businesses are
regulated by governmental agencies. Alas, it is
not often the case with MFIs. In the developing
world there is often, at best, a loose regulatory
framework either in place or under development.
The net result is that MFIs function as banks but
are not regulated as banks. Such mandated
performance requirements such as capital
adequacy, liquidity, reserves, reporting, etc. are
often either non-existent or ignored. MFIs tend
to be viewed by their host governments as
NGOs (non-governmental organizations) and are
relatively free to operate as they wish with
virtually no oversight. For investors this condition
poses obvious risks. 
This condition varies dramatically depending on
MFIs’ corporate structures. In some counties,
NGO MFIs can make the same loans as can
regulated MFIs, while the latter will be bound by
much more stringent regulations than the former.
Countries that do regulate MFIs have regulations
that vary from one anther dramatically (allowing
or not allowing MFIs to raise capital in certain
ways, promulgating different capital adequacy
requirements, etc.), which forces potential
investors to become experts in a variety of
regulatory regimes.
The question of regulation is complicated by a
number of factors. First, many MFIs are NGOs
and therefore not regulated as financial
institutions—but some are indeed regulated
under other frameworks. Second, regulations
differ from one country to the next (coordinating
them would be overwhelmingly daunting). Finally,
on a case-by-case basis, some of those
regulations might be cumbersome and
burdensome. In general it should be
acknowledged that this is a significant issue
being addressed by a number of actors.
Opportunities for improvement:
• Investors like ProFund can help MFIs convert to
regulated MFIs.
• Market participants can support the creation of
third-party international recommendations or
templates for MFI regulations.
5. Investment Rating Services: Within
mainstream capital markets, most investors are
unable or unwilling to conduct the type of
comparative analysis that leads to sound
investment decisions. Instead, they rely on third-
party credit rating entities such as Moody’s,
Standard and Poor’s and others. The microcredit
industry has not developed in a way that has
prompted the development of independent
rating agencies, a problem that may remain in
place until MFIs and their associated financing
deals grow sufficiently large to warrant the cost
and attention of mainstream ratings agencies. 
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Early investors did not expect a “financial return”
on their philanthropic investments so they had
no need for ratings. Microfinance agencies do
exist, but unlike the large rating agencies, these
microcredit-specific rating agencies look only at
microcredit. Accordingly, mainstream investors
see such agencies as lacking credibility,
sometimes reporting in terms that do not
coincide with those used in mainstream
investing. As microfinance and related industries
begin to attract funds from risk-seeking
investors, this lack of rating services will pose
significant problems for achieving meaningful
scale. Furthermore, standardized and reputable
rating agencies will lower the cost of
investments’ due diligence, which currently
exceeds the typical costs associated with
initiating similarly sized investments in more
mainstream markets. 
Opportunities for improvement:
• Ratings services such as Standard and Poor’s,
Moody’s and others must have incentives to
enter this realm
• Local branches of some of these agencies
have rated some MFIs (see ACCION affiliates
section); their experience would surely be
valuable in expanding the practice.
• Here, a “smart subsidy” or creative blended
value investment would advance the cause if it
could creatively encourage the mainstream
ratings agencies to develop microfinance rating
methodologies and to overcome the hurdle of
scale.
• MFIs need to see value in being rated, and so
financiers and foundations alike can give them
incentives—in the form of a lower cost of
capital or a subsidy to purchase the rating
services—to be rated by an appropriate
agency.
6. Fund Comparison Data: While there is some
public information to allow comparison between
MFIs themselves, virtually nothing exists to allow
investors to compare the operating results of the
increasing number of funds investing in MFIs.
For a variety of reasons, these funds are likely to
be the vehicles of significant capital flowing into
microfinance. There are between 50 and 100 of
these funds in operation today around the
world—with more on the way. Virtually all of
them are private funds and publish little to no
public data. A prospective microfinance investor
has little if any means of finding a complete list
of funds, comparing their investment terms, and
understanding their investment results and non-
financial impact. 
The MFI fund world is relatively small, with
relatively few actors. Accordingly, the information
on past funds should not be difficult to
aggregate. Nevertheless, the relatively early
stage of many of these funds (which have not
fully repaid principal lent or have not liquidated
equity investments) makes some of them
hesitant to share data. A recent report published
by CGAP aggregates data (as of 2004) on many
foreign funds (though the data are not rendered
for side-by-side comparison).77 The report
indicates that many of those funds shared
investors. Some funds have been focused on
keeping their investors through emotional appeal
(characteristic of not-for-profit investors) instead
of through a clear statement of performance and
a comparison to the investors’ other options. 
Opportunities for improvement:
• MFI fund investors need to invest on the basis
of expected performance and should demand
performance and comparison data.
• An independent group should study existing
funds and assemble the data in a way that
makes comparison easy.
• The industry would also benefit from a definitive
forum (a Wall Street Journal, of sorts) in which
fund managers can announce and promote
new funds and where existing funds can report
performance data.
7. Insurance: Most investors, or the funds in
which they invest, are able to obtain insurance to
help manage risk. The microcredit industry has
yet to develop the scale necessary to interest
the insurance industry. Accordingly, such things
as foreign exchange risk, errors and omissions
risks, directors and officer’s risk, asset
appropriation risk, political risk and others are
generally uninsurable. While there is some ability
to account for these risks through aggressive
underwriting and risk sharing within funds, most
investors would appear to have few options and
relatively little appreciation of the true relative risk
associated with an investment in microcredit or
similar offerings. 
Opportunities for improvement:
• The small scale of MFIs (relative to mainstream
financial institutions) will remain a barrier to
creating these insurance products, but
mainstream insurers operating in MFIs’ home
countries may have the means and experience
to offer such products. 
A Cautionary Conclusion: Maximizing Blended
Value Returns by Embracing Market Fundamentals
66 Blended Value Investing: Capital Opportunities for Social and Environmental Impact
• Early iterations may need to be subsidized by
other (possibly philanthropic) actors who might
provide assets to underwrite policies that
would be administered by the mainstream
insurers. 
• Ultimately, as the insurers learned more about
the associated risks, mainstream underwriting
capital would enter the market. 
8. Liquidity through secondary markets: At the
risk of stating the painfully obvious, for a true
capital market to exist there must, in fact, be a
market. Clearly, there is a primary microfinance
capital market where equity is placed or loans
made. From that point on, virtually all of the
equity and debt invested in microfinance is
simply illiquid. It can not be traded or sold freely
among willing investors. This simple fact makes
it very difficult for the average investor to
consider taking a position. At present there is
not even discussion among those in the
microcredit industry on how or when a
secondary market might develop.
Opportunities for improvement:
• The conditions above suggest that there is not
yet the demand to buy microfinance
investments on a secondary market; instead
investors seem interested in investing their
capital in new issues, in part because those
new issues directly help poor entrepreneurs,
while transactions on a secondary market
would not. 
• Spurring a secondary market when there seem
to be no buyers would be a dubious prospect,
and creating such a market place before it is
demanded would amount to a new “push”
investment strategy that would likely not bear
fruit.
• Pushing MFIs and investments to adhere to the
conditions enumerated above would help make
a secondary market more viable and likely.
Implications for the Creation of a Blended Value
Capital Market 
Moving the entire industry in the direction of the
tier-one institutions (and even beyond them) will be
very difficult. Traditional market forces will certainly
push some institutions in the right direction (indeed,
those forces are already doing so, and they are
bringing mainstream commercial banks in to
microlending in many parts of the world).
Nevertheless, subsidies—some with very legitimate
social-value creating outcomes, and some with
counter-productive outcomes—will prevent the
entire sector from looking like those tier-one
institutions. 
At a recent conference on microfinance, Bowman
Cutter, Managing Partner of Wall Street investment
firm Warburg Pincus and Chair of the Board of
microfinance fund Microvest, shared his
perspective on the state of the microcredit capital
market. Cutter spoke at length about the effort,
time and resources expended to bring Microvest
into being.78 He observed that he and his
colleagues created from scratch virtually all of their
work; they had no templates or standard
procedures to use as models. He observed that if
every step toward building a microfinance capital
market turns out to be as hard as starting
Microvest, maybe the industry should rethink its
strategy. 
Fortunately, Cutter also provided real hope. He
noted that he started in the investment banking
profession more than 30 years ago. At that time,
the profession was effectively in a start-up mode
and that everything they did then was a “one-off”
creation. He noted that today investment banking is
a robust and very successful industry attracting and
successfully managing billions of dollars annually
and that microcredit feels like investment banking
did 30 years ago. 
The success of investment banking was built on a
firm's appetite for capital and an investor's desire
to put capital at risk. That situation exists today in
the broad range of BVI investment opportunities.
The microfinance business needs many billions of
dollars to fund loan portfolios so that hundreds of
millions of people can begin to create income and
wealth and ultimately raise themselves from
poverty. Similar demand for capital exists in the BVI
segments that would fund affordable housing and
community development, environmental protection,
health, education and related services for the poor
in all countries. As was the case in microcredit
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there are many case studies that could have been
added to those in this paper to make the point that
there are successful, hard-won interventions
already in the market.
However, there are a number of steps that precede
the creation of this blended value capital market. 
Silos Versus Value Chains
First, blended value market participants, both
investors and investees, must collaborate across
their relative areas of interest (for example
community development finance and banking
actors could work more directly with microfinance
practitioners to address common challenges). All
should work to “come out of their silos”. 
Silos breed isolation and the need of every
organization in a given field of endeavour to do
everything in virtual isolation. When applied to
industries such as microcredit or community
development, it means the major players within
their respective organizations are both vertically and
horizontally integrated. They build their
organizations and attendant support structures.
Because the connecting tissue that ties entities
together into value chains is not present, they go
about doing everything for themselves. They
develop no set of core competencies that when
paired with others with different core competencies
allow the formation of a true network of firms all
aligned in their purpose and relying on each others'
strengths to add value to the end customer. 
These value chains or collaborative networks are
how business is done in the for profit arena. One
need only look as far as a Wal-Mart, Boeing or
Cisco Systems to see business models based, at
their very foundation, on the assumption that
networks add value; going it alone does not. 
What are the implications of this for those
interested in building a blended value capital
market? Leaders in the various BVI areas could
construct value chains, ensuring their organizations
develop core competencies and distribute common
work. What is more, they should reach out to
existing players operating outside their BVI area
and enlist them in this effort. 
This is exactly what the Calvert Foundation did by
going to the Depository Trust Company (DTC) to
handle the clearing and holding of community
investment notes. The foundation knew this service
was vital to its business model. It also knew
mainstream investors require such a service. Rather
than build an alternative or survive without it,
Calvert Foundation created with DTC a value chain
that added value for the customer. In reflecting on
how the case studies presented in this paper
evolved, one is struck by how often the successful
initiative was characterized by the sponsor reaching
out to others and building value chains. 
Value chains are resource-conserving by design. A
successful value chain involves bringing together
the best firms in a way that minimizes overlap or
redundancy. Who, exactly, benefits when
redundancies are eliminated and the very best
players are joined along a line where each is there
because of a core competency? Quite simply,
everyone. Scarce resources are preserved, firms
are there because they add value in their areas of
strength and investors get the best return because
the customers get the best good or service at the
best price. The value chain should become the
model of how every BVI initiative is organized.
The second and concluding thought is that this
process will take time—a lot of time—and will
require the building of systems that are, today, not
in place. The time is necessary because, at its
most basic, building successful BVI initiatives
capable of attracting and rewarding large amounts
of capital is about changing culture—the culture of
traditional financial services groups, NGOs,
foundations and other participating entities
structured to address the needs of either for-profit
or non-profit actors. Conceptually and technically, it
really is not hard to imagine microcredit or
affordable housing or community development
being able to arrange themselves into competitive
value chains. In most cases the leaders of the
various BVI segments have a foot in each world,
the economic and the social. Their employees,
boards and stakeholders expect them to be
mission-oriented yet financially successful. That is
very hard to do and requires that culture change to
accommodate the needed alteration in mission
execution.
But if it will be hard for the operators of BV
endeavours to change culture, imagine how hard it
will be for investors. The dominant culture asserts
that one cannot mix mission with money. Even the
socially motivated investor merely winks at the
notion that a very well-run microfinance institution
can address poverty and earn a respectable return
on investment. They hear the story and see the
pictures but suffer a cognitive dissonance. This
dissonance is, of course, what led the founders of
the microcredit industry to initially approach
philanthropists. 
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A Progression of Investors
Many critiques of microfinance-backed assets
address barriers to the widespread adoption of
those securities by institutional and other
mainstream investors. While emerging blended
value capital market participants must not forget
this investor segment is its long-term goal, it would
be wise to pursue a systematic plan that will bring
these investments ever closer to that mainstream
investor pool by targeting other strategic investors
who can help advance the cause.
Most institutional investors require a defined asset
class (wherein the securities bear a certain
uniformity of structure so that the securities’
behaviour can be better understood if not
predicted). Most mainstream market participants
would assert that most blended value investment
products can not yet be considered legitimate
members of an asset class. In spite of the recent
and effective productization of microfinance bonds,
the issues remain too different, there remain too
few of these securities, and they have existed for
too little time for financial analysts to understand
their aggregate behaviour. 
Furthermore, institutional investors with fiduciary
responsibilities will often not even invest in a new
fund or investment product in the mainstream
capital markets. Typically, professional investors will
avoid fund managers and funds that do not have a
demonstrated multi-year track record of managing
that particular investment with that particular
investment style. They do so because they need to
build the expected performance of any given
investment into sophisticated asset allocation and
portfolio models. As long as such quantitative
models are built on historical performance
information, such investors will need to wait for
years until blended value securities can reach
sufficient scale and can generate several years of
performance data. This condition is a factor of time
and it cannot be accelerated.
Instead, market participants offering blended value
investments can target other investors strategically
(as indeed many already have). Currently, it is a rare
blended value investor who can construct a
reasonably diversified portfolio even of
microfinance-backed investments. To do so,
investors must have sufficient capital (in the tens if
not hundreds of millions of dollars) to dedicate to
such a portfolio, and they must have a dedicated
staff that can research potential deals and can
thoughtfully assemble it. 
Thus far, many of these investors have been
development banks and foundations that have both
the scale of investment and staff to effect it. This
condition leaves high net worth individuals—those
with limited staffing resources and a desire to
deploy capital in the hundreds of thousands to the
low millions of dollars—limited options for blended
value investing. As more and more such investors
express interest, there may be a place for
investment funds that can syndicate high net worth
individuals’ investments and then place those funds
into a well-diversified portfolio of blended value
investments. Such intermediaries could help these
investments get “pulled” closer to mainstream
investments by making them accessible to the next
stage of investor (after the way has been blazed by
development banks and foundations). If these
financial intermediaries build properly diversified
portfolios, they will be able to sustain the
occasional inevitable losses on individual
investments.
When high net worth individuals can buy blended
value investments, they will eventually and
increasingly ask their professional wealth advisers
to incorporate such investments into their overall
portfolios. Those advisers, in turn, will bring a new
set of mainstream capital resources to bear on
these emerging investments as they research and
analyze these new investments. 
Accordingly, blended value market participants
should continue to focus on “socially responsible
investors”, individuals who would purchase blended
value investments first because of their expected
SROI and second because of their expected ROI,
because those investors can help these asset
classes establish a track record and because they
can bring additional resources to bear on the
analysis of such assets. Nevertheless, in doing so,
advisers and investors must diligently focus on the
fundamentals and risks of such investments as
though they were purchased purely for their
expected ROI.
Failing Forward
In any market, particularly an emerging market that
has few precedents, there will be occasional
imbalances of supply and demand. At times prices
will be too high, and at other times they will be too
low. As the markets learn to price risk and digest
market and non-market events, prices will likely
swing; some people will make money, and some
will lose. The blended value capital markets must
anticipate this sort of volatility and must face it
without avoiding it. 
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Market participants should structure their
investments so that market shocks engender
market corrections, not market collapses. Keys to
doing so are diversification (at least in terms of
geography, financial instrument and fund managers)
and conscious risk mitigation. As mentioned
elsewhere in this study, foreign exchange risk
remains largely unmitigated in many international
blended value financing strategies. Drastic currency
devaluations have the potential to destroy returns
and collapse private-investor-supported markets for
international lending unless market participants can
develop facilities to understand and begin to
manage foreign exchange risks. 
Fortunately, a number of such initiatives are under
development. Investment advisers such as Omtrix
and others have been at the forefront of advancing
such foreign exchange hedges where they have not
existed in the past. 
Furthermore, open communication about
investment methodologies, pricing, failures and
equity-holders’ profits will be essential to pricing
these blended value investments correctly. Keeping
the data private introduces the chance that other
funds will erroneously price risk. When substantial
capital enters (or fails to enter) a market based on
mispriced risk, that market is prone to dramatic
failure. Markets cannot accurately price the risk
associated with their securities unless they openly
explore failures as well as successes. 
Investors must also be exceedingly rigorous about
entering and exiting investments. They must be
especially careful to understand how the drive to
create SROI can affect an inclination to enter ill-
advised investments and their decisions to exit (or
not exit) underperforming investments. Investors
must have the fortitude to take losses and cut off
investments that are not obviously salvageable. 
The emerging blended value capital markets simply
cannot afford for participants to be secretive about
their data, ashamed of their failures, or fragmented
in their terminology. 
Conclusion
This paper explores various capital structures that
have successfully been used to finance
microfinance, community development and related
areas. We suggest these blended value investing
practices be extended to other value-generating
projects or sectors. It must be stated that such a
progression will not be easy, swift or painless.
Microfinance has the benefit of over 30 years of
refinement—a three-decade head start on other
blended value investments. Furthermore,
microlending itself has some very appealing
characteristics that are not necessarily shared by
other blended value strategies. The fundamental
economics of microfinance are so strong because
they are built on many loans to many people
diversified across business sectors. Given that
those microentrepreneurs are operating in
predominantly cash-oriented economies, often
times providing essential goods and services, they
are somewhat insulated from macroeconomic
fluctuations. Furthermore, those entrepreneurs can
shift their businesses very quickly, exiting and
entering new business areas as conditions dictate. 
Other potential blended value investment vehicles
may not possess such appealing risk-reward
fundamentals. Accordingly, investors and
intermediaries will need to structure and price
investments such that they account for those
unique risk characteristics. Microfinance’s lessons
cannot be applied wholesale and unthinkingly to
other blended value investment systems.
Nevertheless, the market participants aiming to
bring new capital flows to low-cost housing, small
scale irrigation, and so many other systems can
and should learn from the laborious 30+ year
journey that microfinance and its capital markets
have undertaken. Undoubtedly, much can be
learned from careful research into the major
microfinance innovations that led it from a
philanthropically supported enterprise to one
supportable by mainstream capital. Building upon
the great strides made by those within microfinance
and community banking, sustainable financial
innovations hold the promise of expanding into
countless areas of both social need and market
demand.
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Dramatic Expansion of Services
Over the past decades, MFIs have grown in scale
and travelled around the world, and today many
offer an ever-expanding array of services. In many
cases the infrastructure created to establish and
service microcredit may be leveraged across many
different services and programmes. Grameen Bank,
one of the oldest and most established
microfinance institutions, has dramatically
expanded its services, to the great benefit of the
people whom they serve. Grameen has extended
its technical know-how to offer many additional
services through a loose network of affiliated
companies, which it calls the “Grameen Family of
Enterprises”, which includes education,
telecommunications and textile manufacturing
enterprises (among others). 
Savings and Equity for MFI Customers
As MFI clients become increasingly financially self-
sufficient, many MFIs have encouraged and
facilitated savings and deposit programmes.
Furthermore, some MFIs are now exploring
financing structures that allow clients to purchase
equity in the MFI.
Early microfinance efforts focused only on loans,
and many MFIs handled savings clumsily. Some
people even perceived that the poor might make
viable borrowers who could not be effective savers.
The problem was further compounded by
regulations in many markets where MFIs operated.
Many states regulate financial institutions that can
accept deposits in order to protect savers and
investors and many MFIs began (and many still are)
as not-for-profit or informal entities, which in many
cases precluded them from accepting deposits. 
As MFIs have refined their lending models and
moved toward greater financial sustainability, many
have become formalized and regulated so they can
accept their borrowers’ savings deposits as well.
Accepting and then managing deposits often calls
for the development of a new set of competencies,
but those MFIs that can learn them and institute
savings and deposit programmes offer their clients
vital services while gaining a potential source of
low-cost capital that can be re-lent to other
borrowers.
MFI Networks
Established networks of MFIs spread best practices
and offer technical assistance, increased visibility,
and public validation for established and emerging
MFIs alike. For investors in MFIs, the networks can
begin to establish relationships between holders of
capital and potential investees. MFI networks are
often geographically specific and can give an MFI
investor exposure to specific markets. Services
offered by MFI networks to their constituents vary
widely, especially as they pertain to potential
investors. Some MFI networks seed MFIs in new
markets with capital and expertise, thus creating
themselves as networks, while some generate the
affiliation after the constituent MFIs.
The Formal and Informal Banking Sectors
Converge
As the services offered by MFIs increase and the
institutions’ clients improve their financial status and
require more formal banking products, many MFIs
are moving “up-market”. As the scale of their
financial products increases, the nature of those
products also tends to increase. Existing customers
will establish personal credit records—and more
significant sources of income—permitting MFIs to
offer loans with any source of social collateral. As
the upwardly mobile MFIs provide banking
products that resemble those of a typical consumer
bank in the developed world, their costs tend to fall
as well.
Meanwhile, major local and international banks
have observed the opportunities in microfinance,
with many now moving “down-market” by offering
financial products to people who were previously
“unbanked”. It should be no surprise, then, that
many banks have established partnerships with
MFIs who have developed the expertise and hold
the knowledge required to service the informal
sectors on a financially sustainable basis. 
Adoption of Technology
Technological advances are beginning to reduce
the expense of servicing microloans, which in turn
has the potential to make new lending models
available. Beyond financial management information
systems (MIS), many MFIs are now using
technology developed for established, mainstream
financial service firms.
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Share Mircofin Limited and Smart Cards
In collaboration with Venture Infotek, an Indian
corporation that provides payment transaction
processing solutions to banks and related
businesses, SML has integrated smart-card
processing into is core lending business. The
programme’s pilot issued smart cards that could
track multiple accounts. These cards store the
clients’ personal data along with details about their
loans. Handheld terminals used by SML staff update
the information stored on the cards, print paper
receipts, track changes in the clients’ status, and
store the data, which is ultimately up-loaded to SML’s
central enterprise systems. 
SML summarizes the programme as follows:
The programme is a smart-card-based, integrated payment
solution designed for automated loan tracking with
integrated features like risk management, automatic loan
application scoring, on-the-spot updating of loan records,
on-the-spot repayment, customized MIS reports, automatic
late payment/penalty calculation, zero fraud tolerance, true
“anytime-anywhere” loan reconciliation, identity
management, low cost of entry and easy-to-learn
interface.79
The MFI’s early assessment of the programme
deemed it a success: “The new system has reduced
the time of centre collection by 60-75% and branch
records updating by 80-90%. This would help in a
long way in increasing efficiency of the entire
operations [sic].”80
Hewlett-Packard’s Remote Transaction System
(RTS)
Developed in concert with several MFI networks,
HP’s RTS deploys “a combination of wireless
technologies, smart cards, standards-based
software, commodity PCs and business processes”
to enable MFIs to gain access to rural communities.81
Like the SML pilot, HP’s 2004 pilot project used
smart cards and hand-held readers to increase the
efficiency of processing microloans. HP’s hardware
and software were designed specifically for flexibility,
durability, simplicity and scalability. Lessons learned
include the following:
• Business process improvement is as important as
technology innovation;
• High-level management buy-in and ownership
across the organization are necessary for success;
• Scale at an industry level will require
standardization and shared infrastructure in
addition to competition.82
MFI Standards, Rating and Auditing
Through technological innovation and business process
improvement, the microfinance sector is growing to a
significant scale. As practices are refined, costs fall, and
scale increases, potential investors and practitioners alike
have moved to increase transparency and standardization
of MFI practices and performance, though much work
remains to be done. 
The Microfinance Rating and Assessment Fund
The Microfinance Rating and Assessment Fund was
founded in 2001 by the Inter-American Development Bank
(IDB) and the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor
(CGAP). The Fund co-finances ratings and assessments of
MFIs through independent, professional ratings agencies.
The reports, which the Fund makes publicly available on its
website, assess credit and other risks associated with the
different institutions.83 Information on the Fund’s rating
partners is also available.84
The MIX
The Microfinance Information eXchange (MIX), was founded
in 2002 to disseminate information on the microfinance
markets and ultimately to encourage standardization and
transparency by providing detailed information on MFIs,
their partners and investors.85 MIX has two primary
products, MIX MARKET, a Web-based information clearing
house, and MicroBanking Bulletin (MBB), 86, 87 a source for
microfinance performance benchmarks. Additional lists of
rating agencies may be found at the Global Development
Research Center.88
Other MFI-Specific Ratings Institutions
Within the MFI sector, a number of MFI-rating entities have
arisen. Many of them seem suited primarily for internal
industry use. Drew Tulchin, of Grameen Foundation USA,
writes of these microfinance-specific ratings: “Although
these efforts do increase transparency and standardization,
they also obscure ready analysis by outsiders. Evaluation
tools are increasingly specialized, thus decreasing
comparability with other development or investment
choices.”89 Tulchin continues to observe that many existing
MFI metrics (average loan size, number of clients and
others) do not address the needs and interests of potential
investors.
Despite these drawbacks and while various rating
methodologies seem to abound—some doubtlessly better
than others—on the whole, these rating methodologies and
agencies represent the early steps needed to create
internationally recognized ratings agencies on a par with a
Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s or other mainstream ratings
houses. Such advances will be critical to achieving the level
of transparency required to create a truly liquid capital
market. 
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Compiled by Shari Berenbach of Calvert
Foundation with Jan Piercy of ShoreBank
Alternative Investments: Term used by religious
investors for the last twenty to thirty years to refer
to private investing with social goals. This should
not be confused with the more conventional
finance use of this term which refers to non-liquid
financial instruments and classes such as
commodities, private equity, oil wells, real estate,
etc. 
Blended Value Investing: A term first coined by
Jed Emerson, this approach recognizes that value
is non-divisible and naturally incorporates social,
ethical, environmental or charitable elements. The
concept of blended value has many implications for
both organizations and capital managers. In the
context of this paper, blended value investing
encompasses all classes of investments pursuing
such multiple goals, including socially responsible
investments and private investment for social goals.
See, “The Blended Value Map” by Jed Emerson, et.
al. at www.Blendedvalue.org for additional papers
and materials on corporate social responsibility
(CSR), socially responsible investing (SRI), social
enterprise and sustainable development, and how
each of these arenas fit within a broader, value
maximizing worldview. 
Community Development Venture Capital
(CDVC): Funds that extend early stage equity
financing or quasi-equity investment products into
small enterprises typically owned and operated
within disadvantaged communities. Some US$ 600
million has been invested in diverse funds in the US
and abroad. Many US funds are members of the
Community Development Venture Capital Alliance.
A relatively recent financial strategy to promote
community development, most CDVC funds have
not completed an investment cycle, exited or
distributed returns to their investors.
Community Development Financial Institutions
(CDFIs): A term used for community-based
financial intermediaries with a principal mission to
service low-income populations. CDFIs are certified
by the CDFI Fund, a US Department of Treasury
programme. Some CDFIs are for-profit, regulated
community banks and credit unions, while others
are non-regulated, non-profit loan funds.
Community development venture capital funds also
qualify as CDFIs. 
Community Investment: Term popularized by the
US socially responsible investment industry to refer
to direct investment into community-based
intermediaries with the objective of benefiting
disadvantaged communities. Many community
investment options are relatively low risk, such as
deposits in regulated CDFIs or notes into
community-loan funds. Typically these instruments
provide a less than risk adjusted financial return. In
recent years, community investment has begun to
incorporate higher risk sectors such as community
development corporations, social enterprises and
community development venture capital. Returns
from these newer market segments are less
predictable. Approximately US$ 13 billion has been
channelled to community investment intermediaries
in the US.
Ethical Investments: More commonly used in
Europe and the United Kingdom, ethical investing is
broadly similar to socially responsible investing (see
below). Investors incorporate ethical considerations
into their investment process, rely on "reflexive"
strategies such as screening and shareholder
advocacy, and seek market rates of return. 
Financial Intermediary (FIs): Financial
intermediary or financial institution such as a
finance company, development finance corporation,
commercial bank or other kind of financial
institution providing financial services to small- and
medium-sized enterprises or other sectors. 
Grassroots-based Business Organizations
(GBOs): A term recently popularized by the
International Finance Corporation, GBOs may be
privately-owned small- and medium-sized
enterprises or those owned and operated by non-
profits that involve local production and/or
marketing and distribution channels. GBOs typically
combine profitability objectives with private sector
strategies that benefit local small producers. 
Microfinance Institutions (MFIs): Typically
associated with local financial intermediaries in
developing or transitional economies, MFIs provide
very small loans to informal sector
microenterprises. Microfinance institutions may be
non-governmental organizations, specialized
regulated financial intermediaries or full commercial
banks and some provide financial services to small
businesses in addition to microenterprises. In most
instances MFIs connote a distinct stand-alone
financial intermediary, but in other instances they
may be a department of a larger commercial bank
or development programme.
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Programme Related Investments (PRIs): A term
defined by the US tax authorities, PRIs are
investments made by a philanthropic institution with
the primary objective of furthering its mission. Most
programme related investments are structured as
below-market loans or long-term equity
investments into development finance
intermediaries or non-profit social enterprises. 
Private Investment with Social Goals: A term
coined for this meeting, this refers to investment of
capital to promote a specific social or
environmental agenda. Private Investments with
Social Goals includes blended value investing that
incorporates financial instruments offering both
market rates and below-market rates. Different
from socially responsible investment that reflects
investor values, these investments promote social
impact. 
Shareholder Advocacy: A common strategy
among socially responsible investors, this entails
proposing shareholder resolutions and/or proxy
voting in order to influence corporate policies in
favour of social objectives. 
SMEs: Small- and medium-sized enterprises
typically served by local commercial banks in
developing or transitional economies. Some MFIs
have gone up-market to reach SMEs and some
financial intermediaries that historically serviced
SMEs are now downscaling into the MFI market. 
Social Enterprise: Social enterprise typically refers
to non-profits or non-profit-owned subsidiaries that
incorporate commercial discipline within their
operations and seek to generate a surplus (e.g.,
profit) that is returned to the non-profit owner to
support its mission.
Socially Responsible Investing: Socially
responsible investing is the broad term used to
describe investments that reflect investors' moral
and ethical beliefs. SRI instruments are typically
publicly traded funds that return to investors
market-rate, risk-adjusted financial returns and are
exemplified by socially responsible mutual funds
such as Calvert, Domini, Pax World Fund, among
others. Socially responsible investing usually
incorporates screening of investment companies
and shareholder activism through proxy voting. SRI
investment strategies in the US represent more
than US$ 2 trillion or approximately one in eight
dollars invested. The Social Investment Forum in
the US recommends that all SRI Investors also
engage in community investment – (see
Community Investment).
Social and Environmental Screening: Negative
screening entails the practice of screening out of
investment portfolios financial instruments issued
by companies with deleterious social and
environmental impacts. Positive screening involves
selecting for inclusion in portfolios instruments
issued by companies with business practices that
result in positive social and environmental impacts.
Screening is typically associated with socially
responsible investment. 
Social Venture Capital: This refers to venture
capital that seeks to attain social and/or
environmental value as well as financial return,
incorporating early "angel investors" as well as
more conventional stage venture capital. The types
of social objectives pursued range from
environmental, alternative lifestyle, healthy
products, etc. Most social venture capital funds
seek competitive market returns and do not
explicitly strive for poverty alleviation or social
justice goals associated with community
development venture capital (see above.) The US-
based Investors' Circle is a well-known association
of professionals engaged in social venture capital. 
Triple Bottom Line Investing: Triple bottom line
investing returns to investments that seek to
generate social, environmental and financial
returns. Triple bottom line investing is closely
associated with "reflective" investment strategies
associated with socially responsible investing. 
Venture Philanthropy: This form of grant-making
is distinguished by the high level of involvement by
the donor and larger, longer-term grant-making
associated with performance goals. Venture
philanthropy may entail support of social
enterprises owned by non-profits and/or other
more conventional non-profit activities. Although
financial terminology may be used by grant-makers
to underscore a business-like approach, venture
philanthropy should not be confused with
community investment. Funding is provided on a
grants basis; there is no expected financial return. 
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1 Excellent resources that explore the current state of
the microfinance sector include the International Year
of Microcredit website,
http://www.yearofmicrocredit.org, the Microfinance
Gateway, http://www.microfinancegateway.org, and
the Microfinance Information eXchange,
http://www.themix.org. 
2 Meehan, Jennifer. “Tapping Financial Markets for
Microfinance”. Grameen Foundation USA (GFUSA).
2004. This report presents a comprehensive
assessment of microfinance institution access to
capital markets, including a discussion of the
obstacles to the practice. This and other publications
can be downloaded from GFUSA’s website:
http://www.gfusa.org/newsroom/books_and_publicati
ons. 
3 Ibid.
4 This section draws significantly on conversations with
Maria Otero, CEO of ACCION International, and
Elisabeth Rhyne, Senior Vice-President of ACCION.
5 This section and the one that follows it summarize
information presented in: Lopez, Cesar. “Microfinance
Approaches the Bond Market: The Cases of Mibanco
and Compartamos”. Small Enterprise Development
Journal. Vol. 16, No. 1. March 2005.
6 A basis point is 1/100 of 1%. The measure is typically
used in reference to bond yields.
7 Meehan, Jennifer. “Tapping Financial Markets for
Microfinance”. Grameen Foundation USA (GFUSA).
2004. pp. 9-10.
8 Ibid, p. 12.
9 This case study draws significantly on conversations
with Gary Mulhair at Global Partnerships and with
Roger Frank, Peter Johnson and Simone Lee at
Developing World Markets.
10 Global Partnerships.
http://www.globalpartnerships.org. December 2005.
11 Investment advisers and sponsors were engaged in
the private placement of this particular deal when this
paper entered editing; accordingly, the advisers have
asked that the fund not be identified here.
12 The authors gratefully acknowledge Jonathan Lewis of
MicroCredit Enterprises who articulated this point in
interviews cited later in the document.
13 One must not assume that a lack of financial return to
capital market investors necessarily indicates wasteful
or inefficient microfinance administration. While indeed
inefficiency may destroy the potential returns, there
may also be legitimate social value creation strategies
that are not compatible with generating returns to
investors. More data and transparency about MFI
operations are required for investors to develop a
deeper and more nuanced understanding of how
administration costs and social value creation in
various circumstances can influence financial returns. 
14 This case study draws significantly on conversations
with Harlan Mandel, Deputy Managing Director of
Media Development Loan Fund, and with Shari
Berenbach, Executive Director of Calvert Social
Investment Foundation.
15 Reprinted from the Calvert Foundation case study.
16 For additional details, please see
http://www.time.com/time/europe/magazine/article/0,1
3005,901041227-1009841,00.html and
http://www.mdlf.org/look/mdlf/article.tpl?IdLanguage=
1&IdPublication=20&NrIssue=1&NrSection=70&NrArtic
le=793. 
17 Depository Trust Company. “About DTC.”
https://login.dtcc.com/dtcorg/home/page18832.html.
December 2005.
18 More information on the Latin American Bridge Fund
and is successor, the Global Bridge Fund, can be
found in ACCION’s periodic publication InSight.
Number 15, published in September 2005, is devoted
to those funds and the concepts of loan guarantees. It
can be downloaded at http://www.accion.org/insight/.
19 Ragin Jr, Luther. Presentation at Stanford University
Graduate School of Business. 25 October 2005. 
20 This case study draws significantly on conversations
with Cedric de Beer, Managing Director of Nurcha,
and with Stewart Paperin, Executive Vice-President of
the Open Society Foundation.
21 Founded in 1996, the resulting programme is called
the National Housing Financing Corporation. Wholly
owned by the South African government, this
financing intermediary facilitates mortgage lending to
low and moderate income families.
22 The Open Society Institute’s Mission: “The Open
Society Institute (OSI), a private operating and grant-
making foundation, aims to shape public policy to
promote democratic governance, human rights, and
economic, legal, and social reform. On a local level,
OSI implements a range of initiatives to support the
rule of law, education, public health and independent
media. At the same time, OSI works to build alliances
across borders and continents on issues such as
combating corruption and rights abuses.” More
information on OSI can be found at
http://www.soros.org. 
23 Nurcha. Annual Review, 2004. Available at
www.nurcha.co.za. 
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Proposal for Consideration.” Unpublished
presentation. December 2004.
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with Asad Mahmood, Director of the Community
Development Group at Deutsche Bank, and on
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with Jonathan Lewis, CEO of MicroCredit Enterprises,
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the New York office of Goodwin Procter LLP. 
27 MicroCredit Enterprises. Comprehensive Informational
Memorandum. Edition No. 4, September 2005.
28 Such as Freedom from Hunger, Grameen, ACCION,
Pro Mujer, and Unitus.
29 This case study draws significantly on conversations
with Camilla Nestor, Growth Guarantees Manager at
Grameen Foundation USA.
30 Citibank, it should be noted, has made significant
public commitments to microfinance. Coverage in the
business press includes mention in “The Hidden
Wealth of the Poor: A Survey of Microfinance”. The
Economist. 5 November 2005.
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with Alex Silva, President of Omtrix SA and CEO of
ProFund.
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